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ABSTRACT
This dissertation defends the view that there is a Rousseauvian interpretation of Rawls’s political
philosophy by focusing on the significance of amour-propre in Rawls’s political philosophy. In
the first chapter, I introduce my central thesis and chapter arrangements and compare my
Rousseauvian interpretation with other interpretations of Rawls. In the second chapter, I
introduce Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre and try to defend Rawls’s wide view of amourpropre, according to which, amour-propre has both a positive and a negative form. In the third
chapter, I argue that Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre plays a significant role in Rawls’s
conception of justice as fairness. Thus, I show that one of the main reasons why parties in the
original position would choose Rawls’s two principles of justice over other conceptions of
justice is that justice as fairness meets the demands of amour-propre while other conceptions of
justice do not. In the fourth chapter, I argue that Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre plays a
significant role in Rawls’s stability argument. This argument has three parts. The first part
involves showing that Rawls’s moral psychology is an illustration of Rousseau’s thesis that
moral sentiments are derived from natural sentiments. The second part argues that Rawls’s
congruence argument and his overlapping consensus argument are based on Rousseau’s
conception of persons. The third part argues that Rawls’s argument from the absence of special
psychology is also grounded in Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre. In the fifth chapter, I argue
that Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre plays a significant role in Rawls’s law of peoples by
showing that three themes of Rawls’s law of peoples, the two international original positions, the
idea of a realistic utopia and the distinction between peoples and states, parallel, and are
grounded in, Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre. In the final chapter, I consider two objections
against my assumption that the legitimate social bases of self-respect are equal basic rights and
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liberties and their substantive fair value. I argue that these objections are groundless. I thus
conclude that there is a Rousseauvian interpretation of Rawls’s justice as fairness and law of
peoples.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
1.   The Central Thesis of This Dissertation and The Aim of This Chapter
The central thesis of my dissertation is that there is a Rousseauvian interpretation of Rawls’s
political philosophy. I will defend this thesis by focusing on the significance of Rousseau’s
concept of amour-propre in Rawls’s justice as fairness, stability argument and the law of peoples
in the following chapters.
This chapter aims to provide the general picture of my interpretation of Rawls and compare it
with other interpretations of Rawls. I will first introduce the Kantian interpretation of Rawls. I
then consider two difficulties facing the Kantian interpretation. The first difficulty is that the
Kantian interpretation fails to explain why for Rawls acting from the two principles of justice is
acting autonomously. I argue that this difficulty can be resolved by my Rousseauvian
interpretation because Rawls’s justice as fairness is grounded in Rousseau’s (and so also Kant’s)
idea of autonomy. The second difficulty is that the Kantian interpretation fails to emphasize the
importance of stability in Rawls. I argue that this difficulty can also be resolved by my
Rousseauvian interpretation because Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre (correctly interpreted
by Kant) plays a significant role in Rawlsian stability. Next, I will briefly introduce several
themes of the Rousseauvian interpretation of Rawls. I argue that some difficulties facing these
themes can be resolved by my Rousseauvian interpretation. First, I argue that Freeman’s
Rousseauvian interpretation does not explain how a person who is self-interested is capable of
the sense of justice for both Rousseau and Rawls. I argue that my interpretation explains this
difficulty — for both Rousseau and Rawls, the moral sentiments of the sense of justice is
originated from the natural sentiments of self-love or self-respect. Second, I argue that
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Bercuson’s Rousseauvian interpretation mainly focuses on the common aspects of the Hegelian
and the Rousseauvian interpretations of Rawls, and it fails to emphasize the importance of
amour-propre in Rawls’s early and later works. My interpretation addresses this difficulty
because it focuses on the significance of amour-propre in Rawls. Third, I argue that Neuhouser’s
Rousseuvian interpretation does not provide an adequate explanation for why Rousseau’s idea of
the general will parallels Rawls’s idea of public reason. I argue that my interpretation explains
away this difficulty because amour-propre plays a significant role in both the formation of the
general will and that of public reason.

2.   The Kantian Interpretation and Its Shortcomings1
In this section, I will first introduce Rawls’s Kantian interpretation of justice as fairness.
Next, I will introduce the objections against the Kantian interpretation. After introducing these
thoughts, I will examine the existing defenses of the Kantian interpretation. I argue that these
defenses fail to explain why for Rawls acting from the two principles of justice is acting
autonomously. I argue that my Rousseauvian interpretation provides such an explanation.
Finally, I consider the objection that the Kantian interpretation fails to emphasize the importance
of stability in Rawls. I argue that my Rousseauvian interpretation, which focuses on Rousseau’s
concept of amour-propre, plays a significant role in Rawlsian stability.

1

There are other interpretations of Rawls, such as Andres De Francisco (2006) who puts forward a republican
interpretation of Rawls’s political liberalism and Jeffrey Bercuson (2014) who advances a Hegelian interpretation of
Rawls’s justice as fairness. Francisco’s interpretation focuses on the importance of citizenship in Rawls’s political
philosophy. He interprets Rawls’s reasonableness as civic virtue which underlies the stability of the well-ordered
society. Since he appeals to Rousseau’s idea of the general will and his idea of political liberty in support of his
interpretation, his republican interpretation and my interpretation are mutually supportive. Bercuson argues that
Rawls is indebted to Hegel’s concept of reconciliation, in particular, Hegel’s claim that our human nature is
reconcilable to a legitimate and stable political institution. As we will see later, Rawls is also indebted to Rousseau
in the same way. I argue that Bercuson’s interpretation mainly focuses on the common aspects of the Hegelian and
the Rousseauvian interpretations of Rawls and so it fails to emphasize the importance of amour-propre in Rawls.

2

2.1 The Kantian Interpretation of Rawls
The Kantian interpretation is first endorsed by Rawls himself in A Theory of Justice, and
latter supported by others such as Stephen Darwall (1976; 1980), Bernard H. Baumrin (1976),
Paul Guyer (2000), Nicholas Tampio (2007), and Robert Taylor (2003; 2011).2 Rawls himself
titiles Section 40 of A Theory of Justice, “The Kantian Interpretation of Justice as Fairness.”
Rawls argues that his interpretation is based on Kant’s notion of autonomy. He writes:
For one thing, he [Kant] begins with the idea that moral principles are the object
of rational choice. They define the moral law that men can rationally will to
govern their conduct in an ethical commonwealth. Moral philosophy becomes the
study of the conception and outcome of a suitably defined rational decision. This
idea has immediate consequences. For once we think of moral principles as
legislation for a kingdom of ends, it is clear that these principles must not only be
acceptable to all but public at well. Finally Kant supposes that this moral
legislation is to be agreed to under conditions that characterize men as free and
equal rational beings. The description of the original position is an attempt to
interpret this conception. (TJ 221)
In his original position argument, Rawls argues that parties that are free and equal rational beings
under the veil of ignorance would choose the principles of justice over other conceptions of
justice. Now Rawls argues that the premises of this argument parallel Kant’s idea of the social

2

Paul Guyer’s Kantian interpretation of Rawls, differs from the interpretation others in that it focuses on Kant’s
political philosophy, especially his conception of right. He argues that “Rawls’s two principles of justice are the
necessary reconstruction of Kant’s own conception of right” (Guyer, 2000, p.285). Nicholas Tampio (2007) also has
a different Kantian interpretation of Rawls, he argues that Rawls’s political liberalism is indebted to Kant’s idea of
autonomy and that Rawls’s idea of public reason parallels Kant’s idea of public reason in “What is Enlightenment?”
Richard W. Miller (2012) also has a different Kantian interpretation of Rawls. He argues that Rawls’s law of
peoples “was modeled on Kant’s claim that international justice consists of terms of confederation suitable to free
peoples, terms largely concerned with the keeping of peace” (p.297).
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contract and his idea of moral persons. First, Rawls argues that he and Kant share a contractarian
assumption that moral principles must be public and acceptable for all. Second, he argues that
they agree that a moral theory must characterize moral agents as free and equal rational beings.
In particular, he argues that his idea of autonomy parallels Kant’s idea of autonomy:
Kant held, I believe that a person is acting autonomously when the principles of
his action are chosen by him as the most adequate possible expression of his
nature as a free and equal rational being……Now the veil of ignorance deprives
the persons in the original position of the knowledge that would enable them to
choose heteronomous principles. (TJ 222)
Here Rawls argues that the veil of ignorance ensures that the principles of justice chosen
in the original position are not heteronomous, and so citizens who act on, and from, the
principles of justice are not heteronomous. In other words, the people who are represented by
parties in the original position are autonomous because they act on and from the principles of
justice. Rawls continues:
The principles of justice are also analogous to categorical imperatives. For by a
categorical imperative Kant understands a principle of conduct that applies to a
person in virtue of his nature as a free and equal rational being. The validity of the
principle does not presuppose that one has a particular desire or aim. Whereas a
hypothetical imperative by contrast does assume this: it directs us to take certain
steps as effective means to achieve a special end…The argument for the two
principles of justice does not assume that the parties have particular ends, but only
that they desire certain primary goods. These are things that it is rational to want
whatever else one wants. (TJ 223)

4

Rawls argues that since the principles of justice are chosen by free and equal rational
agents who do not have particular ends, these principles are categorical. He assumes that parties
in the original position are rational, that is, they desire certain primary goods. He argues that
moral agents are not heteronomous simply because they desire certain primary goods; for the
preference for primary goods is derived “from only the most general assumption about
rationality and the conditions of human life” (TJ 223).
To sum up, Rawls argues that there is a Kantian interpretation of justice as fairness for
three reasons. First, he and Kant share a conception of autonomy. A person is autonomous if he
or she acts on the principles of justice chosen in the original position by free and equal rational
beings. Second, his principles of justice parallel Kant’s categorical imperative. Since the
principles of justice are chosen by free and equal rational beings in the original position, they are
not hypothetical. The principles of justice express the free and equal rational nature of the parties
in the original position, and so they do not presuppose a special end or a particular desire. Third,
he and Kant share a conception of rationality. Rationality is not instrumental in the sense that it is
not purely used to pursue a particular desire or a special end. Rather, it is used to pursue the
common interests.

2.2 The Objections Against the Kantian Interpretation
Many commentators either argue that Rawls misunderstands Kant, or argue that some
aspects of Rawls’s justice as fairness are not Kantian.3 Some of these commentators argue that

3

See, for example, Oliver Johnson (1974), Andrew Levine (1974), Allan Bloom (1974), H. E. Mason (1976),
Agneta Sutton (1979), Thomas Pogge (1981), Michael Sandel (1997), Bonnie Honig (1993), Onora O’Neill (1989),
Larry Krasnoff (1999), Frederick Neuhouser (2008) and Jeffrey Bercuson (2014).
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the individuals in Rawls’s original position are not Kant’s noumenal self.4 Others argue that
since political and social institutions play a significant role in shaping the moral character of the
individuals in Rawls’s well-ordered society of justice as fairness, these individuals are
heteronomous for Kant.5 Some of these commentators suggest that had Rawls interpreted Kant
correctly, he would have found that his overall project in A Theory of Justice is inconsistent with
Kant’s notion of autonomy.6 Most of them agree that Rawls is mistaken in believing that he and
Kant share the common ideas of autonomy, categorical imperative and rationality.7
First, Rawls’s critics argue that Rawls and Kant do not share a common idea of
autonomy.8 They argue that, for Kant if a person is autonomous, the motive for his action can
only be respect for the moral law. And so if wants and inclinations play any role in motivating a
moral agent, that moral agent is not autonomous. They argue that Rawls seems to be using
autonomy in a quite different way: for Rawls, a person is autonomous even though that person is
motivated by the desire to promote his own interest. Thus, they argue that there is no parallel
relation between Rawls’s and Kant’s ideas of autonomy.
Second, Rawls’s critics argue that Rawls’s principles of justice are not analogous to
Kant’s categorical imperative. On the one hand, they argue that Rawls’s principles of justice,
chosen by free and equal rational agents, are not categorical imperatives.9 On the other hand,

4

For example, see Andrew Levine (1974, p.57), Michael Sandel (1997, p.13), and Frederick Neuhouser (2008,
p.258).
5
See Jeffrey Bercuson (2014, pp.11-2).
6
For example, see H. E Mason (1976, p.52-4).
7
See Oliver Johnson (1974;1977), Andrew Levine (1974), Allan Bloom (1974), H. E. Mason (1976), Agneta Sutton
(1979), and Thomas Pogge (1981).
8
See Oliver Johnson (1974, pp.60-2;1977, p.251), Andrew Levine (1974, pp.48-54), Allan Bloom (1974, p.656), H.
E. Mason (1976, p.50), Agneta Sutton (1979, p.138), Thomas Pogge (1981, pp.48-9) and Jeffrey Bercuson (2014,
pp.11-2).
9
See Oliver Johnson (1974, pp.62-3), Andrew Levine (1974, pp.54-5), Allan Bloom (1974, pp.256-7), H. E. Mason
(1976, p.50), Agneta Sutton (1979, p.138), and Thomas Pogge (1981, pp.47-8).
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they argue that Kant’s categorical imperative procedure is a procedure made by actual
individuals in the world to produce possible agreement to serve as a negative check on the
maxims that individuals bring about and that it is not, as Rawls argues, a procedure made by
hypothetical individuals to produce hypothetical agreement to produce moral principles.10 Thus,
they argue that there is no parallel between Rawls’s principles of justice and Kant’s idea of the
categorical imperative and between Rawls’s original position procedure with Kant’s categorical
imperative procedure.
Third, Rawls’s critics argue that Rawls and Kant do not share the same idea of
rationality.11 They argue that the parties in Rawls’s original position are assumed to be only
capable of means-ends reasoning. However, for Kant, the “true vocation of reason” is “to
produce a will that is good, not perhaps as a means to other purposes, but good in itself, for
which reason was absolutely necessary” (Kant, 1996, p.52). Thus they argue that Rawls’s idea of
rationality in the original position does not parallel Kant’s idea of reason.

2.3 The Existing Defenses of Rawls’s Kantian Interpretation
Other commentators try to defend Rawls’s interpretation of Kant.12 First, some of these
commentators argue that Rawls’s interpretation of Kant’s notion of autonomy is not mistaken.13
They argue that for Kant, autonomy is to act on the law that one gives to oneself. Rawls’s two

10

See Onora O’Neill (1989, p.217) and Larry Krasnoff (1999, p.400-1).
See Oliver Johnson (1974, pp.63-6), Allan Bloom (1974, p.256), H. E. Mason (1976, p.50), Agneta Sutton (1979,
p.136), and Thomas Pogge (1981, p.48).
12
See, for example, Stephan Darwall (1976; 1980), Bernard H. Baumrin (1976), Paul Guyer (2000) and Robert
Taylor (2003; 2011), Nicholas Tampio (2007) and Alexander Kaufman (2012).
13
See Stephen Darwall (1976, pp.166-7), Bernard H. Baumrin (1976, p.56).
11
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principles of justice are chosen in the original position by all free and equal rational beings. And
so to act on and from the principles of justice is to act autonomously.
Second, some of these commentators argue that Rawls’s principles of justice parallel
Kant’s categorical imperative.14 Darwall (1976, p.167) argues that since the principles of justice
are chosen in the original position by all free and equal rational beings, they are practical laws
that require that “one be capable of regarding it as a principle which could be willed by all other
rational beings also.” Guyer (2000) argues that since primary goods are necessary for any
rational ends, they are “means that are recommended by pure reason itself” (p.271). Taylor
(2011) argues that social primary goods are not merely an instrument for the realization of our
rational ends, but also necessary for the exercise and development of our two moral powers (cf.
p.37).
Finally, some of these commentators argue that Rawls’s idea of rationality is close to
Kant’s idea of reason. For example, Darwall (1976, p.168) argues that rational agency itself
requires the possession of the primary goods. Baumrin (1976, p.57) argues that “In the original
position prudence for me is prudence for humanity, and prudence for humanity is just the same
as legislating for a kingdom of ends.” Taylor argues that Rawls’s idea that individuals possess
the capability to form, revise and pursue their own conception of the good, is close to Kant’s idea
of prudential reasoning. (cf. Taylor, 2011, p.25).
But Rawls’s critics might argue that Rawls’s Kantian interpretation cannot be defended
because it is simply not Kant’s view that an autonomous person is merely a person who acts
from a self-legislating law. They might argue that acting from a self-legislating law is only a

14

Even though Kaufman (2012, p.13) argues for a Kantian interpretation of Rawls’s justice as fairness, he does not
argue for the parallel relation between Rawls’s original position and Kant’s categorical imperative procedure, but for
the parallel relation between Rawls’s original position and Kant’s social contract theory.
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necessary condition, but not a sufficient condition for autonomy. For example, Oliver Johnson
(1977) says:
Suppose an individual adopted the following rule of action for himself: Act
always in such a way as to keep your reputation. In fulfillment of this rule he
always tells the truth and never lies. According to Baumrin’s [and Rawls’s]
interpretation of Kant’s notion of autonomy, the individual in question would be
acting autonomously, for his action would be pursuant to a rule, hence in
accordance with law, and his rule would be self-legislated. He would be fully
responsible for his acts, for they would be done in fulfillment of a self-imposed
rule. Yet, if we look at Kant, we find him using the same illustration as I have —
but as a case of heteronomous action. (Oliver Johnson, 1977, p.278)
Kant does say that hypothetical imperatives take the form that “I should do something
because I will something else” and that the categorical imperatives take the form that “I ought to
act in such or such a way even though I have not willed anything else” (Kant, 1996, p.89). And
he says that “the former [the hypothetical] says that I ought not to lie if I will to keep my
reputation” (ibid). But it seems to me that for Kant acting from a self-legislating law is both
necessary and sufficient for autonomy because Kant did not think the person who always tells
the truth in order to keep his reputation is acting from a self-legislating law. As Kant says:
If the will seeks the law that is to determine it anywhere else than in the fitness of
its maxims for its own giving of universal law — consequently if, in going
beyond itself, it seeks this law in a property of any of its objects — heteronomy
always results. The will in that case does not give itself the law; instead the
object, by means of its relation to the will, gives the law to it. This relation,

9

whether it rests upon inclination or upon representations of reason, lets only
hypothetical imperatives become possible: I ought to do something because I will
something else. (ibid.)
While Kant suggests that acting from the law one gives oneself is acting autonomously,
He also seems to suggests that a person who is motivated by his self-interest is not acting
autonomously; for he is not acting from pure practical reason alone. And so for Kant, it seems
that acting from the two principles of justice which are chosen in the original position by free
and equal rational agents is not acting autonomously; for the two principles of justice are not
chosen by pure practical reason alone. Rather they are chosen by the parties who are not
reasonable in the original position. While the parties represent reasonable citizens in the wellordered society of justice as fairness, they are not reasonable themselves. The parties are
assumed to be free and equal rational beings. They would choose the two principles of justice in
the original position not because these principles express their nature as reasonable but because
these principles express their nature as free and equal rational beings. In other words, the two
principles of justice are chosen because they express their self-love nature. But Kant insists in a
number of places that the principle of self-love cannot be willed as a universal law (cf. ibid.,
p.44; p.70; pp.158-60).15 For example, he says:
But suppose that finite rational beings were thoroughly agreed with respect to
what they had to take as objects of their feelings of pleasure and pain and even
with respect to the means they must use to obtain the first and avoid the other;
even then they could by no means pass off the principle of self-love as a practical
law; for, this unanimity itself would still be only contingent. (ibid.,
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This is pointed out by Kerstin Budde (2007, p.350).
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p.159-60)
Kant thus has explicitly said that the principle of self-love cannot be a practical law despite the
fact that it is thoroughly agreed by finite rational beings. Even though it is true that every person
desires pleasure and tries to avoid pain, this maxim cannot be willed as a universal practical law
because it has a subjective determining ground, an empirical foundation. He says: “The
determining ground would still be only subjectively valid and merely empirical and would not
have that necessity which is thought in every law, namely objective necessity from a priori
grounds” (ibid., p.160). Since the desire for the primary goods also has an empirical foundation,
it does not have the “objective necessity from a priori grounds”. Thus, it is clear that for Kant
acting from the two principles of justice is not acting from pure practical reason alone, but from
empirical practical reason. And so it is puzzling why for Rawls acting from the two principles of
justice is acting autonomously in the Kantian sense.
Rawls himself says in A Theory of Justice that he does “not wish to argue here for this
interpretation on the basis of Kant’s text” (TJ 221). He later says in his Lecture that “in
presenting Kant’s moral philosophy, I have played down the role of the a priori and the formal”
(LHMP 275). He also criticizes Kant’s categorical imperative procedure because Kant’s
reasoning rejects any maxim of mutual aid (LHMP 172-3).16 He acknowledges that his Kantian
interpretation makes two revisions to Kant’s ethical theory. The first revision is to “give more
content to the will of ideal agents in deciding whether they can will an adjusted social world”
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Rawls argues that the duty of mutual aid cannot be willed as a universal law for Kant because it requires us to help
others in circumstances in which we may not want to help. Kerstin Budde (2007, p.346) argues that Rawls’s reading
of Kant’s CI-procedure is superficial and misleading. He argues that the maxim of mutual aid cannot be willed as a
universal law only when the maxim is expressed from self-love. He argues that since a possible maxim of mutual aid
can be expressed as “If I see someone in need and I can help, I will, because I will to treat human beings as ends in
themselves,” it contains no contradiction of the will. Budde fails to see that for Rawls (and for Rousseau) self-love is
compatible with the maxim of mutual aid and so it is puzzling for him why Rawls insists the maxim of mutual aid
must be expressed from self-love.
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(LHMP 173). This content is the true human needs (or the desires for social primary goods). The
second revision is “to specify further the point of view from which these decisions about social
worlds are made” (LHMP 173). But one may wonder to what extent Rawls’s Kantian
interpretation, which makes these revisions, is still Kantian. For example, Budde (2007) argues
that Rawls is not a Kantian but that he gives a Rawlsian interpretation to Kant. He argues that
Rawls’s interpretation of Kant, which emphasizes the role of true human needs but neglects the
role of a priori and the formal, has deviated from “the very essence of the natural of [Kant’s]
moral theory” (p.354). He argues:
Rawls’s rejection of the capacity of pure reason alone to ground moral principles
through a priori and formal reasoning pushes him to an attempt to derive objective
moral principles partly through empirical reasoning. Well aware that, as such,
empirical reasoning is based on desires which are different for each person, Rawls
tries to argue for universal human needs, the ‘rational wanting’ of which can then
explain the force and authority of moral principles. However, this justification
remains conditional: the moral principles hold as long as one desires the true
human needs that the principles guarantee. (ibid.)
I agree with Buddle that Rawls rejects Kant’s idea of pure practical reason that Rawls’s Kantian
interpretation has an empirical foundation, universal human needs, which appear to be absent in
Kant’s practical reasoning. But I think Buddle is mistaken to say that Rawls’s interpretation of
Kant has deviated the essence of the nature of Kant’s ethics. As we will see, Rawls’s
interpretation of Kant can be understood from a Rousseauvian perspective.
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2.4 Understanding Rawls’s Kantian Interpretation from a Rousseauvian Perspective
As Rawls acknowledges, his Kantian interpretation is not strictly based on Kant’s text.
As we have seen, it is not clear why Rawls’s justice as fairness is grounded in Kant’s idea of
autonomy. In particular, it is not clear why for Rawls acting from Rawls’s two principles of
justice is acting autonomously in the Kantian sense. Rawls’s proponents fail to give us a
persuasive response to the objections against the Kantian interpretation. I think that the key to
understanding Rawls’s Kantian interpretation is to see it from a Rousseauvian perspective. As
Rawls writes:
Those who think of Kant’s moral doctrine as one of law and guilt badly
misunderstand him. Kant’s main aim is to deepen and to justify Rousseau’s idea
that liberty is acting in accordance with a law that we give to ourselves. And this
leads not to a morality of austere command but to an ethic of mutual respect and
self-esteem. (TJ 225)
Rawls explicitly says here that his idea of autonomy is both Kantian and Rousseauvian. For
Rawls, both Kant and Rousseau maintain that autonomy is acting from the law one gives oneself.
Thus, to understand why Rawls insists that acting from the two principles of justice is acting
autonomously, we need to see Rawls’s Kantian interpretation from a Rousseauvian perspective.
Rousseau says that by subjecting oneself to the general will (the law), one is more free than one
was in the state of nature because in the state of nature one was driven by appetites, but in the
civil state, one’s appetites are restrained by reason (SC 53). Rawls’s original position argument is
grounded in Rousseau’s idea of autonomy. Rawls assumes that parties in the original position are
free and equal rational beings. This assumption about individuals in the original position
parallels Rousseau’s assumption about individuals in the state of nature. Rawls claims that acting
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from the two principles of justice chosen in the original position by free and equal rational beings
is acting autonomously. This claim also parallels Rousseau’s view that subjecting oneself to the
general will (the law) makes one more free than one was in the state of nature. The reason why
Rawls thinks that the two principles of justice are categorical, despite the fact that they are
chosen by rational agents who all desire the social primary goods, is that these primary goods are
not a particular person’s private interest but the common interest of all. Rousseau distinguishes
the will of all from the general will: “the latter looks only to the common interest, the former
looks to private interest, and is nothing but a sum of particular wills” (SC 60). Thus, the general
will is not the will deprived of all personal interest, but the will deprived of all private interest.
Since Rawls’s rational agents are assumed to have only the common interest of exercising and
developing their two moral powers, they are deprived of all private interest. And so these rational
agents are not heteronomous in the Rousseauvian sense. Thus, if, as Rawls suggests, Kant’s main
aim is to deepen and justify Rousseau’s idea of autonomy, Rawls’s rational agents are not
heteronomous for Kant. It also follows that from a Rousseauvian Kantian perspective, acting
from Rawls’s two principles of justice is acting autonomously. Thus, it seems to me, that the
reason why Rawls thinks that there is a Kantian interpretation of his justice as fairness is that he
reads Kant in a Rousseauvian way. As Rawls writes in his Lecture: “it was not until I connected
the Second Discourse with Kant’s remarks here that I felt I finally understood what either of
them was saying” (LHPP 200). Kant’s interpretation of Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre is
endorsed by Rawls. Based on this interpretation, Rawls supposes that it is in a Kantian spirit to
include self-love in practical reasoning. He assumes that Kant appreciates Rousseau’s concept of
amour-propre, especially the reciprocal feature of amour-propre, according to which, a person
who has a proper sense of amour-propre is ready to grant equal standing to others. Thus, even
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though the parties in the original position are assumed to be rational, not reasonable, since they
would choose the principles of justice that are publically acceptable for others, the two principles
of justice are reasonable. Thus, from a Rousseauvian Kantian perspective, acting from the two
principles of justice are acting autonomously.
It is sometimes argued that the Kantian interpretation of Rawls fails to emphasize the
importance of stability. For example, Jon Garthoff (2013) argues that Taylor’s Kantian
interpretation “fails to appreciate how deeply this orientation [stability] figures in Rawls’
thinking” (p.285). He argues that Taylor’s failure to appreciate the importance of stability in
Rawls leads him to accuse Rawls of making a number of mistakes that Rawls isn’t committed to.
Jeffrey Bercuson (2014) also argues that Rawlsian stability is not Kantian.17 He writes: “Rawls is
unconvinced by the supposed natural immediacy of the moral law, and when Rawls himself
acknowledges the socializing or pedagogical function of group practices values and (most
importantly) institutions, he sees this as turning away from Kant” (Bercuson, 2014, p.12).
The importance of stability in Rawls’s works has been emphasized by many. For example,
Jon Garthoff (2016) emphasizes the importance of stability in Rawls’s justice as fairness.18 He
argues that one of the main reasons why justice as fairness is more defensible than other
conceptions of justice is that justice as fairness is more stable than others. He further argues that
the criterion of publicity and that of reciprocity are constituents of stability, and that since justice
as fairness meets these two criteria, justice as fairness is more stable than other conceptions of
justice.

17
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See Todd Hedrick (2015, p.296).
Also see Freeman (2003; 2007) and Hill (2014).
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Paul Weithman (2010) argues that the reason why Rawls turned from A Theory of justice to
Political Liberalism is that Rawls realized that his original argument for the stability of justice as
fairness in A Theory of Justice failed. And so, according to Weithman, the primary task of
Rawls’s Political Liberalism is to explain how his political conception of justice is stable for the
right reason given the fact of reasonable pluralism.
Hyunseop Kim (2015) argues for the stability interpretation of Rawls’s law of peoples. He
argues that the stability interpretation is better than its alternatives. This interpretation, he argues,
explains why Rawls does not opt for the global distributive principles of justice. For since,
according to Rawls, domestic political culture is conducive to stability, the global distributive
principles of justice are not needed. Kim further argues that this interpretation explains why
Rawls insists on the duty of assistance and the toleration of decent peoples. He argues that the
assistance from liberal and decent peoples helps burdened societies to become well-ordered, so
that they will not be aggressive and undermine the stability of the law of peoples. For if decent
peoples are not tolerated by liberal peoples, their self-respect will be hurt and this will undermine
the stability of the law of peoples.
Now my Rousseauvian interpretation of Rawls emphasizes the importance of stability in
Rawls’s early and later works. First, I argue that Rawls’s justice as fairness meets the demand of
amour-propre, and that once people recognize that their demand of amour-propre is met by
justice as fairness, they will willingly comply with the principles of justice. This explains why
Rawls’s well-ordered society of justice as fairness is stable for the right reason. Second, I argue
that Rawls’s law of peoples meets the demand of amour-propre, and that once peoples recognize
that their demand of amour-propre is met by the law of peoples, they will willingly comply with
the principles of the law of peoples. This explains why Rawls’s law of peoples is stable for the
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right reason. Thus, this difficulty faced by the Kantian interpretation can also be resolved from a
Rousseauvian perspective.
To sum up, I have argued that Rawls’s Kantian interpretation faces two difficulties both of
which can be responded to from a Rousseauvian perspective. The first difficulty is that the
Kantian interpretation fails to explain why acting from the two principles of justice is acting
autonomously. The second difficulty is that it fails to emphasize the importance of stability. I
have argued that this first difficulty is resolved if we understand Rawls’s Kantian interpretation
as being grounded in Rousseau’s (and so also Kant’s) idea of autonomy. I have also argued that
the second difficulty can be resolved because Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre (correctly
interpreted by Kant) plays a significant role in Rawlsian stability.

3.   The Rousseauvian Interpretation of Rawls
In this dissertation, I argue that there is a Rousseauvian interpretation of Rawls’s political
philosophy. As pointed out by many commentators, there are a number of important ways in
which Rawls’s works are indebted to Rousseau, for example, the idea of natural goodness of
humans, the idea of the social contract, the idea of the general will, the idea of a realistic utopia,
the idea of the legislator and so on.19 But I will focus on just one way in which Rawls’s work is
indebted to Rousseau, one way that has not received adequate attention, namely, Rousseau’s
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For example, Samuel Freeman (2007) points out that Rousseau’s idea of the natural goodness of humans, his idea
of equal rights of political participation, and his idea of the general will have important influences on Rawls.
Frederick Neuhouser (2014) argues that Rousseau and Rawls share some similarities concerning how social
cooperation is to be arranged to achieve justice. He argues that Rawls’s idea of self-respect as the most important
primary good can be traced back to Rousseau’s idea of amour-propre. He also argues that Rawls’s fair equality of
opportunity and fair value of equal political rights both converge with Rousseau’s aim of the absence of domination
through equality in the political domain. Jeffrey Bercuson (2014) argues that Rawls’s ideas parallel Rousseau’s in
four aspects. First, they both think that institutions can change human nature. Second, they both agree that selfinterest can enhance the stability of a society. Third, they both take men as they are and laws as they can be. And
finally, they both seek the reconciliation between self-interest and the common good.
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moral psychology, especially his concept of amour-propre. I argue that my Rousseauvian
interpretation of Rawls merits special attention because it explains away some of the difficulties
facing other Rousseauvian interpretation of Rawls.

3.1 Other Roussseauvian Interpretations of Rawls and Their Shortcomings
There are many themes that enter into the Rousseauvian interpretation of Rawls. For
example, first, Rawls and Rousseau both think that persons are self-interested and that they are
capable of the sense of justice. Second, they both recognize that institutions can change human
nature. Third, Rawls’s idea of public reason parallels Rousseau’s idea of the general will. Fourth,
similar to Rousseau, Rawls’s idea of realistic utopia takes men as they are and laws as they can
be. Fifth, they both have the idea of a legislator who performs a decisive role in the
transformation of our social nature. I will begin by introducing the first three themes of the
Rousseauvian interpretation and the difficulties they face. In the next section, I will introduce my
Rousseauvian interpretation, and argue that it can resolve these difficulties.
First, as Samuel Freeman (2007) points out, Rawls largely shares the same picture of human
nature with Rousseau. They both reject the Christian idea of original sin and the Hobbesian
account of human nature which characterizes human beings as purely self-interested. They both
think that human beings are capable of compassion and the sense of justice. And they both think
that political and social institutions have great impact on the kind of person one is. But one might
argue that it is not clear why a person who is self-interested is capable of the sense of justice. For
example, G. A Cohen (2008, p.178) argues that Rawls has an incoherent account of human
nature, and that Rawls’s rational agents are unjustly selfish. Freeman’s interpretation does not
give us a response to Cohen’s objection.
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Second, it is worth emphasizing that Rawls and Rousseau both think that social and political
institutions can change human nature. Jeffrey Bercuson (2014) focuses on this theme in his
Rousseauvian interpretation of Rawls. He argues that Rousseau’s claim that “man is naturally
good, and it is through institutions alone that men become bad” (p.68) should be read in a
Rawlsian (and also Hegelian) way: first, “human nature is reconcilable with a legitimate and
stable (i.e., egalitarian) system of social and political institutions;” second, “institutions exercise
an important — no, decisive — influence on the character of human beings: individuals take
their cue from the political institutions that coerce them, and so we ought not expect a people to
be anything other than what their institutions make them” (ibid). Based on this reading, he argues
that for both Rousseau and Rawls, since we have the fundamental interests of freedom and selfrespect, and since these interests can be satisfied by the egalitarian social and political
institutions, our self-interest is reconcilable with political stability and the common good. But
Bercuson’s interpretation mainly focuses on the common aspects of the Hegelian and the
Rousseauvian interpretations of Rawls, that is, the institutional impacts on human nature, and so
the significance of Rawls’s concept of amour-propre is underestimated.
Third, Fredrick Neuhouser (2008) points out that Rousseau’s idea of the general will parallels
Rawls’s idea of public reason. For Rousseau, people have their own judgments about public
matters, but to see if their judgments are correct, they must appeal to the general will. If their
judgments conform with the general will, their judgments are correct; if their judgments do not
conform with the general will, their judgments are incorrect. Neuhouser argues that this suggests
that Rousseau has the idea of public reason: it is not his own reason, but public reason that tells
him what he ought to do in the public sphere. Neuhouser thus concludes that Rousseau’s idea of
the general will parallels Rawls’s idea of pubic reason. But one might argue that Neuhouser does
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not provide an adequate explanation for why Rousseau’s idea of the general will can be
associated with Rawls’s idea of public reason. For example, David James (2011) argues that
since pity plays a significant role in the formation of the general will — it inclines people to
understand the interests of others, Rousseau’s idea of the general will has no parallel with
Rawls’s idea of public reason, in the formation of which pity plays no role.
In the next section, I will introduce my Rousseauvian interpretation of Rawls and argue that
these difficulties others face can be resolved by this interpretation.

3.2 My Rousseauvian Interpretation of Rawls
My Rousseauvian interpretation focuses on the significance of amour-propre in Rawls’s early
and later works. I argue that Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre has a positive form, namely,
the desire to have equal standing with others. This reading of amour-propre, what Rawls calls
“the wide view of amour-propre,” is different from the traditional reading of amour-propre. The
traditional view argues that amour-propre only has a negative form, namely, the desire to be
superior to others. I argue that the traditional reading does not treat Rousseau’s works as a
consistent whole. The traditional reading of amour-propre cannot explain the consistency
between Rousseau’s second Discourse and the Social Contract. It is also not supported by
Rousseau’s moral psychology in Emile. Based on this reading, I argue that Rousseau’s concept
of amour-propre can serve as a starting point for the correct understanding of Rawls. Similar to
Rousseau, Rawls aims to describe a well-ordered society that publicly affirms the equal
standings of each of its citizens. Rawls agrees with Rousseau that once everyone’s equal
standing is publicly recognized by the basic structure of the society, they are provided with the
social bases of self-respect (amour-propre). Now the public affirmation of the two principles of
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justice provides the social bases of self-respect (amour-propre) in Rawls’s justice as fairness.
Once citizens in the well-ordered society know that their social bases of self-respect are ensured
by the two principles of justice, they will willingly comply with the two principles of justice.
This will bring about the stability of the well-ordered society of justice as fairness.
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls argues that if citizens in the well-ordered society of justice as
fairness have acquired the sense of justice in Stage 3 of moral development, and if the sense of
justice is in congruence with the thin conception of the good, and if such a society does not
generate special psychologies such as envy, the well-ordered society of justice as fairness is
stable for the right reason. Now, since Rawls’s moral psychology is an illustration of Rousseau’s
thesis that “the sense of justice is no mere moral conception formed by the understanding alone,
but a true sentiment of the heart enlightened by reason, the natural outcome of our primitive
affections” (CP 96), and since Rawls’s congruence argument in A Theory of justice and his
overlapping consensus argument in Political liberalism are both grounded in Rousseau’s
conception of persons, and since Rawls’s argument for the absence of special psychology is
grounded in Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre, Rawls’s stability argument parallels, and is
grounded in, Rousseau’s thoughts on amour-propre.
Rawls’s stability argument is not complete unless he has shown that the well-ordered
societies can sustain their stability in the face of external threats. Similar to the domestic case,
Rawls argues, in The law of Peoples, that the social bases of self-respect (amour-propre) of both
liberal and decent well-ordered peoples are ensured by the public affirmation of the equal
standing of each member of the law of peoples. Since their equal statuses are recognized by the
law of peoples, they will willingly comply with the principles of the law of peoples. This will
bring about the stability of the law of peoples.
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I argue that my Rousseauvian interpretation of Rawls can resolve some of the difficulties
facing other Rousseauvian interpretations. Firstly, it resolves the difficulty Freeman’s
Rousseauvian interpretation faces, that is, how a person who is self-interested is capable of the
sense of justice. According to my interpretation, amour-propre has both a positive and a negative
form. Once people have the positive form of amour-propre, they are ready to grant others’ equal
standing with them. This reciprocity of disposition is manifested in every stage of moral
development, and it explains why we will acquire the sense of justice once we know that we and
those around us are beneficiaries of the just institution, provided we have gone through the first
two stages of moral development. Thus, Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre explains why a
person who is self-interested is capable of the sense of justice.
Secondly, my interpretation goes beyond the common aspects of the Hegelian and the
Rousseauvian interpretations of Rawls that Bercuson focuses on. My interpretation emphasizes
the significance of amour-propre in Rawls’s early and later works. It explains how amour-propre
makes a just society possible, and how a just society transforms the nature of amour-propre. I
argue that amour-propre can be easily inflamed once we enter society. Once our amour-propre is
inflamed, we will be in a relation of domination and subjection, a relation of exploitation and
subjugation with others. The only way to cure these ills is to have a political institution that
recognizes each and all as free and equal beings. One of the common aims of Rousseau and
Rawls is to describe a society of mutual respect and mutual regard. In the well-ordered society of
justice as fairness, since the social bases of self-respect are ensured by the public affirmation of
the two principles of justice, if every citizen has gone through the three stages of moral
development, they will have a secure sense of self-respect that inclines them to respect others.
Thus, on the one hand, Rousseau’s and Rawls’s political institutions explain the transformation

22

of our social nature, namely, amour-propre; on the other hand, the transformation of amourpropre explains how a society of mutual respect and mutual regard is possible.
Thirdly, my interpretation explains why Rousseau’s idea of the general will is associated
with Rawls’s idea of public reason. I argue that amour-propre is the primary motivating force
behind Rousseau’s just society. And so the reason why individuals in the state of nature willingly
subject themselves to the general will is that the demand of amour-propre and the demand of
amour de soi are met by Rousseau’s society. Amour-propre is also the primary motivating force
for Rawls’s well-ordered society of justice as fairness. And so the reason why citizens in the
well-ordered society of justice as fairness willingly comply with public reason is that the demand
of amour-propre and the demand of amour de soi are met by Rawls’s justice as fairness. Thus,
my interpretation explains why Rousseau’s idea of the general will parallels Rawls’s idea of
public reason.
To sum up, I have argued that the Freeman’s Rousseauvian interpretation of Rawls does not
provide an explanation for how, in both Rousseau and Rawls, a person who is self-interested is
capable of the sense of justice. Moreover, the Bercuson’s Rousseauvian interpretation of Rawls
does not emphasize the significance of amour-propre in Rawls’s early and later works. Finally,
the Neuhouser’s Rousseauvian interpretation does not provide an adequate explanation for why
Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre parallels Rawls’s idea of public reason. I have argued that
these difficulties can be resolved by my Rousseauvian interpretation. I have argued that the first
difficulty is explained away by both Rousseau’s and Rawls’s moral psychology. The second
difficulty is resolved by my interpretation which focuses on the significance of amour-propre in
Rawls’s early and later works. The third difficulty is explained away if amour-propre plays a
significance role in both the formation of the general will and that of public reason.
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4.   The Task of Each Chapter, and How It Contributes to the Overall Project
Chapter 1: I aim to depict the general picture of my Rousseauvian interpretation of Rawls
and compare it with other interpretations. I argue that my interpretation of Rawls can resolve
some of the difficulties faced by other interpretations. First, I argue that the Kantian
interpretation of Rawls faces two difficulties that can be resolved by my interpretation. The first
difficulty is that it fails to explain why, for Rawls, acting from the two principles of justice is
acting autonomously. The second difficulty is that it fails to emphasize the importance of
stability in Rawls. I argue that the first difficulty is resolved because Rawls’s justice as fairness
is grounded in Rousseau’s (and so also Kant’s) idea of autonomy, and that the second difficulty
is resolved because Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre (correctly interpreted by Kant) plays a
significant role in Rawlsian stability. Second, I argue that other themes that factor into the
Rousseauvian interpretation face several difficulties that can be resolved by my interpretation.
First, it explains away the difficulty facing Freeman’s interpretation, that is, how a person who is
self-interested is capable of the sense of justice. Second, it explains away the difficulty facing
Bercuson’s interpretation, that is, how significant the role of amour-propre is in Rawls. Third, it
explains away the difficulty facing Neuhouser’s interpretation, that is, why Rousseau’s idea of
the general will parallels Rawls’s idea of public reason.
Chapter 2: I aim to defend Rawls’s interpretation of Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre.
The traditional view of amour-propre is that amour-propre only has a negative form, namely, the
desire to be superior to others. This view, however, contradicts Rousseau’s own interpretation.
The wide view of amour-propre, endorsed by Dent, Rawls, Cohen and Neuhouser, argues that
amour-propre also has a positive form, namely, the desire to have equal standing with others.
However, Bloom would argue that the traditional view is consistent with Rousseau’s works

24

because it is not amour-propre but compassion that makes the society of mutual respect and
mutual regard possible. I argue that Bloom’s objection is implausible because for Rousseau
compassion is too inert to motivate human actions. I argue that, for Rousseau, self-love or selfrespect (amour de soi or amour-propre) is the primary motivating force, as is evident in the
second Discourse, Emile and other of Rousseau’s political works. Furthermore, I argue that the
wide view of amour-propre presents us with a Rousseau that is distinct from natural law theorists
and utilitarians. This also explains why Rawls shifts from the natural law tradition and the
utilitarian tradition to the social contract tradition after reading Rousseau.
Chapter 3: I aim to show that there is a Rousseauvian interpretation of Rawls’s justice as
fairness by focusing on the significance of Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre in Rawls’s
justice as fairness. I argue that for Rawls, one of the main reasons why parties in the original
position would choose justice as fairness over other principles of justice is that justice as fairness
meets the demand of amour-propre, namely, the need for having equal status with others, while
other principles do not. For Rawls, justice as fairness meets the demand of amour-propre because
the public affirmation of equal citizenship provides the social bases of self-respect. He argues
that classic and average utilitarianism (or perfectionism) fail to provide the social bases of selfrespect because they allow the sacrifice of one’s freedom for the greater good of many (or the
maximization of human excellences). In explaining why Rawls’s justice as fairness meets the
demand of amour-propre, I also argue that the assumptions of Rawls’s argument from selfrespect for the two principles of justice parallel, and are grounded in, Rousseau’s thoughts on
amour-propre. I argue that Rawls’s assumption that self-respect is perhaps the most important
primary good parallels Rousseau’s story of an unhappy fugitive who has no self-esteem. His
assumption that the public affirmation of equal citizenship provides the social bases of self-
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respect that makes a society of mutual respect and mutual regard possible also parallels, and is
grounded in, Rousseau’s thoughts on amour-propre, especially the relative nature, the conditions
and the reciprocal feature of amour-propre. I conclude that there is a Rousseauvian interpretation
of Rawls’s justice as fairness.
Chapter 4: I aim to show that there is a Rousseauvian interpretation of Rawls’s stability
argument. There are three parts of Rawls’s stability argument: his moral psychology, the
congruence argument in A Theory of Justice or the overlapping consensus argument in Political
Liberalism, and his argument from the absence of special psychologies. First, I try to explain
why Rawls’s moral psychology is an illustration of Rousseau’s thesis. I argue that the reason for
this is that, for Rawls, the natural feelings of love and friendship are necessary for the acquisition
of the sense of justice. I also argue that Rawls’s moral psychology parallels, and is grounded in,
the reciprocal feature of amour-propre. I also argue that Rawls’s claim that his moral psychology
is more realistic than other conceptions of justice parallels, and is grounded in, Rousseau’s claim
that amour-propre is the primary motivating force to stabilize the well-ordered society. Second, I
argue that Rawls’s congruence argument in A Theory of justice is grounded in the Rousseauvian
and Kantian conception of moral autonomy. I also argue that Rawls’s overlapping consensus
argument in Political Liberalism is grounded in Rousseau’s conception of political autonomy
and his idea of public reason. Third, I argue that Rawls’s argument from the absence of special
psychologies also parallels Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre because meeting the demand of
amour-propre is the main reason why Rawls’s well-ordered society of justice as fairness does not
generate special psychologies such as envy.
Chapter 5: I aim to show that there is a Rousseauvian interpretation of Rawls’s law of
peoples by focusing on the significance of amour-propre in Rawls’s law of peoples. First, I argue
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that Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre plays a significant role in three themes of Rawls’s law
of peoples, that is, the two international original positions, the idea of a realistic utopia, and the
distinction between peoples and states. Second, I argue that amour-propre plays a significant role
in Rawls’s argument that his law of peoples meets the demand of amour-propre, his stability
argument in the law of peoples, and his arguments against other principles of international justice
such as political realism and distributive cosmopolitanism. I then consider two objections against
Rawls’s argument that his law of peoples meets the demand of amour-propre. The first objection
is that Rawls’s law of peoples neglects women’s need for recognition in decent peoples; the
second objection is that Rawls’s law of peoples does not grant equal status to burdened societies,
outlaw states and benevolent absolutism. I argue that there are Rousseauvian responses to these
objections. In response to the first objection, I argue that Rawls’s treatment of decent peoples
meets the demand of amour-propre for all peoples and it meets the demand of amour-propre at
least in a minimal sense for all natural persons. In response to the second objection, I argue that
Rawls’s treatment of outlaw states and other societies meets the demand of amour-propre for all
natural persons, and that outlaw states and other societies are not moral persons that have a
positive sense of amour-propre. I conclude that there is a Rousseauvian interpretation of Rawls’s
law of peoples. In particular, Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre plays a significant role in
Rawls’s law of peoples.
Chapter 6: I have assumed that the legitimate social bases of self-respect are equal basic
rights and liberties and their substantive fair value. Given this assumption, I have argued that
Rawls’s justice as fairness and his law of peoples meet the demand of amour-propre. I consider
two objections against this assumption. The first objection comes from some Chinese nationalists
who argue that Chinese people’s self-respect comes from their achievements and
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accomplishments in their history, especially the traditional culture of China. The second
objection is from luck egalitarians who argue that a person’s self-respect comes from economic
equality. I argue that these two objections are groundless.
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CHAPTER 2 ROUSSEAU’S CONCEPT OF AMOUR-PROPRE
Rousseau is one of the most enigmatic writers in the history of philosophy.
Commentators have different opinions about whether he is an individualist or a collectivist, a
rationalist or an irrationalist, a socialist or a non-socialist, a pessimist or an optimist, a Deist, a
Catholic or a Protestant, etc. Since, in each of these debates, both sides can marshal arguments
from Rousseau’s writings to support their view, some commentators have concluded that
Rousseau is an inconsistent and incoherent writer. But this verdict underestimates the integrity of
Rousseau’s works. It also fails to interpret Rousseau as he interprets himself: “All that is daring
in the Contrat Social had previously appeared in the Discours sur l’inégalité; all that is daring in
Emile had previously appeared in Julie” (Cassirer & Gay, 1954, p.3). I take this principle as
paramount in interpreting the work of Rousseau, that is: there is nothing incoherent or
inconsistent in his works as a whole. On the basis of this principle, I argue that the traditional
view of Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre fails, and that the wide view advocated by Nicholas
Dent (1988; 1998), John Rawls (2007), Joshua Cohen (1997) and Frederick Neuhouser (2008;
2014) succeeds.
Amour-propre is sometimes translated as vanity or pride,20 sometimes as self-love or selfesteem.21 Commentators generally agree Rousseau’s use of amour-propre is in contrast with
amour de soi, which is usually understood as a kind of self-love or self-esteem that is
independent of others and which refers to the desire for self-preservation or for one’s well-being.
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Christopher Bertram (2004, p.22) says that amour-propre is “often somewhat misleadingly translated as pride or
vanity.”
21
Allan Bloom (1979, p.11) says that amour de soi is a “natural and healthy self-love and self-esteem,” and amourpropre is “a self-love relative to other men’s opinion of him”. But as we will later see, Rousseau explicitly says that
amour-propre can also have a natural or healthy form.
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But it is a matter of controversy what amour-propre refers to. The traditional view of Rousseau’s
concept of amour-propre takes it to be exclusively negative, that is, the desire to be superior to
others.22 According to this view, in the state of nature, one’s amour de soi can be satisfied by
meeting one’s basic needs, and so men are self-sufficient and free; but in society, one’s amour de
soi is replaced by amour-propre, which can never be satisfied, and so men become unfree and
unhappy. Rousseau’s psychological remedy to this ill, according to this view, is to return to
amour de soi by freeing one from the enslavement of amour-propre. But the opponents of this
traditional view of amour-propre argue that amour-propre also has a positive aspect.23 For
example, Dent, Rawls, Cohen, and Neuhouser argue that the traditional view fails to understand
Rousseau’s works as a whole. They point out that this view seems incompatible with Rousseau’s
views in the Social Contract and in Emile. If amour-propre manifests solely negatively, what
provides the psychological foundation for the society described in the Social Contract?
Furthermore, this view neglects some of Rousseau’s insights in Emile, where Rousseau explicitly
suggests that amour-propre can have a positive form. Proponents of the traditional view argue
that their reading of amour-propre is also compatible with Rousseau’s other works, since, in their
view, it is compassion that provides the psychological foundation for the society Rousseau
describes in the Social Contract, not amour-propre. It is this wide view of amour-propre that I
defend in this chapter; I argue that amour-propre has a positive aspect, i.e., the desire for public
esteem, or the desire to have, or to be evaluated as having equal status with others.24 I argue that
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For, one of the most recent proponents of this reading, see Pauline Chazan (1993).
For example, Grace Roosevelt (1941), Roger Masters (1968), Judith Schklar (1969), Nicholas Dent (1988; 1998),
Joshua Cohen (1997), Timothy O’Hagan (1997;1999), Christopher Bertram (2004), David Gauthier (2006), John
Rawls (2007), Mark Button (2008), Christopher Brooke (2010), Niko Kolodny (2010), Jeffrey Bercuson (2014), and
Frederick Neuhouser (2008; 2014).
24
The desire for public esteem is different from the desire for superiority in the sense that the former can be satisfied
by one’s having or being evaluated as having equal status with others.
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30

for Rousseau the psychological foundation of a just society is not pity but amour-propre in its
healthy form, as is clear from his second Discourse, Emile, and other political works. I argue that
this thesis is a great principle in Rousseau’s political works, without which we cannot fully
understand Rousseau. On the basis of this principle, we are in a position to read Rousseau as a
distinctive figure in the history of political philosophy, one whose theory of a just society is
different from that of natural law theorists and utilitarian theorists. Furthermore, presumably,
Rawls anticipated the wide view of amour-propre in mid-1950s, which explains his transition
from the natural law tradition and the Millian utilitarian tradition to the social contract tradition.

1.   The Traditional View of Amour-propre
Rousseau’s Discourse on the Origin of Inequality is addressed to the question “what is the
origin of (moral) inequality?” In the beginning of the second Discourse, he draws a distinction
between natural inequality, consisting of differences in age, health, strength of the body and
quality of the mind, and social inequality (or what he calls moral inequality), consisting of
differences in fame, power, wealth, etc. He argues that the first kind of inequality is justified
because it will not give rise to relations of domination and subjection, but whether the second
kind of inequality can be justified or not requires careful examination. What is the origin of
social inequality? Rousseau argues that original human nature is made of original dispositions
and capabilities from nature alone. The original dispositions are self-love (amour de soi) and
pity; the capabilities from nature are perfectibility and free will. Since social inequality
originated neither in the original dispositions nor in the capabilities from nature, he argues that
social inequality does not originate in human nature. Therefore, moral inequality must originate
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from somewhere other than human nature. According to the traditional view, Rousseau proposes
that this inequality originates in an artificial passion that seeks social advantages, or what is
called “amour-propre.” The traditional view argues that with the appearance of amour-propre,
social inequality emerges;25 with the development of agriculture and metallurgy, social
inequality is enlarged; the institutionalization of private property enhances the inequality
between the rich and the poor; and with the appearance of political institutions to protect the
advantage of the rich, another kind of social inequality emerges, the inequality between the
powerful and the powerless. Under this regime, the poor and powerless are forced to sell
themselves for their subsistence. The rich and the powerful exploit the less advantaged while
they are dominated or alienated by their insatiable desire for prestige, wealth and power.
Therefore, everyone in society is in a relationship of domination and subjugation, alienation and
subjection, exploitation and suppression. Thus, according to the traditional view, amour-propre is
the desire to be superior to others that makes men harm each other and compete with each other.
Or as Rousseau writes:
Finally, consuming ambition, the ardent desire to raise one’s relative fortune less
out of genuine need than in order to place oneself above others, instills in all men
a black inclination to harm one another, a secret jealousy that is all the more
dangerous as it often assumes the mask of benevolence in order to strike its blow
in greater safety: in a word, competition and rivalry on the one hand, conflict of
interests on the other, and always the hidden desire to profit at another’s expense;
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The first appearance of amour-propre is occasioned by the development of human intelligence, the get-together of
idle men and women, and so on. (DI 166)
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all these evils are the first effect of property, and the inseparable train of nascent
inequality. (OW, II, 171)
Following the passage quoted above, according to the traditional interpretation, it is
natural to interpret amour-propre as exclusively negative, “the ardent desire to raise one’s
relative fortune less out of genuine need than in order to place oneself above others.”
On this interpretation, it is natural to interpret Rousseau as expressing in Emile a yearning
to return to amour de soi by freeing oneself from the enslavement of amour-propre, as Rousseau
says:
Self-love, which regards only ourselves, is contented when our true needs are
satisfied. But amour-propre, which makes comparisons, is never content and
never could be, because this sentiment, preferring ourselves to others, also
demands others to prefer us to themselves, which is impossible. This is how the
gentle and affectionate passions are born of self-love, and how the hateful and
irascible passions are born of amour-propre. (E 213-4)
The educative purpose of Emile, according to the traditional view, is to identify Emile’s
social self with his natural self through negative education or natural education. In other words,
according to this reading, by preventing the emergence of amour-propre, Emile can be his
natural, free and happy self, even in a corrupted society.26 The principles guiding the earliest
stage of Emile’s moral development seem to support this reading. For example, the first principle
is to “let [children] have all the strength that nature gives them-—a strength they would not know
how to abuse” (E 68); the second principle is to “aid and supplement what is lacking to them,
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As we will see later, the educational plan in Emile stands in stark contrast to the educational plan of Polish people
in Considerations on the Government of Poland.
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whether in intelligence or strength, in all that is connected with physical need” (E 68); the third is
to “limit oneself solely to the really useful, without granting anything to whim or to desire
without reason” (E 68); and the fourth is to “distinguish in their desires what comes immediately
from nature and what comes from opinion” (E 68). Thus, according to the traditional view of
amour-propre, Rousseau’s educative purpose in Emile is to return to amour de soi. On this
reading, if one is merely moved by amour de soi in society, his needs will not exceed his strength
and he will be self-sufficient, free, and happy, just like he was in the state of nature.

2.   The Wide View of Amour-propre
The traditional view of amour-propre maintains that Rousseau holds the thesis that amourpropre is exclusively negative, i.e., the desire to be superior to others, and that it follows from
this thesis that Rousseau’s educative purpose in Emile is to return to amour de soi. But if this
reading is right, Rousseau is an incoherent and inconsistent writer, for he says in Rousseau juge
de Jean-Jacques that:
human nature does not go backward, and it is never possible to return to the times
of innocence and equality once they have been left behind. This too is one of the
principles on which he has most insisted. So that his object could not be to bring
populous peoples or great States back to their first simplicity, but only to stop, if it
were possible, the progress of those whose small size and situation have preserved
from such a swift advance toward the perfection of society and the deterioration
of the species. These distinctions deserved to be made and were not. He was
stubbornly accused of wanting to destroy the sciences, the Arts, the theaters, the
Academies and to plunge the universe back into its first barbarism; and on the
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contrary he always insisted on the preservation of existing institutions, holding
that their destruction would only move the palliatives while leaving the vices and
substituting brigandage for corruption. (RJJ 213)
Here Rousseau says that he never advocated human beings to go back to the barbarous
state of nature; rather, he always insisted that the cure to the ills in the existing institutions lies in
the institutions themselves. Thus if we accept Rousseau’s interpretation of himself, we must
reexamine the traditional view of amour-propre, which claims that amour-propre cannot but be
inflamed when men step into society. The opponents of the traditional view of amour-propre
provide a new reading of amour-propre which tries to render Rousseau’s works as a coherent and
consistent whole.
In Dent’s Rousseau (1988), he argues that Rousseau’s idea of amour-propre has great
force in explaining human psychology and shaping today’s world, a world in which domination
and subordination, mastery and subjection still widely exist. Rousseau’s aim, he argues, is to
fight “the nightmarish version of man and society” (Dent, 1988, p.5), and to do that, citizens
need to respect each other’s equal status and have full participation in the legislative activities of
a society. But what is the psychological foundation of a society of mutual respect and equality?
If one’s major drive in society is merely a desire for distinction, it is impossible to realize the
ideal of mutual respect and equality. For this reason, but not only this reason, Dent argues there
must be a positive form of amour-propre in human psychology that makes the ideal of mutual
respect and equality possible.
Dent admits that Rousseau focuses on the negative form of amour-propre in his early
writings. In the Discourse on the Sciences and Arts, Rousseau criticizes people’s high
achievements in artistic and scientific fields as being mostly motivated by their desires for
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distinction and for prestige, not by their passions for truth. In the Discourse on the Origin of
Inequality, he writes that the origin of inequalities is amour-propre, a desire for recognition and
acknowledgement for oneself from others, an artificial feeling that arises in peoples’ hearts when
they step into society. But amour-propre must also have a positive form that provides the
psychological foundation for the society Rousseau describes in the Social Contract. This form of
amour-propre is most explicit in Book IV of Emile, where Rousseau says:
Since my Emile has until now looked only at himself, the first glance he casts on
his fellows leads him to compare himself with them. And the first sentiment
aroused in him by this comparison is the desire to be in the first position. This is
the point where love of self turns into amour-propre and where begin to arise all
the passions which depend on this one. But to decide whether among these
passions the dominant ones in his character will be humane and gentle or cruel
and malignant, envy and covetousness, we must know what position he will feel
he has among men, and what kinds of obstacles he may believe he has to
overcome to reach the position he wants to occupy. (E 235)
From this, as Dent argues, it follows that the demand of amour-propre can be met if we
know what position we have among men, that is, a position of mutual regard and respect, a
position of equality (cf. Dent 1988, p.105). In other words, our desire for having, or being
evaluated as having equal status with others can be met if we know that we have equal status
with others. Thus, since I do not need to dominate you to satisfy my amour-propre, the
satisfaction of my amour-propre does not have to be in conflict with yours; rather, the
satisfaction of my amour-propre requires the satisfaction of yours. Thus granting that you have
equal status with me is the requirement of my desire for having equal status with you. In this
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sense, self-respect and respect for others are mutually supportive. In other words, if one wishes
to acquire human recognition and respect for oneself, one must acknowledge others’ status as
equal with oneself (ibid., p.149). Dent argues that Rousseau’s Social Contract describes a society
in which everyone is recognized as having equal status with everyone else, that is, equal
citizenship. Thus, the equality granted to everyone in such a society satisfies a person’s amourpropre which, in turn, provides for the possibility of a society of mutual regard and mutual
respect.
Rawls accepts Dent’s interpretation of amour-propre for two reasons. First, he argues that
Kant also interprets Rousseau’s amour-propre as having a positive form, as Kant says:
The predisposition to humanity can be brought under the general title of self-love
which is physical and yet compares… that is to say, we judge ourselves happy or
unhappy only by making comparisons with others. Out of this self-love springs
the inclination to acquire worth in the opinion of others. This is originally a desire
merely for equality, to allow no one superiority above oneself, bound up with a
constant care lest others strive to obtain such superiority; but from this arises
gradually the unjustifiable craving to win it for oneself over others.27
Here Kant interprets Rousseau’s amour-propre as “the inclination to acquire worth in the
opinion of others” and “a desire merely for equality” (ibid). Rawls says that it is only through
Kant’s interpretation of amour-propre that he finally understands Rousseau’s second Discourse.
Similar to Dent’s view, the second reason Rawls gives is that the wide view of amour-propre is
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Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (La
Shalle, II: Open Court, 1934), bk.1, sec. 1. This passage is quoted by Rawls (LHPP 199) in support of the wide view
of amour-propre. Dent (1992, pp.35-6; 1998, pp.105-6; 1998, pp.65) and Cohen (1997, pp.134-35) also connect this
passage with Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre.
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necessary for understanding Rousseau’s works as coherent and consistent. If amour-propre is
merely an artificial passion to be superior to others, what is the psychological foundation for the
political society depicted in the Social Contract? If there is no psychological force that motivates
people to achieve that kind of society, the political society depicted in the Social Contract is
utterly utopian and Rousseau’s works are generally pessimistic. Therefore, Rawls says that if we
agree that Rousseau is a coherent and consistent writer, we should accept that amour-propre has
a positive form.
Cohen agrees that if amour-propre is only a desire to be superior to others, then it is
impossible for Rousseau to address the motivation problem, namely, to specify what motivates
one to conform to the general will. He argues that one solution to the motivation problem lies in
the natural form of amour-propre, i.e., “a concern that they affirm my worth” (Cohen, 1997,
p.109). This form of amour-propre is natural because when I develop a relation with others as I
enter society, self-love, which includes a sense of self-worth, naturally extends to include a
concern for others’ affirmation of my self-worth. Amour-propre in its natural form, therefore,
Cohen argues, can be understood as a concern that others value me as I value myself. This
interpretation of amour-propre, Cohen says, is supported by Rousseau, who says: “This is, then,
the summary of the whole human wisdom in the use of the passions: (1) To have a sense of the
true relations of man, with respect to the species as well as the individual. (2) To order all the
affections of the soul according to these relations” (E 219). Here, Rousseau explicitly says that in
contrast to the false relations of man — competition and rivalry — there are “the true relations of
man” with respect to “the species as well as the individual.” What is the true relation of man?
Rousseau later points out that “Man is the same in all stations. If that is so, the stations having
the most members merit the most respect. To the man who thinks, all the civil distinctions
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disappear. He sees the same passions, the same sentiments in the hodcarrier and the illustrious
man” (E 222). Amour-propre interpreted as having a natural form, therefore, captures the true
relations of man, i.e., the equal stations of man. Properly understood, amour-propre should have
a natural or positive form, that is, the desire for public esteem, or the desire to have or to be
evaluated as having equal status with others.
Neuhouser (2008; 2014) also argues that amour-propre has both a negative form and a
positive form. On one hand Neuhouser agrees with Dent, Rawls and Cohen that if amour-propre
only has a negative form, it is impossible for the various evils diagnosed in the Second Discourse
to be remedied; one the other hand, he provides a different interpretation for Note XV in the
second Discourse from commentators who take Rousseau to be suggesting that amour-propre is
exclusively negative.28 In Note XV, Rousseau says:
Amour propre [vanity] and Amour de soi-même [self-love], two very different
passions in their nature and their effects, should not be confused. Self-love is a
natural sentiment which inclines every animal to attend to its self-preservation
and which, guided in man by reason and modified by pity, produces humanity and
virtue. Amour propre is only a relative sentiment, factitious, and born in society,
which inclines every individual to set greater store by himself than by anyone
else, inspires men with all the evils they do one another, and is the genuine source
of honor. (DI, 218)
Commentators usually take this distinction between amour de soi and amour-propre as
evidence in supporting of the traditional interpretation of amour-propre.29 But, as Neuhouser
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points out, Rousseau does not mean to say here that the inclination “to set greater store by
himself than by anyone else” is the necessary consequence of amour-propre, but rather that it is
the likely consequence; Rousseau does not mean to say that amour-propre is the source of all the
evils regardless of its forms, but that when amour-propre is occasioned with certain
circumstances, such as leisure, luxury, division of labor, etc., it is the source of all the evils.30 It
follows from Neuhouser’s reading that the traditional reading of amour-propre misunderstands
Rousseau. The meaning of “the ardent desire to raise one’s relative fortune less out of genuine
need than in order to place oneself above others, instills in all men a black inclination to harm
one another” is that when amour-propre is inflamed it instills in all men an inclination to harm
others (OW, II, 171). Furthermore, when Rousseau hyperbolically says “amour-propre, which
makes comparisons, is never content and never could be” (E 213-4), he means that amour-propre
is likely to be insatiable, but will not necessarily be so.

3.   An Argument Against the Wide View of Amour-propre
As discussed above, the opponents of the traditional view of amour-propre, for example,
Dent, Rawls, Cohen and Neuhouser, argue that amour-propre has a positive form because the
traditional view is incompatible with Rousseau’s works as a whole. But the proponents of the
traditional view of amour-propre might further argue that the traditional view of amour-propre is
well supported by Rousseau’s Emile and that it is compatible with Rousseau’s interpretation of
himself.31 For example, in Allan Bloom’s introduction to Emile, amour-propre, a “keystone of
Rousseau’s psychological teaching” (Bloom, 1979, p.10), is said to be the source of all ills, such
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traditional reading of amour-propre, even though it appears to.
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See, for example, Chazan (1993, p.348) and Bloom (1979).
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as “anger, pride, vanity, resentment, revenge, jealousy, indignation, competition, slavishness,
humility, capriciousness, rebelliousness” (ibid., p.11). Bloom argues that Rousseau’s intention of
negative education here is to “prevent amour de soi from turning into amour-propre, for this is
the true source of man’s dividedness” (ibid., p.10), and that government and law are needed to
prevent the emergence of amour-propre. Therefore, if Bloom’s interpretation is plausible, amourpropre is not really the psychological foundation of society described in the Social Contract, but
rathe the source of inequality and human ills.
What is the psychological foundation of the society described in the Social Contract, if not
amour-propre? Is Rousseau’s project in the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality compatible
with his project in the Social Contract, if amour-propre does not have a positive form? These
problems, Bloom seems to suggest, can be resolved if we take Rousseau’s ideas of compassion
into account.32 Unlike amour-propre, according to Bloom, compassion is a natural feeling in
human hearts. Bloom suggests that Rousseau’s view is that compassion, rather than amourpropre, makes a society of mutual respect and mutual regard possible. He writes:
The recognition of our sameness and our common vulnerability dampens the
harsh competitiveness and egotism of egalitarian political orders. Rousseau takes
advantage of the tendency to compassion resulting from equality, and uses it,
rather than self-interest, as the glue binding men together. (ibid., p.19)
The purpose of Emile’s education, Bloom argues, is to let Emile realize the miseries of
human kind and nurture his feelings of compassion.33 The first level of Emile’s education in
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compassion is to let Emile study arts instead of science. This study will enable Emile to despise
the vanity of Plutarch’s heroes and pity their unfortunate ends. The second level is to study
Robinson Crusoe’s island and to produce “contempt for the great of this world, not a slave’s
contempt founded in envy, indignation, and resentment, but the contempt stemming from a
conviction of superiority which admits of honest fellow feeling and is the precondition of
compassion” (ibid., 19). The third level of education is to study fables and satires, which make
Emile identify himself with the sufferers and have a feeling of compassion toward human beings.
If the education is successful, he suggests, Emile’s compassion, together with his desire for selfpreservation, becomes his principle of action, according to which, “concern for others becomes
part of his sense of his own interest” (ibid., 20).
If Bloom’s interpretation, that is, that compassion or pity, instead of the positive form of
amour-propre, is the psychological foundation of the political society depicted in the Social
Contract, is plausible, perhaps the traditional reading of amour-propre is not mistaken in saying
that amour-propre is exclusively negative. But as I will argue presently, in agreement with Dent,
Rawls, Cohen and Neuhouser, the traditional view of amour-propre fails to understand
Rousseau’s works as a coherent and consistent whole. This implies that compassion cannot be
the psychological foundation of the political society of mutual respect and equality. In fact, if the
ground of morality, for Rousseau, is the natural feeling of compassion, his political society of
mutual respect and equality is merely a utopia and his political theory is pessimistic. As Rawls
points out, this reading makes Rousseau’s overall thoughts unworkable and thus fails to be
persuasive.

weakness of compassion. He describes the state of nature as a state of peace, not because of the natural pity of
human beings, but because of their amour de soi, i.e., their needs that does not exceed their strength.
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4.   My Defense of the Wide View of Amour-propre
Bloom suggests that compassion can serve as the psychological foundation of the society
described in the Social Contract. Rousseau, however, never says that compassion is the basis of a
just society.34 Rather, for Rousseau, amour de soi is the primary motivating force in the state of
nature. And amour-propre is the primary motivating force in the civil state. In other words, selflove or self-esteem is the primary motivating force in the state of nature and in the civil state.
This is not to say that compassion plays no role in the state of nature or in the civil state. In the
state of nature, compassion is one of the principles of action and one of the reasons why human
beings are naturally good. In the civil state, compassion plays an important role in preventing
amour-propre from being inflamed. But as we shall see, compassion is not the primary
motivating force for people in the state of nature or in the civil state.

4.1 The Role of Pity vs the Role of Self-love or Self-esteem in the Second Discourse
In the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, Rousseau defines compassion as “a natural
repugnance to seeing any sentient Being, and especially any being like ourselves, perish or
suffer” (DI 127). The feeling of compassion and the desire for self-preservation (amour de soi)
are the two principles of action in the state of nature and the foundation of the rules of natural
right. But compassion has less motivational force than amour de soi (self-love or self-esteem).
As Rousseau says:
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as long as he does not resist the inner impulsion of commiseration, he will never
harm another man or even any sentient being, except in the legitimate case when,
his preservation being involved, he is obliged to give himself preference. (DI 127)
Here Rousseau explicitly says that when pity is in harmony with one’s desire for selfpreservation, it will motivate man not to harm other animals, especially other human beings; but
when one’s feeling of pity is in conflict with one’s desire of self-preservation, he will give
priority to his desire for self-preservation. Later in the same Discourse, he criticizes Hobbes’s
natural philosophy and argues:
By reasoning on the basis of the principles he establishes, this Author [Hobbes]
should have said that, since the state of Nature is the state in which the care for
our own preservation is least prejudicial to the self-preservation of others, it
follows that this state was the most conducive to Peace and the best suited to
Mankind. (DI 151)
Here Rousseau makes clear that he agrees with Hobbes that the primary principle of
action in the state of nature is amour de soi (self-love or self-esteem), especially, the desire for
self-preservation. But he disagrees with Hobbes that this principle necessarily leads to conflicts
of interests and a state of war between one and all; rather, he argues that in the state of nature
one’s concern for self-preservation is rarely in conflict with the self-preservation of others. This
is the reason why the state of nature is a state of peace. For Rousseau, men in the state of nature
do not know what is good and are ignorant of vices. And so it is impossible that men in the state
of nature are, as Hobbes contends, naturally wicked. Once one’s desire for self-preservation is
satisfied, he does not care whether others have more fortunes than he and so his desire for selfpreservation is rarely in conflict with the self-preservation of others. But as one steps into
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society, he develops a sense of self-love or self-esteem that is dependent on the opinion of others,
that is, amour-propre. This relative sense of self-love or self-esteem can be inflamed under
certain circumstances. Motivated by inflamed amour-propre, everyone seeks social advantages
and superiority, and thus the civil state is a state of war. In the state of war, compassion has no
motivational force against (inflamed) amour-propre. Rousseau explicitly says that compassion is
“developed but weak in Civil man” (DI 153). This weakness of compassion is vividly presented
by Rousseau: “One of his kind can with impunity be murdered beneath his window; he only has
to put his hands over his ears and to argue with himself a little in order to prevent Nature, which
rebels within him, from letting him identify with the man being assassinated” (DI 153). He later
argues that this inflamed amour-propre which stifles natural pity “made men greedy, ambitious,
and wicked” (DI 171). Therefore, self-love or self-esteem, rather than pity, as Rousseau suggests
in the second Discourse, is the primary motivating force both in the state of nature and in the
civil state.

4.2 The Role of Pity vs the Role of Self-love or Self-esteem in Emile
The importance of self-love or self-esteem is also explicit in Emile where Rousseau
argues that the purpose of the earlier stages of moral education is to satisfy the child’s self-love
or self-esteem (amour de soi) and to free him from the enslavement of inflamed amour-propre. In
Book I, as we have discussed, the education for the infant stage of moral development is to aid or
supplement one’s strength to meet his natural needs and to limit his desires within his strength.
Thus, the primary motivating force in this stage is self-love or self-esteem (amour de soi), that is,
one’s desire for self-preservation. In Book II, the educative purpose in the child stage of moral
development is to free him from the enslavement of the negative form of amour-propre, and to
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nurture the love of freedom in the child’s heart. Rousseau says of the fundamental maxim in this
stage that “The truly freeman wants only what he can do and does what he pleases” (E 84). In
Book III, the purpose of the adolescent stage of moral development is to teach useful knowledge,
such as geometry, geography, astronomy, physics, social studies and carpentry, which
contributes to one’s well-being which consists in “health, freedom, and the necessities of life
constitute it” (E 177). Thus in a corrupted society, like the one in which Emile lives, before he
enters society, the purpose of education is to satisfy his self-love or self-esteem (amour de soi),
which consists in desire for self-preservation and concern for one’s own well-being, and freeing
one from the enslavement of the inflamed amour-propre. The role of pity is negligible in the first
three stages of moral development.
In Book IV of Emile, Rousseau describes Emile’s adulthood. As a person enters society,
he is in a relation with other human beings. His amour de soi develops into amour-propre.
Amour-propre can be good and useful, as Rousseau says:
The sole passion natural to man is amour de soi or amour-propre taken in an
extended sense. This amour-propre in itself or relative to us is good and useful;
and since it has no necessary relation to others, it is in this respect naturally
neutral. It becomes good or bad only by the application made of it and the
relations given to it. Therefore, up to the time when the guide of amour-propre,
which is reason, can be born, it is important for a child to do nothing because he
is seen or heard-nothing, in a word, in relation to others; he must respond only to
what nature asks of him, and then he will do nothing but good. (E 93)35
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Here Rousseau explicitly says that amour-propre in its natural form is good and useful.
He summarizes the principle of education in the earlier stages of moral development as negative
education, that is, “to do nothing.” He also suggests that the purpose of education in the adult
stage of moral development is to guide amour-propre with reason. The role of reason can vary
for Rousseau. In the second Discourse, he says: “We seek to know only because we desire to
enjoy, and it is possible to conceive why someone who had neither desires nor fears would take
the trouble to reason” (DI 142). But he also suggests that: “Self-love is a natural sentiment which
inclines every animal to attend to its self-preservation and which, guided in man by reason and
modified by pity, produces humanity and virtue” (DI 218).36 Some commentators interpret
Rousseau as a sentimentalist who wants to overturn “the Platonic order that gives primacy to
reason over feeling” (Kelly, 1997, p.30; Qvortrup, 2003, p.115). But this interpretation ignores
the force that Rousseau attributes to reason. Properly understood, there are two kinds of reason
for Rousseau, means-ends reason and ends-in-itself reason. The first kind of reason is conducive
to the realization of a person’s desires. The second kind of reason can guide a person’s animal
desires. The second kind of reason also explains why for Rousseau persons are autonomous
beings, as he says: “for the impulsion of mere appetite is slavery, and obedience to the law one
has prescribed for oneself is freedom” (SC 54).37 Thus, one of the central tasks of Emile’s
education is to enable him to be an autonomous person whose reason guides his amour-propre
into its healthy and natural form. It is worth exploring how reason guides amour-propre into a
natural form. Niko Kolodny (2010) provides an explanation:
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As Neuhouser (2011, p.483) points out: “autonomy is free choice carried out in accordance with a conception of
one’s own essential identity, a self-conception that supplies the autonomous being with reasons for endorsing some
of its desires as worthy of being acted on and for rejecting others as incompatible with one’s essential nature.”
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If amour-propre is inflamed by the illusion that one’s value depends on one’s
social advantage, then healthy amour-propre would seem to lie in independent
knowledge of one’s true value, as consisting in something other than social
advantage. (Kolodny, 2010, p.192)
Kolodny correctly points out that a necessary condition for the natural or healthy form of
amour-propre is that one knows his true value independent of his social advantage. But this is not
an adequate explanation for the natural or healthy form of amour-propre, which Kolodny defines
as “A desire to have, and to be evaluated by all others as having a certain value in comparison
with all others, including at least moral equality” (ibid., 170). Even though one knows his true
value is independent of his social advantage, if he believes others have the illusion that his value
depends on his social advantage, he will still desire to have, and to be evaluated by all others as
having, social advantage. This point follows from Rousseau’s definition of (natural or inflamed)
amour-propre as a relative sentiment that depends on the opinion of others. Therefore, the
necessary conditions for the healthy or natural form of amour-propre is (1) the knowledge that
one’s true value is independent of one’s social advantage; and (2) the knowledge that others
know that one’s true value is independent of one’s social advantage. But these two conditions do
not suffice to explain the healthy or natural form of amour-propre because they merely explain
why one’s amour-propre is not inflamed, not why one’s amour-propre is natural or healthy. To
know where the natural or healthy amour-propre lies is to know what is good and useful, as
Rousseau says: “This amour-propre in itself or relative to us is good and useful” (E 93). The
fundamental good for human beings is freedom, as Rousseau points out:
The only one who does his own will is he who, in order to do it, has no need to
put another’s arms at the end of his own; from which it follows that the first of all
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goods is not authority but freedom. The truly freeman wants only what he can do
and does what he pleases. That is my fundamental maxim. (E 84)
Thus it is clear that Rousseau thinks that the natural or healthy form of amour-propre lies
in (1) the knowledge that one’s true value is independent of one’s social advantage; and (2) the
knowledge that others know that one’s true value is independent of one’s social advantage; and
(3) the knowledge that one’s true value, i.e., the utmost value of all values, is freedom (and
equality); 38 and (4) the knowledge that others know that one’s true value is freedom (and
equality). Therefore, properly understood, the natural or healthy form of amour-propre is the
desire for freedom and equality.
The above argument constitutes an important part of my main argument that pity cannot
provide the psychological foundation for the political society depicted in the Social Contract. For
it establishes the possibility for the natural form of amour-propre as the psychological foundation
for the political society of mutual respect and equality. In the country in which Emile lives in, if
one is properly educated like Emile, he will have a sort of amour-propre in its natural form
because he knows one’s true value is freedom (and equality), not social advantage.39 It is thus
Emile’s duty to live among them and “cultivate their friendship in sweet association, be their
benefactor and their model” (E 474) so that his associates know that one’s true value is freedom
(and equality). Once people in the country, a small association, know, and know that other
associates know, the true value is freedom (and equality), they will have a sort of amour-propre
in its natural form. But in a corrupted society, like that in which Emile lives, it is impossible for
Emile and his countrymen acquire a robust sense of amour-propre. In a corrupted society, since it
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For Rousseau, equality is necessary for freedom.
This country is the place where Emile can pursue a patriarchal and rustic life.
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is publically known that some people are inferior to others (or simply it is not publically known
that everyone is free and equal), people will necessarily have an inflamed form of amour-propre.
Those who are advantaged will attempt to satisfy their self-esteem by subjecting others. And
those who are disadvantaged will sell their freedom to others for social advantages. Emile and
his countrymen will not have an inflamed form of amour-propre for they know that their true
value lies in freedom and equality. But they will not have a robust sense of amour-propre in its
natural and healthy form either for they know that it is not public knowledge that a person’s true
value lies in freedom and equality in the corrupted society to which that they belong.

4.3 The Role of Pity vs the Role of Self-love or Self-esteem in Rousseau’s Other
Works
The educational goal of Emile is to enable him to guide his amour-propre with reason so
that he knows that his true value lies in freedom and equality. But this task is a difficult one in
the corrupted society in which Emile lives. Even though the tutor’s education makes him able to
acquire the knowledge that his true value lies in freedom and equality, considering that his selfesteem would not be supported by the society that he belongs to, it is likely that Emile would
only have a less than robust sense of self-esteem (amour-propre). In the Political Economy,
Rousseau provides another way of guiding amour-propre with reason, as he says: “his own
reason should be suspect to him, and he should follow no other rule than public reason, which is
the law” (PE 5).40 Here the reason that guides amour-propre is not individual reason as we have
discussed above, but public reason or intersubjective reason. In the Social Contract, Rousseau
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seems to suggest that this public reason is the general will: by examining whether a person’s own
reason conforms with the general will, he knows whether his own reasoning is correct or false.41
Rousseau says: “Each one states his opinion on this by voting, and the declaration of the general
will is drawn from the counting of the votes. Therefore when the opinion contrary to mine
prevails, that proves only that I was mistaken, and what I thought to be the general will was not”
(SC 124). Now we understand why Rousseau says that the fundamental problem that the social
contract tries to solve is “To find a form of association that will defend and protect the person
and goods of each associate with the full common force, and by means of which each, uniting
with all, nevertheless obey only himself and remain as free and before” (SC 49-50). By
submitting himself to the general will, a person submits his own reason to the public reason. And
since the general will (or the public reason) is a part of his own will (or reason), he submits to
nothing but himself by submitting to the general will (or the public reason). Since freedom is the
obedience to the law one gives oneself, a person is as free as before. Furthermore, since the
social contract is an agreement among equals, everyone knows and knows that others know that
everyone totally alienates himself to the general will. In other words, everyone knows, and
knows that others know, that his true value lies in his freedom and equality which he acquires
through the social contract. Therefore, in the Social Contract, the way for amour-propre to
manifest its natural and healthy form is to guide it with public reason, or the general will.
But the starting point of the social unity of the general will is not compassion. What
motivates human beings to form the association at issue is their concern for self-preservation and
well-being, and their concern for freedom and equality. Unless a person’s own amour-propre is
satisfied, he is in no position to pity others. The extension of a person’s amour-propre starts with
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the people around him. This is also why Diderot’s cosmopolitan ideal, “the general will of
human race” is merely utopian. In Rousseau’s argument against Diderot concerning the origin of
the general will, he claims that the concepts of universal or international justice must first be
nurtured in the context of a small political community (cf. Roosevelt, 1941, p.125). Diderot
regards “the general will of human race” as the ground of peace and justice (cf. ibid., p.133), but
for Rousseau this idea is utterly utopian, as Rousseau says:
Every particular society, when it is narrow and unified, is estranged from the allencompassing society. Every patriot is harsh to foreigners. They are only men.
They are nothing in his eyes. This is a drawback, inevitable but not compelling.
The essential thing is to be good to the people with whom one lives. (E 39)
The precondition of the love of humankind is the love of country which originates from the
love of oneself. Compassion, therefore, is the end of peace and justice, not the starting point.42
Rousseau does not trust “those cosmopolitans who go to great length in their books to discover
duties they do not deign to fulfill around them” (E 39). The purpose of public education in a
small community, e.g., Poland in the eighteen century, is, for Rousseau, to nurture a patriotic
zeal in the hearts’ of its people, as he says in the Considerations on the Government of Poland:
“Every true republican has drunk in love of country, that is to say love of law and liberty, along
with his mother’s milk. This love is his whole existence” (Roosevelt, 1941, p.134). A nation’s
amour de soi is its desire for self-preservation. When this amour de soi develops into an inflamed
amour-propre, as Rousseau writes in his “Summary” of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre’s Project for
Perpetual Peace, an empire has a tendency to encroach upon its neighbors (cf. ibid., p.131). But
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this amour de soi can develop into a natural or healthy amour-propre as in the case of Poland, as
the love of country, the love of law and liberty (cf. ibid., p.132).43 The natural development of a
small community thus is analogous to the natural development of a person. In the early stages of
its development, it is only moved by amour de soi, especially, its concern for self-preservation;
gradually, as it develops relations with its neighbor countries, the amour de soi matures into
amour-propre, which can manifest in both a negative and a positive form. Under the guidance of
reason, that is, through the public education which nurtures the love of country in its citizens,
amour-propre manifests in a natural or healthy form, the desire for freedom and equality, or the
desire for justice.

5.   Conclusion and Some Afterthoughts
To conclude, amour-propre has both a positive form and a negative form. This reading of
amour-propre allows us to view Rousseau’s works as a coherent and consistent whole. As we
have seen in the second Discourse, Emile, and his other political works, amour-propre in its
natural form, that is, the desire for freedom and equality, is the psychological foundation for the
political society depicted in the Social Contract.
Now we are in a position to read Rousseau as a distinctive figure in the history of political
philosophy. First, Rousseau’s political theory is different from natural law theorists such as
Aristotle, Grotius and Hobbes.44 Natural law theorists think that the knowledge of what is
reasonable can be derived from the knowledge of what is natural for human beings (cf. Bix,
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2004, p.63). Aristotle thinks that natural justice is superior to conventional justice because
natural justice is valid for all communities while conventional justice is subject to change (cf.
Thomson, 1953, p.138). Grotius and Hobbes also admit the existence of natural law. Rousseau,
however, argues that Aristotle’s theory of justice justifies slavery; for Aristotle claims that there
are natural slaves. Rousseau also argues that for Grotius and Hobbes, “it is an open question
whether humankind belongs to a hundred men, or whether those hundred men belong to human
kind” (SC 42). He argues that “His [Grotius’s] most frequent mode of argument is always to
establish right by fact” (SC 42). For Rousseau, it is true that human beings have natural
differences in age, health, strength of the body and quality of the mind but these natural
differences cannot justify slavery. Rousseau does not think that justice is grounded in nature, for
he does not believe that freedom can be obtained by returning to nature. The traditional view
mistakenly believes that Rousseau’s educational purpose for Emile is to identify his social self
with his natural self. But as we have seen, the real purpose of Emile’s education is to make him
an autonomous person who guides his amour-propre with reason. The domestic education of
Emile is similar to the public education of the people in Poland. Only through the transformation
of amour-propre, with the guidance of public reason, is it possible to form an association in
which people are as free as before. Thus, Rousseau does not belong to the natural law tradition of
Aristotle, Grotius and Hobbes. Rather, he argues that the natural law tradition justifies slavery
and that it fails to treat human beings as equals.
Secondly, Rousseau’s political theory is different from that of Hume and other utilitarian
theorists. Hume famously argues that the natural law theorists mistakenly infers “ought” from
“is”, that is, what is just from what is natural. For Hume, justice is an artificial virtue based on
convention. He argues that once people recognize that the political institution to which they
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belong is aimed at the public good, they will willingly act in accordance with the rules and the
laws set up by the institution. The reason for this is that human beings are capable of taking up
the view of the judicious spectator, identifying and sympathizing with the people who are
benefited by a political institution (LHPP 186). Therefore, for Hume, it is sympathy that makes a
just society possible. Rousseau disagrees with Hume that sympathy is the basis of a just society.
As we have seen, for Rousseau, it is self-love or self-esteem, rather than sympathy, that makes a
just society possible. In other words, unless we have a secured sense of amour-propre, pity’s role
is negligible in motivating us to form or retain a just society. Rousseau also disagrees with Hume
that the recognition that the political institution is aimed at the public good is sufficient for a
sense of justice. Rousseau argues that the virtue of justice originates from self-love (amourpropre) under the guidance of public reason. Therefore, a necessary condition for one’s voluntary
compliance with rules and laws set up by a political institution is that these rules and laws ensure
one’s fundamental good, that is, freedom (and equality).
Utilitarianism, like natural law theories, is a teleological theory. Utilitarianism tries to derive
what is right from what is good for human beings but in maximizing the good, utilitarianism fails
to respect all human beings as equals. Utilitarians, like Hume, argue that sympathy is the
psychological basis of a just society. But for Rousseau, even though what is right must take
human goodness into considerations, it is never just to subject a person to a lesser liberty for the
sake of the greater satisfaction of many. As we have seen, for Rousseau, it is necessary for an
association to respect every associate as equal to ensure his or her self-esteem (amour-propre).
Utilitarianism thus fails to meet the demand of amour-propre. Furthermore, utilitarianism
mistakenly believes that sympathy is the psychological basis of a just society, but as we have
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seen, for Rousseau the natural and healthy form of amour-propre is the psychological basis of a
just society, not sympathy.
To conclude, the wide reading of Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre presents us with an
interpretation of a Rousseau whose political theory is different from that of natural law theorists
and utilitarian theorists. Rawls might have anticipated the wide view of amour-propre in mid1950s, and so he says that reading Rousseau with this understanding helps his transition from the
natural law tradition and the Millian utilitarian tradition to the social contract tradition (cf. Reidy,
2009, p.36). Since commentators often misunderstand both Rawls and Rousseau, it is important
for us to know Rousseau’s influence on Rawls so that we can have a better understanding of both
philosophers. This is the purpose of my next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ROUSSEAU’S CONCEPT OF
AMOUR-PROPRE IN RAWLS’S JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls says “there is a Kantian interpretation of the conception of
justice from which this principle derives. This interpretation is based upon Kant’s notion of
autonomy” (TJ 221). Thus, some commentators naturally take Rawls’s justice as fairness as
mainly influenced by Kant. For example, Stephen Darwall (1980) reads Rawls’s Theory as a
Kantian response to emotivism and utilitarianism in the context of the debate between
Humeanism and Kantianism in the last century. But Rawls himself acknowledges that his
reading of Rousseau plays a major role in his transition from the natural law and Millian
utilitarian tradition to the social contract tradition in the mid-1950s (cf. Reidy, 2009, p.36).
And while Rawls criticizes Hobbes, Locke, Kant, Hume, Mill and Marx in his Lectures, he
makes no critique of Rousseau.45 In his Lectures, as we have seen, Rawls provides an
interpretation of amour-propre which is different from the traditional reading. There he
argues that amour-propre should be understood as “a natural concern for a secure standing in
relation to others and involves a need for equal acceptance with them” (LHPP 198). He also
suggests that the positive form of amour-propre makes Rousseau’s society, depicted in the
Social Contract, possible. He later introduces Rousseau’s social contract theory, according to
which, “we must arrange our political and social institutions according to the terms of
cooperation expressed by the social contract” so that our moral freedom, political and social
equality and independence can be secured (LHPP 208). Rawls’s justice as fairness is also a
contract theory, according to which, all parties, free and equal, rational and reasonable, in the
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Original Position, under the veil of ignorance, would choose the two principles of justice
over other conceptions of justice. In the opening pages of his The Law of Peoples and
Restatement, he says that his liberal conception of justice as fairness, which follows
Rousseau’s thought in The Social Contract, describes a realistic utopia which “takes people
as they are (by the laws of nature), and constitutional and civil laws as they might be, that is,
as they would be in a reasonably just and well-ordered democratic society” (LP 13; JF 13).
One of the central tasks of Rawls’s justice as fairness, therefore, is to explain how his liberal
conception of justice as fairness meets the demand of amour-propre, that is, a person’s need
for equal status with others, and how this amour-propre in turn makes his well-ordered
society in justice as fairness realistic.
In this chapter, I argue that Rawls’s justice as fairness has a Rousseauvian interpretation
for two reasons. The first reason is that amour-propre (self-respect) 46 plays a significant role
in Rawls’s justification of the two principles of justice. The second reason is that Rawls’s
argument from self-respect for the two principles of justice parallels, and is grounded in
Rousseau’s thoughts on amour-propre.
In the first section, I will briefly introduce Rawls’s justice as fairness; in the second
section, I will introduce his argument from self-respect for the two principles of justice. As I
explain the significance of amour-propre in this argument, I will explain how his assumptions
in the argument from self-respect parallel, and are grounded in, Rousseau’s thoughts on
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amour-propre. I conclude that there is a Rousseauvian interpretation of Rawls’s justice as
fairness.

1.   A Brief Introduction to Justice as Fairness
In the opening pages of A Theory of Justice, Rawls says that his contract theory of justice
aims “to present a conception of justice which generalizes and carries to a higher level of
abstraction the familiar theory of the social contract as found, say, in Locke, Rousseau, and
Kant” (TJ 10).	
  His social contract theory, like all other social contract theories, has three parts: a
description of the state of nature, the contract itself and an outline of the political institutions. He
argues that parties who are free and equal rational beings, in the Original Position, under the veil
of ignorance, will choose the two principles of justice over other conceptions of justice, such as
utilitarianism, perfectionism, and intuitionism. The parties in the original position are seen as
free because first, they are capable of having the moral power to have a conception of the good,
second, they are self-authenticating sources of valid claims, and thirdly, they are capable of
taking responsibility for their ends (JF 21-4; PL 72). The parties are seen as equal because they
equally have the two moral powers to a minimal degree to engage in social cooperation (PL 50).
They are rational in the sense that they have their own conceptions of the good and they are
willing to make efforts and use resources to achieve their plans of life (PL 50). He also
presupposes that there are social primary goods that are necessary for the exercise and the
development of the two moral powers and the pursuit of any conception of the good. These
primary goods are rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, incomes and wealth, and the
social bases of self-respect. The Original Position is an initial situation in which free and equal
rational beings, who do not know their identities and idiosyncrasies under the veil of ignorance,
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try to decide how to distribute these social primary goods. Rawls argues that the parties in the
original position would choose the two principles of justice over other conceptions of justice.
The parties in the Original Position would not choose intuitionists’ principles of justice because
intuitionism does not have a priority rule to resolve the conflicts among different first principles
of justice. Since the parties are rational, they wish to establish standards according to which their
different claims can be weighted. Thus, they would not choose the intuitionists’ principles of
justice which involve a plurality of conflicting first principles of justice, without a method for
weighing these principles against each other. They would not choose the perfectionists’ principle
of justice because perfectionism takes one conception of the good, that is, human excellence, as
exclusively intrinsically valuable and thus cannot be acceptable by all parties in the Original
Position.47 For the parties in the Original Position conceive of themselves and of each other as
free to choose and alter their own ends, and so they know that they might not share the same
conception of the good with perfectionism. But the perfectionists’ society might require them to
sacrifice their own freedom for the sake of maximizing perfection. For example, Aristotelian
perfectionism notoriously justifies slavery. Thus, the parties in the Original Position would not
take the risk of losing their freedom to choose the principle of perfection. For similar reasons, the
parties in the Original Position would not choose the utilitarian principle of justice. For
utilitarianism might require a person to sacrifice his freedom for the sake of (total or average)
utility.48
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Rawls argues that the two principles of justice would be chosen by the parties in the
Original Position. The two principles of justice are as follows: the first principle of justice, or the
principle of equal liberty, says that “Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully
adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of
liberties for all” (JF 42); The second principle of justice, which consists of the principle of fair
equality of opportunity and the difference principle, says that “Social and economic inequalities
are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached to offices and positions open to all
under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit
of the least-advantaged members of society” (JF 42-3). The principles of justice might conflict
with each other. If there is no priority rule, there is no way to resolve conflicts. Rawls thus
provides several notions of priority to solve this problem: the priority of equal liberty (the first
priority rule) which says the first principle of justice is prior to the second principle of justice, the
priority of justice over efficiency and welfare (the second priority rule) which includes the
priority of the first half (the principle of fair equality of opportunity) of the second principle over
the second half (the difference principle) of the second principle, and the priority of second
principle over the principle of efficiency and that of maximizing the sum of advantages, and the
priority of right over the good.
Why would the parties in the Original Position choose the two principles of justice over
other conceptions of justice? One of the main grounds of Rawls’s justification for the two
principles of justice is the argument from self-respect, which explains how the two principles of
justice meet the demand of amour-propre.
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2.   The Argument from Self-respect for the Two Principles of Justice
In §29 Rawls appeals to the conditions of publicity and finality to ground the two
principles of justice. The conditions of publicity and finality are two of the formal constraints on
the concept of right. Other formal constraints on the concept of right are the conditions of
generality, universality and ordering. These formal constraints on the concept of right must be
met if a conception of justice is to be allowed to be presented to the parties in the Original
Position. The condition of generality says that principles should be general. And so the egoistic
principle that everyone is to serve my purpose should not be considered as a candidate for the
principles of justice presented to the parties. The condition of universality says that principles
should be universal in application. A principle of justice must hold for all moral persons. It
cannot be self-contradictory or self-defeating if everyone acts on it. The condition of publicity
says that principles should be publicly known to all parties. This condition is met by all contract
theories because the word “contract” means that it is accepted by all parties. The condition of
ordering says that a conception of justice must be able to adjudicate conflicting claims. The
intuitionists’ principles of justice do not have a priority rule and thus do not meet the condition
of ordering.49 The condition of finality means that the original agreement is final and there is no
second chance to reconsider it. The conditions of publicity and finality are some of the main
grounds of the two principles of justice. These two conditions give rise to the strains of
commitment, according to which, those who are represented by the parties must honor the
principles of justice agreed by the parties in the Original Position. Rawls argues that other
conceptions of the good, especially the principle of utility fail to meet the strains of commitment.
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They meet the condition of ordering formally, but not substantively. Perhaps it is for this reason it is presented to
the parties in the original position to choose from.
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On the one hand, if the principle of utility is chosen in the Original Position, parties are to stick
to it and act upon it. But for the sake of greater utility, the utilitarian society may require a person
to sacrifice his own freedom. Thus if the principle of utility is chosen, by the strains of
commitment, a person may need to sacrifice his freedom for the greater good. Since the decision
made in the Original Position is final, there is no second chance for them to reconsider the
original agreement. And since the agreement is publicly known, persons in the utilitarian society
are not motivated to retain the utilitarian society out of the fear that they may be asked to
sacrifice their freedom for the sake of the greater satisfaction of many.
I argue that for Rawls what underlies the argument from self-respect for the two
principles of justice is the demand of amour-propre. First, I will argue that for Rawls the
utilitarian principle fails to meet the demand of amour-propre, the need for equal status, because
the utilitarian society undermines self-respect.50 This is not to deny that utilitarianism affirms
one’s equal status in an important sense — each counts equally (for one) in the aggregation of
utility. But to be publicly affirmed as an equal input to social utility is not the same as being
publicly affirmed as a separate equal person within a system of social cooperation. The former
undermines one’s self-respect while the latter does not. Next, I will argue that for Rawls the two
principles of justice meet the demand of amour-propre because the public affirmation of equal
citizenship ensures the social bases of one’s self-respect. In the mean-time, I will explore some
similarities between Rawls’s thoughts on self-respect and Rousseau’s thoughts on amour-propre.
I argue that the premises of Rawls’s argument from self-respect parallel, and are grounded in,
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Robert Jubb correctly points out that “the discussion of how utilitarianism would fail to meet the strains of
commitment is the obverse of the set of demands that the natural form of amour-propre makes” (Jubb, 2011, p.251).
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certain of Rousseau’s thoughts on amour-propre. If my argument is plausible, there is a
Rousseauvian interpretation of Rawls’s justice as fairness.

2.1 The Utilitarian Principle Fails to Meet the Demand of Amour-propre
The utilitarian principle that Rawls criticizes for the most part is the principle of utility
endorsed by classic utilitaranism such as Bentham, Sidgwick and Edgeworth, and the principle
of average utility endorsed by average utilitarianism such as Mill and Wicksell.51 Classic
utilitarianism says that a society is to be arranged so as to maximize the utility. Average
utilitarianism says that a society is to be arranged so as to maximize average utility. Rawls
argues that both classic utilitarianism and average utilitarianism undermine self-respect. Another
kind of utilitarianism he discusses is restricted utilitarianism. Rawls is sympathetic to restricted
utilitarianism in his “Two Concepts of Rules (1955),” but in Theory and Restatement he
criticizes mixed utilitarianism, a form of restricted utilitarianism, as indeterminate, and maintains
that it fails to meet the condition of publicity (TJ 277-85; JF 126-30). Mixed utilitarianism (that
Rawls discusses) says that the society is to be arranged in accordance with the principle of equal
liberty and the principle of utility and that the principle of equal liberty is prior to the principle of
utility. Rawls suggests that the mixed view is not utilitarian for the principle of utility only has a
subordinate place. Since both mixed utilitarianism and justice as fairness agree on the priority of
the principle of equal liberty, it is reasonable to postulate that mixed utilitarianism secures self-
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Rawls’s criticisms against utilitarianism face many criticisms. See, for example, Gregory S. Kavka (1975), Brian
Barry (1977), Ivar Labukt (2009), David Lyons (1972), David Braybrooke (1973), Timothy D. Roche (1982),
Thomas Carson (1983), Richard Arneson (2000). Most of these criticisms fail to understand Rawls’s argument
against utilitarianism as the argument from self-respect.
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respect to a certain degree.52 But, as we shall see, both classic utilitarianism and average
utilitarianism fail to meet the demand of amour-propre.

2.1.1 Classic Utilitarianism Fails to Meet the Demand of Amour-propre
One of the criticisms Rawls levels against classic utilitarianism is that it fails to “take
seriously the distinction of persons” (TJ 24). Classic utilitarianism suggests that “a society is
properly arranged when its institutions maximize the net balance of satisfaction” (TJ 21). Classic
utilitarianism argues that since a person should sacrifice small pleasure in the present for greater
pleasure in the future, a society should sacrifice an individual person’s freedom for the sake of
the greater good of many. Rawls argues that for this kind of utilitarianism “it does not matter,
except indirectly, how this sum of satisfactions is distributed among individuals any more than it
matters, except indirectly, how one man distributes his satisfaction over time” (TJ 23). Classic
utilitarianism takes the perspective of an impartial spectator who uses “sympathetic identification
in guiding our imagination that the principle for one man is applied to society” (TJ 24). This
impartial spectator “is the perfect rational individual who identifies with and experiences the
desires of others as if these desires were his own” (TJ 24). But classic utilitarianism fails to
provide a motivating force for the utilitarian society. Even though from a third person
perspective, that is, from the impartial spectator’s perspective, every single person is disposable
for the sake of the greater good, it is not the case for the persons who live in the utilitarian
society. Those who live in the utilitarian society will not be motivated to retain the utilitarian
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I will discuss why the priority of equal liberty is crucial for the satisfaction of the demand of amour-propre later in
the chapter.
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society.53 Under the condition of finality, if the principle of utility is chosen in the Original
Position, they must live upon the principle of utility. Under the condition of publicity, it is
publicly known that the utilitarian principle requires a person to sacrifice his own freedom for
the greater good. Since everyone in the utilitarian society fears that they might be the one who is
disposable, they are not willing to form or retain the utilitarian society. Since it is not rational for
citizens in the utilitarian society to retain the society, classic utilitarianism must rely on the role
of sympathy or compassion to motivate its citizens to retain the utilitarian society. But “it seems
quite incredible that some citizens should be expected, on the basis of political principles, to
accept still lower prospects of life for the sake of others” (TJ 154). When a person’s selfpreservation is at stake, he will not, and legitimately so, give preference to compassion or
sympathy. In other words, a person will not, and should not, give up his own freedom for the
sake of the greater satisfaction of many. After all, it is my freedom that is sacrificed for the
greater good of others.
Another important aspect of classic utilitarianism, Rawls argues, is that “In calculating
the greatest balance of satisfaction it does not matter, except indirectly, what the desires are for”
(TJ 27). But certain conceptions of the good violate our sentiments of justice as they violate our
deep conviction in the inviolability of rights and liberties. He writes:
if men take a certain pleasure in discriminating against one another, in subjecting
others to a lesser liberty as a means of enhancing their self-respect, then the
satisfaction of these desires must be weighed in our deliberations according to
their intensity, or whatever, along with other desires. If society decides to deny
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Assuming that those who live in the utilitarian society have ordinary human psychology, they will not be
motivated to retain the utilitarian society. But we will see that utilitarianism assumes that its people have a peculiar
personality.
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them fulfillment, or to suppress them, it is because they tend to be socially
destructive and a greater welfare can be achieved in other ways. (TJ 27)
It is important to notice that Rawls suggests here that self-respect has a negative sense. It
can be enhanced by “subjecting others to a lesser liberty.” This, however, is no surprise to us,
for, as we have seen, Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre has a negative sense, that is, a desire
for superiority, or a desire for domination. Those who have the negative sense of amour-propre
thus seek to manipulate or dominate others, to subject others to a lesser liberty. But this negative
amour-propre must be suppressed by the society, Rawls argues, regardless of whether its
fulfillment will bring about the greater satisfaction of many or not.
What underlies Rawls’s objections to classic utilitarianism is the demand of amourpropre to value oneself, or respect for oneself. When a person’s freedom is sacrificed for the sake
of the greater satisfaction of many, this person is regarded as having inferior status compared
with others. If he knows, and knows that others know that he has inferior status compared with
others, he will lack a sense of self-respect. Since under the condition of publicity people in the
utilitarian society will know, and know that others know, that he has inferior status, they will
tend to lack a sense of self-respect. The deferential wife, Uncle Tom, and the self-deprecator are
examples of those who lack self-respect (cf. Thomas Hill, 1991, p.5). The deferential wife is a
woman who is devoted to serving her husband. Uncle Tom is a Black man who is extremely
deferential to his white masters. The self-deprecator is a person who has contempt for himself for
he judges that he is not worthy of respect. All of them are examples of servility. These people do
not have a secure sense of self-respect. The utilitarian society is similar to the patriarchal society
and the white supremacist society in the sense that it encourages the vice of servility.
Utilitarianism may justify patriarchy and white supremacy if the husbands and the whites
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contribute more to the net balance of satisfaction. In the utilitarian society, the vice of servility
might be praised as a virtue to encourage people to sacrifice their freedom for the sake of the
greater satisfaction of many. Those who live in the utilitarian society might mistakenly believe
that they do not have equal moral status with others. Thus in the utilitarian society the least
advantaged people, who mistakenly believe that they have inferior status, will be timorous and
lack self-respect, and the more advantaged people, who falsely believe that they have superior
status, will be arrogant and self-conceited. Thus the utilitarian society fosters the negative sense
of amour-propre, a desire for superiority on the one hand, and the lack of self-respect, a vice of
servility on the other. Consumed with the sense of negative amour-propre or a vice of servility,
those who live in the utilitarian society can hardly have the moral sensibility that the utilitarian
optimistically expects them to have to stabilize the utilitarian society. This society thus is
unlikely to be a society of mutual respect and mutual regard, but rather a society of domination
and subjection, a society of manipulation and subjugation.

2.1.2 Average Utilitarianism Fails to Meet the Demand of Amour-propre
It is apparent that average utilitarianism faces the same difficulties that classic
utilitarianism does for they both takes utility as the satisfaction of desires and they both admit of
“interpersonal comparison that can at least be summed at the margin” (TJ 139).54 If the
population of a society remains unchanged, the principle of average utility is equivalent to the
principle of total utility. But if the population of a society doubles, the average utility of the
society will decrease while the total utility of the society will increase. Rawls argues that parties
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Rawls notes that this notion of utility has been largely abandoned by modern economic theory. The new
understanding is that utility is a way of representing the choices of economic agents (TJ 143).
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in the original position will choose the principle of average utility over the principle of total
utility because the parties aim to advance their own self-interest and have no interest in
maximizing the sum total of satisfaction (TJ 141).55
But the parties in the original position will not choose the principle of average utility over
the two principles of justice. Rawls argues that average utilitarianism, just like classic
utilitarianism, justifies, “if not slavery or serfdom, at any rate serious infractions of liberty for the
sake of greater social benefits” (TJ 135).56 Since the parties in the original position are assumed
to be ignorant of the probability of their chance of turning out to be somebody, they will not take
the risk of being subjected to slavery or serfdom by choosing the principle of average utility.
Thus, similar to classic utilitarianism, average utilitarianism also fails to meet the demand of
amour-propre for it may justify the sacrifice of a person’s freedom for the sake of average utility.
Rawls acknowledges that average utilitarianism may argue that if the equal liberties are
necessary for a secure sense of self-respect, then they should be established because they may
promote average utility (TJ 157). But according to the strains of commitment, the principle of
average utility should be publicly known by everyone in the utilitarian society and they cannot
adopt non-utilitarian principles of justice. Thus, if it happens that the principle of average utility
undermines their self-respect, they cannot reconsider the original agreement. Thus, the parties in
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Some commentators disagree that the parties in the original position will choose the principle of average utility
over the principle of total utility. See, for example, Gregory S. Kavka (1975), Brian Barry (1977). Kavka and Barry
argues that the parties in the original position know that they exist and this knowledge inclines them to choose the
principle of total utility over the principle of average utility because the average utility is higher than the total utility
when they do not exist. But there is no reason for Rawls to suppose that the parties in the original position know that
they exist or know about the probability of their existence.
56
David Lyons (1972) argues that utilitarianism does not justify slavery or serfdom more than justice as fairness.
But this objection is untenable. As we will see later, even though average utilitarianism may argue that the equal
liberties promote average utility, the parties in the original position will still choose the two principles of justice.
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the original position will not choose the principle of average utility over the two principles of
justice.
Another difficulty that Rawls mentions with average utilitarianism is that it presupposes a
bizarre conception of persons. The utilitarian persons do not have any determinate highest-order
interest or fundamental ends. They are ready to accept “as defining their good whatever
evaluations these rules assign to accept as defining their, or anyone else’s, final ends, even if
these evaluations conflict with those required by their existing fundamental interests” (TJ 151).
Thus, average utilitarianism assumes that those who live in the average utilitarian society will
have the moral sensibility to act on and from the principle of average utility even though it may
turn out to undermine their own self-respect. Rawls’s moral persons, in contrast, have a
determinate highest-order interest and fundamental interest. He says that “free persons conceive
themselves as beings who can revise and alter their final ends and who give first priority to
preserving their liberty in these matters” (TJ 131-2). Thus, Rawls’s moral persons, unlike the
utilitarian persons, will not accept the principle of average utility which may undermine their
fundamental interest. Rawls’s moral persons also have moral sensibility, but their moral
sensibility, which is based on the principle of reciprocity and equal respect, will not incline them
to act on and from the principle of average utility which may undermine their self-respect. As we
will see later, the two principles of justice meet the demand of amour-propre, and so Rawls’s
moral persons are motivated to stabilize the well-ordered society of justice as fairness.

2.2 The Two Principles of Justice Meet the Demand of Amour-propre
As we have seen, parties in the original position, under the veil of ignorance, would not
choose the principle of (average) utility because it fails to meet the strains of commitment and
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the demand of amour-propre. But why would they choose the two principles of justice? In §29
Rawls argues that “the public recognition of the two principles gives greater support to men’s
self-respect and this in turn increases the effectiveness of social cooperation” (TJ 154). His
argument from self-respect for the two principles of justice therefore goes as follows: (1) selfrespect is perhaps the most important primary good; and (2) the public recognition of the two
principles gives greater support to a person’s self-respect than other conceptions of justice; and
therefore (3) the two principles of justice are more defensible than other conceptions of justice.
In explaining the reason why the two principles of justice meet the demand of amour-propre, I
will argue that the premises of Rawls’s argument from self-respect for the two principles of
justice parallel, and are grounded in, Rousseau’s thoughts on amour-propre. If my argument is
plausible, there is a Rousseauvian interpretation of Rawls’s justice as fairness.

2.2.1 Self-respect as Perhaps the Most Important Primary Good
First, Rawls argues that self-respect is perhaps the most important primary good. He
argues that “A sense of their own worth is necessary if they are to pursue their conception of the
good with satisfaction and to take pleasure in its fulfillment,” and that “Self-respect is not so
much a part of any rational plan of life as the sense that one’s plan is worth carrying out” (TJ
154). In §69 He explains what self-respect is and why it is perhaps the most important primary
good:
We may define self-respect (or self-esteem) as having two aspects. First of all, as
we noted earlier (§29), it includes a person’s sense of his own value, his secure
conviction that his conception of his good, his plan of life, is worth carrying out.
And second, self-respect implies a confidence in one’s ability, so far as it is within
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one’s power, to fulfill one’s intentions. When we feel that our plans are of little
value, we cannot pursue them with pleasure or take delight in their execution. Nor
plagued by failure and self-doubt can we continue in our endeavors. It is clear
then why self-respect is a primary good. (TJ 386)
Thus, just like other social primary goods, self-respect is an important social primary
good because it is desirable for every rational being and it is necessary for the pursuit of any
rational plan of life. It is a human good because it is rational for everyone to have self-respect. It
is a social primary good because unlike natural primary goods such as health and vigor,
intelligence and imagination, it is directly under the control of the basic structure (TJ 54). But
why is self-respect perhaps the most important primary good? Or in other words, why is it
perhaps more important than rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth?
Rawls says “Without it [self-respect] nothing may seem worth doing, or if some things have
value for us, we lack the will to strive for them. All desire and activity becomes empty and vain,
and we sink into apathy and cynicism” (TJ 386). Without other social primary goods, arguably,
we may still find our ends worth pursuing, and we may still take pleasure in the pursuit of our
own conceptions of the good. But without self-respect, we may not find anything worth doing, or
we may not have the confidence to achieve anything. Admittedly, without other social primary
goods, especially rights and liberties, it may be extremely difficult for us to achieve any ends of
ours. But only if we have self-respect, that is, we believe that our ends are worth pursuing and
we believe that we have the ability to achieve them, will we still strive to achieve our plans of
life with pleasure. Furthermore, we may say that other primary goods are important primary
goods partly because they are social bases of self-respect. Rawls suggests that the equal fair
distribution of social primary goods (the two principles of justice) ensures the social bases of

72

self-respect, and that this is one of the main grounds for the two principles of justice. Thus selfrespect is intrinsically valuable while other social primary goods are valuable in part for the sake
of self-respect.57
Rawls’s definition of self-respect bears some similarities to Rousseau’s thoughts in Book
IV of Emile. There Rousseau tells a story of an unhappy fugitive (whom he latter confesses is
himself). This young expatriate was born a Calvinist but latter became a fugitive in a foreign
land where he changed his religion for bread. He was admitted to an almshouse where he was
taught evils and new dogmas. When he wanted to flee, he was locked up. Fortunately, an
ecclesiastic came to the almshouse and helped him to escape. Having escaped, the young man
soon obtained a fortune. But he lost everything and was left, without a shelter, without food,
ready to die. But the ecclesiastic came to him, and tried to help him. He found the young man
had no self-respect, and full of self-contempt and contempt for others because he was a victim of
opprobrium and contempt. The ecclesiastic helped the young man to gain his self-confidence by
respecting him as an equal, and tried to awaken his amour-propre.58 Rousseau writes:
He showed him a happier future in the good employment of his talents. He
reanimated a generous ardor in his heart by the account of others’ noble deeds. In
making the boy admire those who had performed them, the priest gave him the
desire to perform like deeds. To detach him gradually from his idle and vagrant
life, he had the boy make extracts from selected books; and, feigning to need
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This is not to say that liberties and rights are not intrinsically valuable because they are constitutive of the social
bases self-respect. Without liberties and rights, a person can hardly have a secure sense of self-respect, even though
he may have an extravagant amount of power or wealth.
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Rousseau says that the ecclesiastic treated the young man as an equal: “One day, when he had been given some
money to pass out to the poor, the youth, claiming his right as a poor man, was so craven as to ask him for some of
it. ‘No,’ the priest said, ‘we are brothers; you are part of me and I ought not to touch this deposit for my use.’ Then
he gave the youth from his own money as much as he had asked for” (E 264).
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these extracts, he fed the noble sentiment of gratitude in him. He instructed him
indirectly by these books. He made the boy gain a good enough opinion of
himself so as not to believe he was a being useless for anything good and so as
not to want any longer to make himself contemptible in his own eyes. (E 264)
Rousseau’s story of the unhappy fugitive tells us that a hostile environment in which the
advantaged oppress the disadvantaged fosters a lack of self-respect, shame, and spite. The
ecclesiastic’s education of the unhappy fugitive is Rousseau’s education of Emile in miniature.
To rebuild a person’s secure sense of self-respect, he must live in an environment in which he is
respected, and is known to be respected as equals. He also should have a rational plan of life that
is worth carrying out. As he carries out his plan, he will gradually have a stronger sense of selfworth and self-esteem. In the example of the unhappy fugitive, the young man was instructed to
make extracts from books. And the ecclesiastic pretended that what the young man did was
helpful to him. The affirmation of his self-worth from the ecclesiastic thus enabled him to gain a
good opinion of himself, a sense of self-worth, a sense of self-esteem.

2.2.2 The Public Affirmation of Equal Citizenship Ensures the Social Bases of SelfRespect Which Makes a Society of Mutual-Respect Possible
Having established that self-respect is perhaps the most important good, Rawls argues
that the public recognition of the two principles gives greater support to a person’s self-respect
which makes a society of mutual-respect possible. Rawls’s argument for this claim has three
steps. The first step is the dependency thesis, that is, self-respect depends on the respect of
others. In other words, a person’s need for equal status can be met only if others grant him equal
status. The second step is the legitimacy thesis, that is, the legitimate social bases of self-respect
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are the public affirmation of equal citizenship, not equal socio-economic status. In other words,
the public affirmation of a person’s equal status, equal citizenship, rather than equal socioeconomic status, meets his need for equal status. The third step is the reciprocity thesis, that is,
self-respect and the respect for others are mutually supportive. Thus self-respect makes a society
of mutual respect and mutual regard possible. I will argue that the dependency thesis is grounded
in the relative nature of amour-propre, and that the legitimacy thesis parallels the conditions of
amour-propre, and that the reciprocity thesis is grounded in the reciprocal feature of amourpropre. Therefore, there is a Rousseauvian interpretation of Rawls’s justice as fairness.

2.2.2.1 The Dependency Thesis
To argue for the main thesis that the public affirmation of equal citizenship ensures the
social bases of self-respect, Rawls relies on the dependency thesis, that is, self-respect depends
on the respect of others. The dependency thesis explains why the problem of the social bases of
self-respect is not a private matter, but a public matter, a matter that needs to be, and can be
addressed in the public sphere by the government.59 As he says: “Now our self-respect normally
depends upon the respect of others. Unless we feel that our endeavors are respected by them, it is
difficult if not impossible for us to maintain the conviction that our ends are worth advancing”
(TJ 154). The problem of the social bases of self-respect is a matter that needs to be addressed in
the public sphere by the government because it cannot be satisfied by me alone, assuming my
self-respect depends on the respect of others. This problem is a matter that can be addressed in
the public sphere by the government because the public affirmation of my equal citizenship
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Some commentators argue that self-respect is a private matter. See, for example, Robert E. Lane (1982) who
quotes Karl Popper in support of this claim.
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ensures the social bases of my self-respect, assuming my self-respect depends on the respect of
others.
But it may not be clear for some people why self-respect depends on the respect of
others. Some commentators argue that Rawls mistakenly assumes self-respect depends on the
respect of others.60 Bird (2008) argues that if we imagine an encounter between a humiliator and
the humiliated, the humiliator has the power to undermine the self-respect of the humiliated. But
he argues that the victims can remind themselves that their self-respect does not depend on the
respect of others and that in this way they can keep their self-respect intact. But Bird fails to see
why it is difficult, if not impossible for the victims to deceive themselves that their self-respect
does not depend on the respect of others. Rousseau’s thoughts on the relative nature of amourpropre explain why it is difficult, if not impossible for them to do so.
Rawls’s dependency thesis is grounded on the relative nature of amour-propre. Rousseau
suggests that it is necessary and inevitable that our amour-propre depends on how others value
us. In his second Discourse, Rousseau writes:
As ideas and sentiments succeed one another, as the mind and the heart grow
active, Mankind continues to grow tame, contacts expand and bond ties tighten. It
became customary to gather in front of the Huts or around a large Tree: song and
dance, true children of love and leisure, became the amusement or rather the
occupation of idle men and women gathered together. Everyone began to look at
everyone else and to wish to be looked at himself, and pubic esteem acquired a
price. The one who sang or danced best; the handsomest, the strongest, the most

60

For example, Colin Bird (2008) argues that a person’s self-respect should not depend on others.

76

skillful, or the most eloquent came to be the most highly regarded, and this was
the first step at once toward inequality and vice. (DI 166)
Here Rousseau says that with the development of our intelligent faculties and our
sentiments, as we have more leisure time and a variety of amusements, we start to have tightened
social bonds with each other. And thus our amour-propre becomes relative to others: we can
have a sense of self-respect only when we are respected by others. If Rousseau is right that as we
associate with each other, our sense of amour-propre relies on what we are in the eyes of others,
then it is necessary and inevitable that the respect of oneself depends on the respect of others. If
it is necessary and inevitable that self-respect is dependent on the respect of others, the stoic
strategy to escape public opinions, as Bird suggests the humiliated should, is but a sort of selfdeception. And if self-respect depends on the respect of others, under social institutions where a
person is often disrespected by others, he will necessarily lack self-respect. This implies that the
cure for the ill lies in the social institutions themselves. A person’s need for equal status can only
be met when the social bases of self-respect are ensured.

2.2.2.2 The Legitimate Social Bases of Self-Respect
As we have seen, one of the reasons that Bird’s argument against Rawls’s dependency
thesis fails is that he fails to see why the humiliated cannot deceive herself that self-respect does
not depend on the respect of others. Another reason his argument fails is that he fails to see that
as Rousseau and Rawls both observe the legitimate social bases of self-respect is not power but
the public affirmation of equal citizenship. Actually, Bird’s objection only confirms the
importance of the public affirmation of equal citizenship as the social bases of self-respect.
Indeed, if the social base of self-respect is power, the humiliated will have less self-respect due
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to lack of power. But if the humiliated knows, and knows that others know, that the social base
of self-respect is not power, but equal citizenship, she will have a secure sense of self-respect
despite the fact that she has no power. Bird fails to see the institutional factor that underlies a
person’s secure sense of self-respect. And thus it is difficult for him to understand why the
respect of others is owed to the humiliated despite the fact that she is less privileged in a society.
Why can the need of equal status not be met by the public affirmation of socio-economic
status such as power status? In §82 Rawls argues that if a society places the social bases of selfrespect on the socio-economic status, it will necessarily undermine the self-esteem of its people.
Therefore, the legitimate social bases of self-respect are (should be) equal citizenship. Since the
priority of equal liberty acknowledges the legitimate social bases of self-respect while other
conceptions of justice do not, he concludes that justice as fairness is more defensible than other
conceptions of justice.61 The reason why he thinks so is as follows. Since self-respect depends on
the respect of others, if society is to provide the social basis of one’s secure sense of self-respect,
it must provide an environment in which one’s equal worth is recognized and accepted by others.
Rawls argues that the well-ordered society provide such an environment: “in a well-ordered
society the need for status is met by the public recognition of just institutions, together with the
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Nir Eyal (2005), Russell Keat and David Miller (1974), Kai Nielsen (1979), Jeanne Zaino (1998) argue that his
argument does not provide grounds for the priority of liberty; on the contrary, it lends support for the priority of
socioeconomic equality. Robert Taylor (2003) argues that Rawls’s self-respect argument can only prove that
political liberty has high priority. Robert Lane (1982) and Richard Sinopoli (1994) argue that social or political
institutions should not be designed to ensure one’s self-respect. Lane argues that self-esteem is a scarce good and
should be earned by individuals and that it is not the task of government to maximize the self-esteem of its
population. But as we have seen, since self-respect depends on the respect of others, the social bases of self-respect
need to be, and can be addressed in the public sphere by the government. Sinopoli argues that Rawls mistakenly
assumes that the considerations of equal respect always outweigh the considerations of associational freedom. He
argues that in certain circumstances, associations should have the freedom to associate only with a certain kind of
person. For example, if a group of lesbians form a company, they should have the freedom not to hire heterosexual
men or women. Sinopoli argues that under these circumstances, government should not interfere with their
associational freedom. I tend to think that Sinopoli is right to point out that government should not interfere with the
associational freedom of these lesbians, but I do not think their associational freedom necessarily contravenes the
principle of equal respect.
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full and diverse internal life of the many free communities of interests that the equal liberties
allow” (TJ 477). Under the condition of publicity, in the well-ordered society everyone accepts
and knows that everyone has equal liberties and rights which allow for a large variety of
communities in which a person can develop his interests and talents. The equal distribution of
fundamental liberties and rights provides a secure standing for one’s equal status, and the public
affirmation of one’s equal status satisfies one’s desire for having, and being evaluated as having,
equal status with others. Thus Rawls argues that the social bases of self-respect should be the
public recognition of one’s equal status. This equal status is not equal socio-economic status but
the status of equal citizenship because a society which bases one’s self-respect on socioeconomic status necessarily undermines one’s self-esteem, as he says:
doing this [grounding one’s self-respect on socio-economic status] would put
them at a disadvantage and weaken their political position. It would also have the
effect of publicly establishing their inferiority as defined by the basic structure of
society. This subordinate ranking in public life would indeed be humiliating and
destructive of self-esteem. (TJ 477)
Here Rawls suggests that if a society takes a person’s socio-economic status to be the
legitimate source of his self-respect, he will mistakenly believe that his true value lies in social
advantages. Thus he argues that the basic structure of the well-ordered society should be
arranged in a way that everyone’s equal status, equal citizenship is publicly affirmed. If everyone
knows, and knows that others know, that their true value lies in something other than social
advantages, or more specifically, in one’s status of equal citizenship, it is likely that they will
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have a healthy and natural form of amour-propre.62 Notably, Rawls does not neglect the
important role of social and economic equality in ensuring the social bases of self-respect. He
acknowledges that if social and economic inequality is large enough, it will undermine selfrespect and arouse special psychologies such as envy. The equal fair distribution of social
primary goods (the two principles of justice) is designed to ensure that social and economic
discrepancies between one and another are beneficial to all. But he emphasizes that the principle
of equal liberty is prior to the second principle of justice, and that the public affirmation of the
priority of equal liberty ensures the social bases of self-respect.
Rawls’s thoughts on the legitimate social bases of self-respect parallels the conditions of
amour-propre. As we have seen in the previous chapter, Rousseau thinks that the belief that a
person’s true value lies in social advantages necessarily leads him to have a desire for
superiority, a corrupted form of amour-propre. He argues that this corrupted form of amourpropre is the cause of inequalities and other evils in society and that a just society should guide
amour-propre with reason so that amour-propre can manifest its healthy and natural form. The
reason that guides amour-propre is the public knowledge that one’s true value lies in his equal
status, equal citizenship. In other words, the necessary condition for a person’s healthy and
natural amour-propre is the public knowledge that one’s true value lies in his equal status, equal
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Elsewhere, Rawls says that the public affirmation of equal citizenship and its fair value ensures the social bases of
self-respect. Meena Krishnamurthy (2013) argues that Rawls has not given any reason why people’s equal worth is
respected by social institutions only when all individuals have the same political rights and liberties. She tries to
develop Rawls’s argument from self-respect and explain why equal political rights and liberties are essential for
self-respect. She argues that since a secure sense of self-respect is necessary for the exercise and the development of
the two moral powers, equal political rights and their fair value must be ensured to secure self-respect. First, she
supposes the minority groups in a society do not have rights to vote. This suggests that their moral powers are less
valuable than those of others, and thus they will have a less secure sense of self-respect. Thus, these minority groups
will not support institutions that do not ensure their equal liberty to vote. Second, she supposes the rich controls the
course of legislation for their advantage. This suggests that the poor’s determinate conception of the good is not
equally valuable as that of the rich, and this will undermine the poor's sense of self-respect.
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citizenship. Rousseau’s social contract is an agreement among equals. Therefore, it is publicly
known and accepted that all citizens have equal status. The social contract among all equals
therefore is the remedy for the pervasive desires for domination, as Rousseau writes:
If there is any means of remedying this ill in society, it is to substitute law for man
and to arm the general wills with a real strength superior to the action of every
particular will. If the laws of nations could, like those of nature, have an
inflexibility that no human force could ever conquer, dependence on men would
then become dependence on things again; in the republic all of the advantages of
the natural state would be united with those of the civil state, and freedom which
keeps man exempt from vices would be joined to morality which raises him to
virtue. (E 85)
Rousseau’s social contract theory provides a remedy for this ill. By “the total alienation
of each associate with all of his rights to the whole community” (SC 50), citizens in the civil
state are as free and equal as they were in the state of nature. Since each and all totally alienate
themselves to the union, everyone is equal. And thus no one is superior to anyone else. Since this
is an agreement by all, it is publicly known that everyone has equal status. Therefore, in a
Rousseauvian society, it is unlikely that people will have a negative sense of amour-propre.
	
  

2.2.2.3 The Reciprocity Thesis
After Rawls has established that the public affirmation of equal citizenship ensures the
social bases of self-respect, he says that since self-respect and the respect for others are mutually
supportive (call it the reciprocity thesis), one’s secure sense of self-respect makes the society
depicted in the Social Contract, the society of mutual respect and mutual regard, possible.
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Rawls’s reciprocity thesis is grounded in the reciprocal feature of amour-propre. In
Rawls’s Lecture on Rousseau, he says that for Rousseau, in the society under the social contract,
people are concerned about two things. The first is our own well-being which is the object of our
amour de soi. The second is our equal status with others which is the object of our amour-propre.
Rawls suggests that for Rousseau our natural form of amour-propre, the desire for equal status
with others, makes a rightful claim on our conduct, a claim for us to grant others’ equal status
with us, as Rawls says:
on the basis of our needs and wants we can make claims which are endorsed by
others as imposing rightful limits on their conduct. Needing and asking for this
acceptance from others involves giving the same to them in return. For, moved by
this natural amour-propre, we are ready to grant the very same standing to others,
and to recognize the rightful limits that their needs and rightful claims impose on
us, provided — and this is essential — our equal status is accepted and made
secure in social arrangement. (LHPP 198)
According to Rawls in this passage, if our needs for equal status are met by the social
arrangement, our desires for equal status require us to grant others equal standing with us. Thus
the precondition of a society of mutual respect and equality is the public affirmation of a
person’s equal status, that is, equal citizenship. This explains why in the well-ordered society
citizens have a natural duty for mutual respect or civility. Since everyone rationally desires the
respect of others, it is rational for them to grant others equal standing with them which is the
precondition of the satisfaction of their own self-respect. This also explains why unreasonable
claims must be “overruled” in the well-ordered society. In Rawls’s example of the slaveholder
who gets great satisfaction from subjecting others to a lesser liberty, the slaveholder does not
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have a healthy and natural form of amour-propre, a desire to have equal status with others.
Rather, he has a negative sense of amour-propre, a desire for domination, a desire for subjecting
others to lesser liberty. But this desire for domination cannot be universalized because as
Rousseau says, it is impossible for everyone’s negative amour-propre to be satisfied. Thus the
desire for domination cannot make rightful claim on our conduct. Rather, as Rawls says, this
claim must be “overruled.”63

3.   Conclusion
To conclude, I have argued that amour-propre plays a significant role in Rawls’s
argument from self-respect for the two principles of justice. The two principles of justice are
more defensible than the principle of (average) utility because the latter cannot satisfy the
demand of amour-propre. The (classic and average) utilitarian society necessarily undermine
one’s self-respect because it requires a person to sacrifice his freedom for the sake of (total or
average) utility. Rawls’s two principles of justice can satisfy the demand of amour-propre
because the public affirmation of equal citizenship ensures the social bases of self-respect.
I have also argued that Rawls’s argument from self-respect for the two principles of
justice parallels, and is grounded, in Rousseau’s thoughts on amour-propre. Each premise of
Rawls’s argument from self-respect parallels, and is grounded in, Rousseau’s thoughts on amourpropre: (1) Rawls’s self-respect as the most important primary good seems to be inspired by
Rousseau’s story of the unhappy fugitive, a depiction of Emile’s moral education in miniature.
(2) There are three reasons why the public affirmation of equal citizenship ensures the social
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It is not hard to connect Rousseau’s thought here with Kant’s Formula of Universal Law: “act only in accordance
with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law” (Kant, 1996, p.73).
Adam Cureton (2013) suggests that “Kant proceeds from our own rational self-regard, through our willingness to
reciprocate with others, to duties of respect for others” (p.166). If Rawls’s interpretation of Rousseau here is right,
Kant’s theory of respect is likely to have its root in Rousseau.
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bases of self-respect which makes the society of mutual respect and mutual regard possible. The
first reason, the dependency thesis, is grounded in the relative nature of amour-propre. The
second reason, the legitimacy thesis, parallels the conditions of amour-propre. And the third
reason, the reciprocity thesis, is grounded in the reciprocal feature of amour-propre. Thus, if my
argument is plausible, there is a Rousseauvian interpretation of Rawls’s justice as fairness.
On my interpretation, there are several places (§5-6, §26-30, §64, §67, §82) in which
Rawls’s objections to the utilitarianism and his justifications for the two principles of justice are
grounded in Rousseau’s thoughts on amour-propre. There are several advantages of my
interpretation over other interpretations such as the Kantian interpretation. First, my
interpretation explains why Rawls says that after he read Rousseau with understanding, he turned
from the natural law tradition and the utilitarian tradition to the social contract tradition. Second,
my interpretation explains why Rawls does not criticize Rousseau while he criticizes Hobbes,
Locke, Kant, Hume, Mill and Marx in Lecture. Third, my interpretation explains why in The Law
of Peoples and in Restatement Rawls says that his liberal conception of justice aims to describe a
realistic utopia which takes “men as they are and laws as they might be”. Fourth, my
interpretation explains why Rawls insists on the wide view of amour-propre and why he suggests
that the healthy and natural form of amour-propre makes a society of mutual respect and mutual
regard possible. Notably, to say that Rawls’s justice as fairness has a Rousseauvian interpretation
is not to say that Rawls’s justice as fairness is not influenced by other great philosophers such as
Kant. My purpose in this chapter is merely to show that there is a Rousseauvian interpretation of
Rawls’s justice as fairness and thus Rawls’s justice as fairness is not distinctively Kantian as
Stephan Darwall (1980) and Robert Taylor (2003; 2011) suggest.
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CHAPTER 4 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ROUSSEAU’S CONCEPT OF
AMOUR-PROPRE IN RAWLS’S STABILITY ARGUMENT
We have seen that there is a Rousseauvian interpretation of Rawls’s justice as fairness for
two reasons. First, for Rawls, one of the main reasons why the two principles of justice are more
defensible than other conceptions of justice, especially utilitarianism, is that the two principles of
justice meet the demand of amour-propre. And second, Rawls’s argument from self-respect for
the two principles of justice parallels, and is grounded in, Rousseau’s thoughts on amour-propre,
in particular, its relative nature, its conditions and its reciprocal feature. But Rousseau’s
influence on Rawls is not simply an influence on his original position argument for justice as
fairness, but also an influence on his stability argument, which constitutes the second part of his
argument for the two principles of justice. The importance of the stability in Rawls’s overall
project has been emphasized by many commentators, nevertheless, only a few recognize the
importance of Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre in Rawls’s stability argument.64 Rawls
acknowledges the influence of Rousseau on his moral psychology, as he says, his aim in “The
Sense of Justice (1963)” is to reconstruct an account of moral development in order to illustrate
how “Rousseau’s thesis might be true” (CP 96). What Rawls refers to by “Rousseau’s thesis” is
the idea that “the sense of justice is no mere moral conception formed by the understanding
alone, but a true sentiment of the heart enlightened by reason, the natural outcome of our
primitive affections” (CP 96).65 We have seen that amour-propre has a reciprocal feature.
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For the importance of Rawls’s stability for his overall project, see Freeman (2003; 2007), Pogge (2007), Hill
(2013), Weithman (2010), Garthoff (2016).
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This thesis is explicit in Emile where Rousseau says “Our first duties are to ourselves: our primary sentiments are
centered on ourselves; all our natural movements relate in the first instance to our preservation and our well-being.
Thus, the first sentiment of justice does not come to us from the justice we owe but from that which is owed us; and
it is again one of the mistakes of ordinary education that, speaking at first to children of their duties, never of their

85

According to the reciprocity thesis, those who have self-respect have the tendency to respect
others. More generally, the reciprocity thesis says that those who receive benefits from others
have the tendency to benefit others. This reciprocity thesis originated in Rousseau, but is
developed by Rawls. In “The Sense of Justice” (1963) and Chapter VIII of A Theory of Justice,
Rawls explains how the reciprocity of disposition is exhibited in each of the three stages of moral
development. In Restatement, he re-emphasizes the importance of the acquisition of the sense of
justice through the three stages of moral development, and argues that the reciprocity of
disposition is an essential element in his reasonable moral psychology. Thus it should come as no
surprise that Rawls’s moral psychology has a Rousseauvian interpretation. And it is worth
exploring whether other parts of the stability argument have a Rousseauvian interpretation.
In this chapter, I will first briefly introduce Rawls’s moral psychology, and then I will
argue that Rawls’s account of moral development parallels, and is grounded in, Rousseau’s
thoughts on amour-propre. In particular, I argue that (1) Rawls’s thesis that the sense of justice is
derived from love and friendship is an illustration of Rousseau’s thesis that moral sentiments are
derived from natural sentiments, that (2) Rawls’s explanation for how we acquire the reciprocity
of disposition is grounded in Rousseau’s explanation of how amour-propre can be extended into
the sense of justice, and that (3) Rawls’s thoughts on the principle of sympathy parallel
Rousseau’s thoughts on compassion. In arguing for the Rousseauvian interpretation of Rawls’s
moral psychology, I will also answer some of the objections against his moral psychology in a
Rousseauvian way.

rights, one begins by telling them the opposite of what is necessary, what they cannot understand, and what cannot
interest them” (E 97).
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Next, I will argue that Rawls’s congruence argument in Theory and his overlapping
consensus argument in Political Liberalism parallel, and are grounded in, Rousseau’s conception
of persons. I argue that his congruence argument in Theory is grounded in the Kantian
Rousseauvian conception of moral freedom. And I argue that his overlapping consensus
argument in Political Liberalism is grounded in Rousseau’s conception of political freedom.
Finally, I will show that Rawls’s argument from the absence of special psychologies is
grounded in Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre. I argue that some of the objections against
Rawls’s treatment of economic inequality can be addressed in a Rousseauvian way.
To conclude, I argue that the three parts of the stability argument are all grounded in
Rousseau’s thoughts on amour-propre. Therefore, there is a Rousseauvian interpretation of
Rawls’s stability argument. In response to some of the objections against his stability argument, I
argue that Rawls’s stability argument is Rousseauvian in a deeper and better way.

1.   Amour-propre and Rawls’s Moral Psychology
Rawls says that his moral psychology is a psychological reconstruction which aims to
illustrate how Rousseau’s thesis can be true. Rousseau’s thesis includes three aspects. First, he
argues that moral sentiments are derived from natural sentiments. Second, he argues that amourpropre has a reciprocal feature. And third, he argues that self-love or self-esteem is the primary
motivating force for human actions, not compassion. I will call the first aspect “Rousseau’s
thesis” narrowly construed (as Rawls calls it), the second aspect “the reciprocity thesis,” and the
third aspect “a realistic moral psychology.” I argue that these three aspects parallel and provide
the basis for Rawls’s moral psychology. In this section, I will first briefly explain Rawls’s moral
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psychology and then I will explain the parallel relations between Rawls’s moral psychology and
that of Rousseau.

1.1 A Brief Introduction to Rawls’s Moral Psychology
Rawls’s moral psychology did not fundamentally change between his early and later
works.66 In “The Sense of Justice (1963)” he outlines the three stages of moral development
through which a person acquires a sense of justice which motivates him to stabilize the basic
structure of the well-ordered society. In Theory, this same account of moral development is
restated. The role of moral psychology, however, is not limited to explaining the acquisition of a
sense of justice, but also explains the congruence between the right and the thin conceptions of
the good, and explains the absence of special psychology such as envy. In Political Liberalism,
Rawls argues that there are two questions of stability, the first one is “whether people who grow
up under just institutions (as the political conception defines them) acquire a normally sufficient
sense of justice so that they generally comply with those institutions” (PL 141). The second
question is whether the political conception of justice can be the focus of an overlapping
consensus. He argues that the first question is answered by his account of moral development in
Theory. The second question is answered by the fact that the political conception of justice is
acceptable for all reasonable comprehensive views. In Restatement, in response to the objection
that the consensus is utopian, he argues that his is a reasonable moral psychology, which
includes the reciprocity of disposition that is exhibited in each stage of moral development (JF
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196). Thus, even though the role of moral psychology shifts slightly in his later writings, the
content of moral psychology remains unchanged.67
The content of Rawls’s moral psychology includes an account of moral persons and an
account of moral development to specify the account of moral persons. Rawls’s moral persons
are free and equal, rational and reasonable. They are free in the sense that they have the two
moral powers, the capacity for a sense of justice and the capacity for a conception of the good
(TJ 11; JF 21; PL 19). They are equal in the sense that they equally have these moral powers to a
minimal degree to be fully cooperating members of the society (TJ 17; JF 20; PL 19). They are
rational because they can choose and alter their own ends, and they seek efficient and probable
means to achieve their own ends (TJ 10; JF 6-7; PL 50). They are reasonable in the sense that
they are willing to honor the fair terms of cooperation, provided that others are willing to do the
same. The idea of reasonableness thus is a part of the idea of reciprocity (JF 6-7; PL 40-50).
Thus, to honor the two principles of justice is to honor the principle of reciprocity. They are
reasonable also in the sense that they are willing to recognize the burdens of judgment and to use
public reason to resolve fundamental political problems (PL 54).
The principle of reciprocity is specified in Rawls’s account of moral development. His
three-stage development of the morality of principles is initially stated in “The Sense of Justice”
(1963) and Chapter VIII of Theory. The origin of moral sentiments is natural love in the infant
stage. Family is the first institution of moral education. Thus Rawls says that the basic structure
of the well-ordered society includes family (TJ 405). In the first stage, parents love their child,
and they express their love for their child evidently through their care for him, their intention to
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do what the child’s rational self-love would incline and the fulfillment of this intention. When
parents’ love of their child is recognized by the child, the child loves them back. This is the first
psychological law. The child’s returning sentiment is not immediate after he sees “the evident
intention” of his parents’ love. It needs to go through several steps: first, the child is assured of
his self-worth when he sees “the evident intention” of his parents’ love; second, the child trusts
his parents and has confidence in his surrounding environment, as he experiences his parents’
unconditional love; and third, in developing various skills, the child gradually acquires a sense of
self-confidence, which affirms his self-esteem; and finally, the child has tightened bonds with
and deep affection for his parents as he connects them with his self-development and selfesteem. The child’s returning sentiment is the first appearance of the reciprocity of disposition.
This stage is called “the morality of authority,” for the child sees his parents as the sources of
authority. And he would have a sense of guilt, “authority guilt,” which is a proto-moral
sentiment, if he violates their commands, provided that he has the natural sentiments of love and
trust. Since the natural sentiments of love and trust are necessary for the moral sentiment of guilt,
the absence of guilt indicates the absence of love and trust (TJ 425). But this stage is not a moral
stage, but a proto-moral stage of moral development, for the child does not have moral
sentiments in reference to moral concepts.68
In the proto-moral stage, the child evaluates the goodness or badness of an action
according to a person’s external behavior regardless of his motives. But in the second stage of
moral development, as he assumes more demanding roles in more complex schemes of rights
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Rawls (TJ 421) argues that “it is a necessary feature of moral feelings, and part of what distinguishes them from
the natural attitudes, that the person’s explanation of his experience invokes a moral concept and its associated
principles. His account of his feelings makes reference to an acknowledged right or wrong.” Since children in the
first stage of moral development do not have a clear idea of moral right or wrong, they do not have the strict sense of
moral feelings.
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and duties in various associations, the examples of which are family, school, games and play,
and national association, he will have a more robust moral point of view. He gradually knows the
standard of being a good son or daughter, a good student, a good sport and companion, and a
good citizen. He learns to identify himself with others and sees things from their perspective.
The development of his intellectual abilities is necessary for his acquisition of moral sensibility.
But this intellectual development is not sufficient for the acquisition of moral sensibility, for a
person who possesses these intellectual skills may be manipulative and exploitative. Thus, a
necessary condition for moral sensibility is the recognition of others as equals.69 By the
recognition that other people are equally doing their part in the association that they belong to, he
acquires the feelings of trust and friendship toward them, provided that he loves his parents back
in Stage 1. If he fails to do his part, he will have a sense of guilt, “association guilt,” the absence
of which indicates the absence of the natural feelings of trust and friendship. In other words, the
natural feelings of trust and friendship are necessary for the moral sentiment of association guilt.
And so the presence of the moral sentiment of guilt indicates the presence of the natural feelings
of trust and friendship. The returning sentiments of trust and friendship also need to go through
several steps: the first step is to recognize that others’ doing their part is beneficial to each and all
in the association. Secondly, it is regarded as a form of good will that others are doing their part
and they want to, and this arouses feelings of trust and friendship. Thirdly, everyone who
participates in the same activity reciprocally does his or her part in the association.
In a certain form of the morality of association, once a person has the recognition that his
fellow citizens willingly contribute to the cooperative scheme of a well-ordered society, he will
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and the development of their own intellectual skills. The sense of self-respect inclines them to respect others and
recognize them as equals.
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have friendly feelings and trust toward them, and he will reciprocally do his share. He will have
a sense of guilt if he fails to contribute to social cooperation, provided that he has feelings of
trust and friendship toward them. But since the natural feelings of trust and friendship are
necessary for the moral sentiment of guilt, his moral sentiments are contingent upon his natural
feelings of trust and friendship, without which, he would not have “association guilt.” In the final
stage of moral development, the morality of principles, a person acquires a sense of justice if he
recognizes that the just institutions benefit him and those whom he cares for, provided he has
acquired feelings of love and friendship in the first two stages. Unlike the second stage, now his
moral sentiments are not contingent upon his natural feelings toward his fellow citizens, but
upon the acceptance of the principles of justice. For while a citizen is attached to several other
citizens, nobody is attached to all. And so citizens cannot be bound with each through the ties of
friendship; rather, they are bound by the allegiance to the principle of justice. Note that the
acquisition of love and friendship in the first two stages is still necessary for the sense of justice.
But once a person has the sense of justice, he will act upon the principles of justice no matter if
he has feelings of love or friendship toward others or not. If he violates the principles of justice,
he will have a sense of guilt, “principle guilt,” regardless of the contingencies of the world. But if
he at the same time has fellow feelings toward his countrymen, his moral sentiments will be
intensified. Rawls thus says that the sense of justice and the love of humankind are two forms of
the morality of principles. But he argues that the later is supererogatory while the former is a
natural duty. He concludes that justice as fairness has a more realistic moral psychology than
other conceptions of justice. It is more realistic than intuitionism because intuitionism fails to
explain the sense of justice in a psychologically understandable way (TJ 418). And even though
utilitarianism and perfectionism explain the sense of justice in a natural way, he suggests that
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they ground justice in the love of humankind, a supererogatory duty.70 What makes Rawls’s
moral psychology realistic is that it recognizes the primary motivating force of self-respect,
which inclines a person to respect others. The principle of reciprocity is neither egoistic nor
altruistic.
To sum up, the content of Rawls’s moral psychology has three themes. First, the sense of
justice is derived from love and friendship. In other words, to acquire the sense of justice in the
final stage, a person must love his parents back in the first stage and have friendly feelings
toward his associates in the second stage. Second, the reciprocity of disposition is exhibited in
each stage of moral development. In the first stage, once the child recognizes his parents’ love
with evident intention, he will love his parents back. In the second stage, given that the child
loves his parents back in the first stage, once he sees that his associates do their parts in the
associations they belong to, he will have feelings of trust and friendship toward them. In the third
stage, given that he has returning sentiments of love and friendship in the first two stages, once
he sees that the just institutions are beneficial to him and those around him, he will acquire a
sense of justice. Third, Rawls’s moral psychology is a realistic moral psychology. It is more
realistic than utilitarianism and perfectionism because for him the love of humankind which is
their psychological basis is a supererogatory duty.
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Rawls connects utilitarianism with the principle of sympathy or the love of humankind in several places, for
example, see section 5, section 30 in Theory. For Rawls, both perfectionism and utilitarianism may sacrifice
freedom for the sake of the greater good (perfection or utility), and so their moral psychologies are similarly
unrealistic.
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1.2 The Parallel Relations Between Rousseau’s Concept of Amour-propre and
Rawls’s Moral Psychology
I argue that Rawls’s moral psychology parallels, and is grounded in, Rousseau’s moral
education in Emile.71 First, Rawls’s thesis that the sense of justice is derived from love and
friendship is an illustration of Rousseau’s thesis that moral sentiments are derived from natural
feelings. Second, Rawls’s explanation of how we acquire the reciprocity of disposition is
grounded in Rousseau’s explanation of how amour-propre can be extended to the sense of
justice. And third, Rawls’s thoughts on the principle of sympathy or the love of humankind
parallel Rousseau’s realistic moral psychology.

1.2.1   Rousseau’s Thesis
Rawls acknowledges that his moral psychology is an illustration of how Rousseau’s
thesis might be true (CP 96). He says that Rousseau’s thesis is “the sense of justice is no mere
moral conception formed by the understanding alone, but a true sentiment of the heart
enlightened by reason, the natural outcome of our primitive affections” (CP 96). His account of
moral development tries to show that a person’s sense of justice is not simply formed by the
understanding or recognition that the just institutions are beneficial to him and those around him,
but also the outcome of the natural feelings of love and friendship. It is true that in the final stage
of moral development, the sense of justice is not contingent on the natural feelings. But without
the acquisition of the natural feelings of love and friendship in the first two stages, it is
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impossible to acquire the sense of justice. Or we may say, the acquisition of the natural feelings
of love and friendship is a necessary condition for the acquisition of the sense of justice.
John Deigh (1996) argues that Rawls fails to explain how the sense of justice is derived
from love and friendship. This failure, he argues, comes from Rawls’s confusion between guilt
and remorse. He argues that the moral feeling, which is necessarily connected with the natural
feelings of love and friendship, is remorse, and that Rawls mistakenly confuses this feeling with
guilt. He argues that this confusion leads Rawls to claim that a sense of guilt connects the sense
of justice with the natural feelings of love and friendship. But since guilt is not necessarily
connected with the natural feelings of love and friendship, he argues, the sense of justice is not
derived from love and friendship. He says:	
  
To explain how the child comes to love its parents is not yet to explain how it
comes to respect them. The former establishes that the child identifies with its
parents but not that it accepts their authority, and acceptance of authority is the
facet of moral development Rawls means to explain in giving his account of the
first stage. (Deigh, 1996, p.57)
Deigh correctly points out that love is not sufficient for “authority guilt.” It is not
sufficient to explain how children come to respect parents’ authority. It is also not sufficient to
explain how citizens in the well-ordered society of justice as fairness acquire the sense of justice.
Rawls acknowledges that love is merely a necessary but not sufficient condition for “authority
guilt.” He writes:
In the light of this sketch of the development of the morality of authority, it
seems that the conditions favoring its being learned by the child are these. First,
the parents must love the child and be worthy objects of his admiration. In this
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way they arouse in him a sense of his own value and the desire to become the sort
of person that they are. Secondly, they must enunciate clear and intelligible (and
of course justifiable) rules adapted to the child’s level of comprehension. In
addition they should set out the reasons for these injunctions so far as these can be
understood, and they must also follow these precepts insofar as they apply to them
as well. (TJ 408)
Thus, for Rawls, love is merely a necessary but not sufficient condition for moral
sentiments. For a child to acquire “authority guilt,” he not only needs to have parental love but
also understand the rules that are set up and followed by his parents. But Deigh not only denies
that love is sufficient for moral sentiments, he also denies that love is necessary for moral
sentiments. He endorses Freud’s pessimistic view of moral education and explains guilt in terms
of fear. He writes:
At this stage, fear is the emotion that they in their role as authorities evoke in the
child. Then, as their authority becomes internal, as the child comes to see itself as
part of a moral order over which its parents preside, its fear of their power is
transformed into respect for their authority. Correspondingly, its fear of
punishment — or of whatever evil the child senses will be the consequence of
disobedience — becomes a liability to guilt. (Deigh, 1996, p.62)
Here Deigh argues that a person has feeling of guilt only if he or she is afraid of
punishment. But Deigh confuses the acceptance of authority with the acquisition of moral
sentiment. To explain why a person accepts parental (or anyone’s) authority does not yet explain
why this person has the moral sentiment of guilt when he violates his parents’ (or anyone’s)
demands. In fact, a person may accept his parents’ (or anyone’s) authority, if they have a gun to
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his head, but does not have any feelings of guilt when he violates their demands. In any case,
Deigh does not explain why and how a person internalizes an external authority. Fear of
punishment may explain why a person accepts an external authority but it does not explain why
and how this person internalizes such authority.72 Rawls’s and Rousseau’s moral psychologies
fill in the blank. Rawls agrees with Rousseau that love is the origin of moral sentiments. Without
the natural sentiment of love, the moral sentiment of guilt is inexplicable. Fear cannot explain the
moral sentiment of guilt. A person may do as someone commands out of fear but he will not
have the moral sentiments of guilt if he violates this person’s commands. Rousseau warns us
about the consequences of imposing punishment on children:
Firstly, by imposing on them a duty they do not feel, you set them against your
tyranny and turn them away from loving you. Secondly, you teach them to
become dissemblers, fakers, and liars in order to extort rewards or escape
punishments. Finally, by accustoming them always to cover a secret motive with
an apparent motive, you yourselves give them the means of deceiving you
ceaselessly, of depriving you of the knowledge of their true character, and of
fobbing you and others off with vain words when the occasion serves. (E 91)
Rousseau writes:
It is quite strange that since people first became involved with raising children, no
instruments for guiding them has been imagined other than emulation, jealousy,
envy, vanity, avidity, and vile fear — all the most dangerous passions, the
quickest to ferment and the most appropriate to corrupt the soul, even before the
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body has been formed. With each lesson that one wants to put into their heads
before its proper time, a vice is planted in the depth of their heart. (E 92)73
Thus, for Rousseau, fear is not the appropriate means of making a child a good person.
On the contrary, fear is “most appropriate to corrupt the soul.” A child who is educated in this
way would be either servile or arrogant. This child, in Rousseau’s terms, would have an inflamed
amour-propre. We have seen in the first chapter that the inflamed amour-propre is the root of all
evils. Thus, if in the early stage of his moral development, a person’s amour-propre is inflamed,
it will be impossible for him to acquire the sense of justice in the later stages. Rousseau argues
that the sense of justice is derived from primitive sentiments. He writes:
Our first duties are to ourselves; our primary sentiments are centered on
ourselves; all our natural movements relate in the first instance to our preservation
and our well-being. Thus, the first sentiment of justice does not come to us from
the justice we owe but from that which is owed us. (E 97)
For Rousseau, since self-love is reciprocal (E 214), a person who is affirmed of his selflove by his parents’ manifest love tends to love his parents back. If this person “sees that
everything approaching him is inclined to assist him” (E 213), he will have friendly feelings
toward those around him. Eventually, he will acquire the sense of justice.
To sum up, Rawls’s moral psychology is an illustration of Rousseau’s thesis that moral
sentiments are derived from natural sentiments, or, in particular, the sense of justice is derived
from love and friendship. Deigh argues that Rawls’s moral psychology mistakenly grounds
justice in love. He argues that the sense of justice is derived from fear. But as we have seen, in
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Rousseau, fear is not the appropriate way to nurture the sense of justice. On the contrary, it gives
rise to an inflamed amour-propre, which, as we have seen, is the root of all evils.

1.2.2 The Reciprocity Thesis
In the previous chapter, we saw that Rawls’s concept of reciprocity is derived from
Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre, more specifically, the reciprocal feature of amour-propre.
Rousseau suggests that our natural and healthy form of amour-propre makes a rightful claim on
our conduct, a claim to grant others equal standing with us provided they do the same in return.
And so those who have self-respect are more likely to respect others. This explains why the
natural and healthy form of amour-propre is the psychological foundation of a society of mutual
respect and self-esteem for both Rousseau and Rawls. But it remains to be seen how citizens in
the well-ordered society of justice as fairness acquire the reciprocity of disposition which
inclines them to accept the principle of reciprocity or the principles of justice.74 Rawls’s moral
psychology provides an answer to this question. Rawls says that “In the account in Theory of the
three-stage development of the morality of principles (as it is called there), the psychological
laws for each stage exhibit this reciprocity of disposition” (JF 196). The reciprocity of
disposition is a “tendency to answer in kind, to answer others’ being fair to us with our being fair
to them, and the like” (JF 196). In the first stage of moral development, children acquire the
reciprocity of disposition for the first time. They are disposed to love their parents back once
they recognize that their parents love and want to love him. In the second stage, as they play
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more complex roles in the society, they reciprocally contribute to the cooperative arrangement of
the association once they recognize that others willingly contribute to it. And in Stage 3, they
willingly comply with the two principles of justice once they recognize that the just institutions
are beneficial to them and those around them. It is important to note that the reciprocity of
disposition is acquired for the first time when the children are disposed to love their parents back
on the condition that their parents love them “with evident intention.” As Rawls says:
The parents, we may suppose, love the child and in time the child comes to love
and to trust his parents. How does this change in the child come about? To answer
this question I assume the following psychological principle: the child comes to
love the parents only if they manifestly first love him. (TJ 406)
Rawls notes that this psychological principle is drawn from Rousseau’s Emile (TJ 406,
fn.9). In explaining the second psychological law that people acquire feelings of trust and
friendship toward their associates on the condition that their associates do their part “with
evident intention,” He notes that “the idea of evident intention as used here is from Rousseau’s
Emile” (JF 196, fn.16). In the Emile, Rousseau says:
A child’s first sentiment is to love himself; and the second, which derives from
the first, is to love those who come near him, for in the state of weakness that he
is in, he does not recognize anyone except by the assistance and cares he receives.
At first the attachment he has for his nurse and his governess is only habit. He
seeks them because he needs them and is well-off in having them; it is recognition
rather than benevolence. He needs much time to understand that not only are they
useful to him but they want to be; and it is then he begins to love them. (E 213)
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Rousseau points out that children are disposed to return love for love if the caregivers
manifestly love them. This is the first step of the extension of self-love. Human beings naturally
have self-love and they naturally love those who manifestly love them. Love is extended from
themselves to those around them (provided that they love them with evident intention). Parental
love planted the seed of humanity in Emile so that he could become a good person in his later
life. Once Emile acquired the returning sentiment of love, in reaching the adulthood, after he
became interested in his surroundings (or after he began to compare himself with others around
him), he acquired the first sentiment of friendship toward others. In this step, self-love becomes
relative; amour de soi turns into amour-propre. But Emile is brought up “(1) To have a sense of
the true relations of man, with respect to the species as well as the individual. (2) To order all the
affections of the soul according to these relations” (E 219). Thus Emile’s amour-propre is not
inflamed. He recognizes that human beings have equal status and that they are not in the
relations of subjugation and domination, alienation and exploitation. By recognizing others as
equals, Emile’s amour-propre extends to the love of human species, or the love of justice. Now,
for Rousseau there are two sources of the sense of justice: the recognition of human beings as
equals and the natural feelings of love and friendship. And the natural feelings of love and
friendship are aroused in his heart because of his recognition of the manifest love of his parents
and those around him. As Rousseau says, “A child is therefore naturally inclined to benevolence,
because he sees that everything approaching him is inclined to assist him; and from this
observation he gets the habit of a sentiment favorable to his species” (E 213).
Thus, not only is Rawls’s reciprocity thesis grounded in Rousseau’s reciprocal feature of
amour-propre, but Rawls’s explanation of how citizens in the well-ordered society of justice as
fairness acquire the reciprocity of disposition which inclines them to accept the principle of
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reciprocity or the principles of justice is grounded in Rousseau’s explanation of how amourpropre can be extended to the sense of justice.

1.2.3 A Realistic Moral Psychology
Rawls suggests that justice as fairness has a more realistic moral psychology than other
conceptions of justice, such as utilitarianism, perfectionism and intuitionism. The flaw of
intuitionism is that it fails to describe the sense of justice as “psychologically understandable.”
Rawls says that for intuitionism, the sense of justice is simply a desire for what is right but the
right is unanalyzable. And thus intuitionism fails to explain the sense of justice in an
understandable way. Rawls argues that utilitarianism and perfectionism can interpret the sense of
justice in a natural way, and, thus, they can describe the sense of justice as “psychologically
understandable” (TJ 417). But he suggests that the love of humankind, which is the
psychological foundation for utilitarianism and perfectionism, is supererogatory for human
beings. And thus utilitarianism’s (and perfectionism’s) moral psychology is the psychology of
the saints (and the psychology of heroes), not a realistic moral psychology for ordinary human
beings. Thus, for Rawls, justice as fairness provides a more realistic moral psychology than other
conceptions of justice.
Rawls’s realistic moral psychology parallels Rousseau’s thoughts on amour-propre. In
particular, Rousseau argues that amour-propre, rather than compassion, is the primary motivating
force for human actions. As we have seen, in the second Discourse, Rousseau suggests that even
though amour de soi and compassion are the two principles of action in the state of nature, amour
de soi, rather than compassion, is the primary motivating force. He also says that in the civil
state, compassion is too weak to motivate a person to act compared with amour-propre. We have
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also seen that in Emile, Rousseau suggests that amour-propre has a natural and healthy form if
guided by reason, and that it is the starting point for justice. He argues that compassion plays a
secondary, supporting role in the transformation of amour-propre, but it is not the starting point
for justice. We have also seen that in the Social Contract and other of Rousseau’s political
works, he suggests that once amour-propre is guided by the general will (public reason), it will
be the primary motivating force to form and retain the just society. Compassion, thus, is not the
primary motivating force to stabilize the just society.
Michael Pritchard (1977) argues that Rawls’s moral psychology faces a dilemma: either his
principle of equal respect is simply based on the principle of reciprocity, as he claims it to be, in
which case there is a gap between the principle of equal respect and the principle of reciprocity;
or, his principle of equal respect also relies on the principle of sympathy, as utilitarianism does,
in which case his objection against utilitarianism fails. To explain the first horn of the dilemma,
Pritchard argues that the principle of reciprocity cannot generate the sense of justice. In other
words, he argues that moved by the principle of reciprocity, people will not have the sense of
justice toward those who cannot contribute to the social cooperation of the well-ordered
society.75 For example, he says that the disabled are incapable of contributing to the cooperative
scheme of the well-ordered society, and, thus, according to Rawls they do not deserve equal
respect.76 To explain the second horn of the dilemma, he argues that the principle of reciprocity
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cannot generate the principle of sympathy. He argues that the principle of reciprocity cannot
generate the love of humankind, which, he maintains, is the rightful basis of the just society
because it explains the equal respect for each and all.
But Pritchard fails to see the distinction between love and respect. Rawls points out that the
love of humankind is supererogatory for ordinary human beings. As Rawls says, “This morality
[the love of humankind] is not one for ordinary persons, and its peculiar virtues are those of
benevolence, a heightened sensitivity to the feelings and wants of others, and a proper humility
and unconcern with self” (TJ 419). Thus it is unrealistic to think that all human beings have “a
heightened sensitivity.” Furthermore, the love of humankind is not necessary for a society of
mutual equal respect. What is needed is the reciprocity of disposition.
Pritchard also fails to fully understand Rawls’s principle of reciprocity. He fails to
understand why the reciprocity of disposition will generate mutual equal respect. He thinks that
the principle of reciprocity is the morality of exchange. On this reading, since those who are
disabled do not contribute to the cooperative scheme of the well-ordered society, they are not the
objects of equal respect. But Rawls never merely understands the reciprocity of disposition in
this way. Indeed, in the first stage of moral development, the morality of authority may be the
morality of exchange because the returning sentiments of love are contingent on the love they
receive from their parents. But in the second stage, the morality of association may not be the
morality of exchange; for we may still do our parts in the associations we belong to, even though
we know that there are free-riders in the associations. And in the final stage of moral
development, the morality of principles, the sense of justice is not contingent on the benefits they

make significant contribution to the society; on the other hand, he might say that even though they cannot make
contribution to the society due to the misfortune in the natural lottery, they still deserve equal respect.
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receive from others. Rawls says: “Once a morality of principles is accepted, however, moral
attitudes are no longer connected solely with the well-being and approval of particular
individuals and groups, but are shaped by a conception of right chosen irrespective of these
contingencies” (TJ 416). In the final stage of moral development, recognizing that the just
institutions are beneficial to them and those around them, citizens will have the sense of justice,
provided that they have feelings of love and friendship in the first two stages. Their sense of
justice is not toward those they love and befriend, for, if so, they will still be in the first two
stages of moral development. The mark of their being in the final stage is that their sense of
justice is not dependent on the benefits they receive from particular persons. Pritchard is wrong,
therefore, to say that for Rawls those who have a sense of justice will not have equal respect to
those who cannot contribute to the cooperative scheme of the well-ordered society.
But perhaps Pritchard’s question is how it is possible that those who have a sense of justice
will have equal respect with those who cannot contribute to the cooperative scheme of the wellordered society. In other words, his question might be about how it is possible that human beings
can proceed into the final stage of moral development. The empirical psychologies of Piaget and
Kohlberg are also subject to the same question. But, unlike their empirical psychology, Rawls’s
moral psychology is not a science of human nature (PL 86). His reasonable moral psychology is
compatible with human nature, and even more so than the moral psychologies of utilitarianism
and perfectionism. Rawls does not need to show that his moral psychology is the most realistic
one; he only needs to show that it is more realistic than the moral psychologies of other
conceptions of justice. Furthermore, if Rawls’s moral psychology is plausible, it will provide
support for Piaget’s and Kohlberg’s empirical psychologies and refute the objections against
their moral psychologies. It is simply too early to say that it is impossible that human beings can
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develop into the final stage of moral development. After all, we do not live in the just society that
Rawls depicts as a realistic utopia. And that most of the people in an unjust society cannot
develop into the final stage of moral development says nothing about the moral psychology of
those who live in the just society. For Rawls and Rousseau, institutional factors have significant
impact on what human beings are like, and so we can reasonably expect that in the just society
people will have the sense of justice in the final stage of moral development.
To conclude, I have argued that there is a Rousseauvian interpretation of Rawls’s moral
psychology which constitutes the first part of his stability argument, and that on this
interpretation, some of the objections against his moral psychology can be answered. In response
to these objections, I hope that I have shown that Rawls’s moral psychology is Rousseauvian in a
deeper and better way.

2.   Amour-propre, the Congruence Argument and the Overlapping
Consensus Argument
Rawls’s moral psychology has shown us how the sense of justice can be developed
through the three stages of moral development. We have seen that his moral psychology
parallels, and is grounded in, Rousseau’s thoughts on amour-propre and that the objections
against his moral psychology can be answered on my Rousseauvian interpretation. But it remains
to be seen whether the congruence argument in Theory and the overlapping consensus argument
in Political Liberalism have a Rousseauvian interpretation. I argue that these arguments are
grounded in Rousseau’s conception of persons. The congruence argument in Theory is grounded
in Rousseau’s conception of moral freedom. This conception of moral freedom is developed by
Kant and endorsed by Rawls in Theory as the moral basis of the justification for the two
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principles of justice. The overlapping consensus argument in Political Liberalism is grounded in
Rousseau’s conception of political freedom. The citizens who guide amour-propre with public
reason are politically autonomous. This ideal of political autonomy is endorsed by the later
Rawls to explain why the political conception of justice is acceptable for all reasonable
comprehensive views.

2.1 Amour-propre and the Congruence Argument in Theory
The congruence argument in Theory argues that acting from the sense of justice is
congruent with the thin conceptions of the good. This argument is called the Kantian Congruence
argument because it starts with a Kantian premise that persons are free and equal rational beings
(cf. Freeman 2007, p.274; Weithman 2010, p.206). The fundamental preference of the moral
persons is the desire to express themselves as free and equal rational beings (TJ 491). “To
express one’s nature as a being of a particular kind is to act on the principles that would be
chosen if this nature were the decisive determining element” (TJ 222). Since the Original
Position is a situation in which our nature is a decisive determining element (TJ 221), to express
one’s nature as a free and equal rational being is to act on the principles that would be chosen in
the Original Position. Therefore, to express oneself as a free and equal rational being is to act on
the principles that would be chosen in the Original Position. Therefore, the desire to express
oneself as a free and equal rational being is the same desire as acting from the sense of justice
(TJ 501). According to the finality criterion, to satisfy the desire to act on the principles that
would be chosen in the Original Position (or the sense of justice), one must take that desire as
supremely regulative (TJ 503). Therefore, the desire to express oneself as a free and equal
rational being is the same as the desire to treat the sense of justice as supremely regulative of
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other desires. The congruence conclusion is established: members of a well-ordered society
judge, from within the thin theory of the good, that the sense of justice is supremely regulative of
their other desires.
The Kantian congruence argument is partly Rousseauvian. The parallel relations between
Rousseau’s conception of moral freedom and Kant’s can be seen from the following passages:
To the preceding one might add to the credit of the civil state moral freedom,
which alone makes man truly the master of himself; for the impulsion of mere
appetite is slavery, and obedience to the law one has prescribed to oneself is
freedom. (SC 54).
Will is a kind of causality of living beings insofar as they are rational, and
freedom would be that property of such causality that it can be efficient
independently of alien causes determining it… The preceding definition of
freedom is negative, and therefore unfruitful for insight into its essence; but there
flows from it a positive conception of freedom, which is so much the richer and
more fruitful… The will is in all its action a law to itself, indicates only the
principle, to act on no other maxim than that which can also have as object itself
as a universal law. (Kant, 1996, p.94)77
Rousseau’s conception of moral freedom has both a negative sense and a positive sense.
The negative sense of moral freedom is the absence of animal appetites. The positive sense of
moral freedom is the obedience to the law one gives oneself. This conception of moral freedom
is endorsed and developed by Kant to explain the autonomy of the will. For Kant, moral freedom
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also has both a negative sense and a positive sense. The negative sense of moral freedom is the
independence from alien causes. The positive sense of moral freedom is to act on the universal
law. The parallel relations between Rousseau’s conception of moral freedom and that of Kant
thus show that the latter’s conception of moral freedom is grounded in the former’s conception
of moral freedom. As is pointed out by Rawls, “Kant’s main aim is to deepen and to justify
Rousseau’s idea that liberty is acting in accordance with a law that we give to ourselves. And this
leads not to a morality of austere command but to an ethic of mutual respect and self-esteem” (TJ
225). The Kantian and Rousseauvian moral freedom provides the moral basis for a society of
mutual respect and self-esteem. For the Kantian and Rousseauvian persons see themselves as
free and equal moral persons by nature. For them, acting justly is an expression of their moral
nature, and their fundamental preference. And so, acting justly is congruent with their thin
conception of the good. What underlies the Kantian Rousseauvian congruence argument is the
Kantian Rousseauvian conception of moral persons. The reason why the Kantian Rousseauvian
persons act on and from the two principles of justice is that they see acting from the principles of
justice as an expression of their personal integrity, a requirement of moral autonomy.
But it is unreasonable to expect that all reasonable persons in the well-ordered society of
justice as fairness are Kantian Rousseauvian persons. Many of them have very different
comprehensive views. Christians may take honoring God as the expression of their nature, and
utilitarians may take acting from the principle of utility as the expression of their nature. For
those who only have a partial comprehensive view, they may have plural ends, and they may not
order these ends by a simple principle. It is, thus, also unreasonable to expect them to take acting
justly as the expression of their nature. In a society regulated by a comprehensive doctrine,
people who have a comprehensive view may not respect other comprehensive views. Thus, as
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Rawls later suggests, the Kantian and Rousseauvian moral freedom is not the correct path toward
the society of mutual respect and self-esteem.
Rousseau never takes his conception of moral freedom to be essential for his social
contract theory, as he says: “But I have already said too much on this topic, and the philosophical
meaning of the word freedom is not my subject here” (SC 54). What is essential for Rousseau’s
social contract theory is his conception of political freedom, the conformation to the general will.
As we shall see later, this conception of political freedom is what grounds Rawls’s congruence
argument in Political Liberalism.

2.2 Amour-propre and the Overlapping Consensus Argument in Political Liberalism
In Political Liberalism, Rawls says that the stability argument in Theory is inconsistent
with his theory of justice as a whole (PL xvi). For the citizens endorse the two principles of
justice on the basis of a comprehensive philosophical view, that is, comprehensive liberalism. He
realizes that, based on the fact of reasonable pluralism, any conception of justice, which is
grounded in a comprehensive doctrine, cannot be stable for the right reason. For a
comprehensive doctrine cannot but be in conflict with other comprehensive doctrines. He argues
that his political conception of justice is the focus of overlapping consensus and that it can be
stable for the right reason, for this political conception of justice is acceptable for all reasonable
comprehensive views. Thus, for example, Kantians, Christians, utilitarians and those who have
partial comprehensive views all have different views as to what expresses their nature, but as
long as they appeal to public reason, namely the reason that cannot be reasonably rejected by
others, to solve fundamental public issues, there will be an overlapping consensus between their
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comprehensive views and the political conception of justice. Rawls argues that if the overlapping
consensus argument sustains, his stability argument is defensible.
I argue that Rawls’s overlapping consensus argument in Political Liberalism is grounded
in Rousseau’s conception of political freedom. For Rawls’s conception of public reason parallels
Rousseau’s conception of the general will. As we have seen, the educative purpose of Emile is to
make Emile an autonomous person who guides his amour-propre with reason. In the Social
Contract, Rousseau makes it clear that one’s particular will must conform to the general will and
that it is through the general will that one knows whether his opinion is true or false. Thus, for
Rousseau, citizens must appeal to the general will to resolve fundamental public issues. And it
shall be clear that, for him, citizens willingly comply with the general will because the general
will is a part of the will of their own and because it is through submitting themselves to the
general will that they remain free in the civil state. In other words, citizens willingly comply with
the just institutions in part because the just institutions satisfy the natural and healthy form of
amour-propre, the desire for freedom and equality. Therefore, political freedom provides another
path, the correct path as the later Rawls says, toward a society of mutual respect and self-esteem.
Parallel to Rousseau’s conception of political freedom, Rawls argues that political
freedom is one of the primary goods essential for securing the social bases of self-respect. Rawls
argues that the social primary goods, rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and
wealth, and the social bases of self-respect, are necessary for the pursuit of any rational plan of
life. They are also necessary for the exercise and development of the two moral powers. Thus,
for all free and equal, rational and reasonable persons in the well-ordered society of justice as
fairness, irrespective of whether they are Kantians, Christians, or utilitarians, they will all value
the fair equal distribution of these social primary goods. Thus, once they recognize that the well-

111

ordered society of justice as fairness ensures the fair equal distribution of these social primary
goods, they will willingly comply with the rules and the laws in the well-ordered society of
justice as fairness. In particular, self-respect is the most important primary good. Once these
persons see that the public affirmation of the two principles of justice and their lexical order
ensures their self-respect, they will willingly comply with the just intuitions and their rules and
laws.78 As Rawls says, “moved by amour-propre we are ready to accept and to act on a principle
of reciprocity whenever our culture makes it available and intelligible to us, and society’s basic
arrangements establish our secure and equal standing alone with others” (LHPP 199). In general,
as beings who are moved by amour de soi and amour-propre, once we recognize that the just
institutions ensure the equal distribution of liberties and rights, and the fair distribution of other
necessary means of our conceptions of the good, we will willingly comply with the two
principles of justice.79 This brings about the stability of Rawls’s well-ordered society of justice
as fairness.80
The stability of Rawls’s well-ordered society allows a small number of unreasonable people
and a certain range of indeterminate fundamental political questions in the well-ordered society
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Nussbaum (2006, p.225) points out that even though political liberals and communitarians have very different
opinions on many matters, they will all think that mutual-respect and reciprocity are extremely important social
goods.
79
The psychological fact that we are moved by amour de soi and amour-propre is not a comprehensive view.
80
Gerald Gaus (2013, p.244) maintains that Rawls’s argument that citizens in the well-ordered society of justice as
fairness will willingly comply with the two principles of justice because of the fair equal distribution of social
primary goods appears only in A Theory of Justice. He argues that in Political Liberalism Rawls merely tries to
show that the political conception of justice is not in conflict with all reasonable comprehensive views. But there is
no reason to think that Rawls has abandoned his theory of primary goods in Political Liberalism, as Rawls says: “at
the basis of the parties’ reliance on primary goods is their recognition that these goods are essential all-purpose
means to realize the higher-order interests connected with citizens’ moral powers and their determinate conceptions
of the good (so far as the restrictions on information permit the parties to know this). The parties are trying to
guarantee the political and social conditions for citizens to pursue their good and to exercise the moral power that
characterize them as free and equal” (PL 76).
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in justice as fairness.81 Given that we can expect that most citizens in the well-ordered society in
justice as fairness have at least acquired friendly feeling toward their fellow citizens, if not the
sense of justice, it is reasonable to think that there will not be a large number of unreasonable
people and a variety of indeterminate fundamental political questions.82

3.   Amour-propre and Rawls’s Argument from the Absence of Special
psychology
We have seen that the two questions of stability have been answered by Rawls’s moral
psychology and his overlapping consensus argument. We have also seen that Rousseau’s concept
of amour-propre plays a significant role in the two parts of the stability argument. Thus we are
ready to say that there is a Rousseauvian interpretation of Rawls’s stability argument. But it
remains to be seen whether citizens in the well-ordered society of justice as fairness would be
free from special psychologies, in particular, social envy, spite, a will to dominate or a tendency
to submit. In Restatement, Rawls says that if we have a sufficiently strong and effective sense of
justice, and if we have the recognition that the well-ordered society of justice as fairness is good
for us, we are unlikely to be moved by these special psychologies (JF 181, 202). In Theory, on
the other hand, he has a subtler and more nuanced argument to explain why the well-ordered
society in justice as fairness will not generate these special psychologies. In section 29, he argues
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Michael Huemer (1996) argues that Christian fundamentalists are not reasonable and that they will not agree on
the political conception of justice. Robert Talisse (2003) argues that Millian utilitarianism are not reasonable and
that they will not agree on the political conception of justice. But neither Christian fundamentalists nor Millian
utilitarians are necessarily unreasonable. If they appeal to public reason in the political sphere, they can be
reasonable despite the fact that they give priority to the Christian doctrines or the principles of utility in ordering
their goods in their private lives. For examples of two sorts of indeterminate fundamental political questions, see
David Reidy (2000).
82
For a detailed theory of moral education from a Rawlsian perspective, see Victoria Costa (2010).
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that self-respect is mutually supportive and that self-contempt is mutually disadvantageous. In
section 81, he argues that a robust sense of self-respect consists of a kind of psychological
immunity toward special psychologies such as envy.83 He says that envy is a collective
disadvantageous feeling ready to worsen the situation of each party, the one who envies and the
one who is envied.84 He, thus, regards envy as a destabilizing force for the well-ordered society
of justice as fairness. He argues that there are three conditions that encourage envy. These three
conditions are an inadequate sense of self-worth, the large visible differences between oneself
and others, and insufficient constructive alternatives, namely, associations or communities, to
opposing the favored condition of the more advantaged in the existing social arrangement. He
argues that since the well-ordered society in justice as fairness ensures one’s sense of self-worth
through the equal distribution of liberties and rights, reduces social inequalities that are not to the
greatest benefit of the least advantaged people, and allows various associations and communities
to oppose the favored condition of the more advantaged, such a society would not generate envy
to undermine its stability.
Careful readers will discover that these three conditions are all closely connected with the
social bases of self-respect. In section 29, Rawls argues that the two principles of justice support
men’s self-esteem. He argues that for the equal distribution of basic liberties and rights and the
fair distribution of other means of exercising and development the two moral powers and the
conceptions of the good ensure the social bases of self-respect. As he says: “For by arranging
inequalities for reciprocal advantage and by abstaining form the exploitation of the contingencies
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Rawls mainly discusses the problem of envy in Theory, but he says that the problem of other special psychologies
can be treated in the same way as envy (TJ 474).
84
We may say that other special psychologies are also mutually disadvantageous for both parties. Rawls explicitly
says that self-contempt is mutually disadvantages in section 29. This may also be true for spite, the will for
domination and the tendency for submission.
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of nature and social circumstance within a framework of equal liberties, persons express their
respect for one another in the very constitution of their society” (TJ 155). In section 82, he
argues that the equal distribution of fundamental rights and liberties is the legitimate social base
of respect and that the need for equal status is met by the public affirmation of equal citizenship
and “the full and diverse internal life of the many free communities of interests that the equal
liberties allow” (TJ 477). Since having a secure sense of amour-propre is the main reason why
citizens in the well-ordered society are free from special psychologies such as envy, Rawls’s
argument from the absence of special psychologies is grounded in Rousseau’s concept of amourpropre.
Some commentators argue, against Rawls, that the equal distribution of basic liberties
and rights is not sufficient for a secure sense of self-respect.85 They argue that economic equality
might also be important for the secure sense of self-respect. For economic inequality is also a
major contributor to social envy. As we have seen, Rawls also thinks that large economic
inequalities caused by the social structure of a society can be a source of envy and a destabilizing
force for the society. But he does not think that the distribution of wealth and income should be
the legitimate base of self-respect because grounding self-respect in social-economic status
necessarily arouses the desire for domination or the tendency for submission. As Rousseau points
out, the true value of human beings lies in freedom, and equality as a means of freedom. Unless
people recognize that their true value lies in their equal political status, not socio-economic
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For example, Bercuson (2014, p.67) says that “We ought not accept (at face value) the claim that institutional
equality can prevent the envy associated with distributive inequality. Although in some instances of public debate,
we can imagine economic inequality receding into the background (and not affecting constitutional or policy
outcomes), in other instances of political deliberation the self-confidence or influence of involved parties is directly
tied to their distributive shares, regardless of norms of moral desert.” Neuhouser (2014, p.223) also makes a similar
point.
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status, they will not have a natural and healthy form of amour-propre, a desire for freedom and
equality. The public recognition of the two principles of justice and their lexical order is thus
necessary for people to have a sufficient sense of self-respect. This does not mean that economic
inequalities can be ignored in the well-ordered society of justice as fairness. For large economic
inequalities caused by the basic structure of the society will have substantial impact on the
alleged equal basic liberties and rights that citizens possess. Thus, Rawls argues that social and
economic inequalities are be to arranged in such a way that they are to the greatest advantage of
the least advantageous people. Thus, for Rawls, social and economic inequalities are only
permissible when these inequalities are better for the less advantaged people than social and
economic equality. Under this circumstance, if the less advantaged people are still envious of the
more advantaged people, we may say that such envy is unreasonable and should not be
considered in a theory of justice.
To conclude, just like his moral psychology, his congruence argument in Theory and his
overlapping consensus argument in Political Liberalism, Rawls’s argument from the absence of
special psychologies is also grounded in Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre. The upshot of this
chapter is that there is a Rousseauvian interpretation of Rawls’s stability argument. On this
interpretation, some of the objections against Rawls can be answered. Thus, to fully and
adequately understand Rawls, we must read Rawls in a Rousseauvian way.
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CHAPTER 5 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ROUSSEAU’S CONCEPT OF
AMOUR-PROPRE IN RAWLS’S LAW OF PEOPLES
In the previous two chapters, I have argued that there is a Rousseauvian interpretation of
Rawls’s justice as fairness and stability argument. There is a Rousseauvian interpretation of
Rawls’s justice as fairness because first, one of the main reasons why parties in the original
position would choose justice as fairness over other principles of justice is that justice as fairness
meets the demand of amour-propre; and second, Rawls’s argument from self-respect for the two
principles of justice parallels, and is grounded in, Rousseau’s thoughts on amour-propre. There is
a Rousseauvian interpretation of Rawls’s stability argument for three reasons. First, Rawls’s
moral psychology is an illustration of Rousseau’s thesis. Second, Rawls’s congruence argument
in Theory and his overlapping consensus argument in Political Liberalism is grounded in
Rousseau’s conception of persons. And Third, Rawls’s argument from the absence of special
psychologies is grounded in Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre. These two arguments are not
separate from each other. Or we may say that Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre bridges
Rawls’s justice as fairness and stability. One of the main reasons why citizens in the wellordered society of justice as fairness willingly comply with the two principles of justice and
stabilize the society is that justice as fairness meets the demand of amour-propre.
If plausible, these two arguments establish that there is a Rousseauvian interpretation of
Rawls’s theory of domestic justice. But it remains to be seen whether there is a Rousseauvian
interpretation of Rawls’s theory of international justice. Rawls says that his theory of
international justice is consistent with his domestic theory of justice, as he says: “I consider how
the content of the law of peoples might be developed out of a liberal idea of justice similar to, but
more general than, the idea I called justice as fairness” (LP 3).	
  But it has been debated whether
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Rawls’s theory of international justice is consistent with his theory of domestic justice.86 If there
is a Rousseauvian interpretation of Rawls’s theory of international justice, and if my
interpretation in the previous chapters is plausible, Rawls’s theory of international justice is
consistent with Rawls’s theory of domestic justice. Furthermore, Rawls’s The Law of Peoples is
the completion of Political Liberalism in the sense that for a well-ordered society to be stable it
must also be able to return to its normal state in the face of external threats. If there is a
Rousseauvian interpretation of Rawls’s theory of international justice, according to which
peoples have the fundamental interests of amour de soi and amour-propre which are respected
and promoted by the principles of the law of peoples accepted by all liberal and decent peoples,
this serves as the completion of the Rousseauvian interpretation of Rawls’s stability argument.
In this chapter, I will first argue that three themes of Rawls’s law of peoples, that is, the
two international original positions, the idea of a realistic utopia, and the distinction between
peoples and states, parallel, and are grounded in, Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre. Second, I
will introduce Rawls’s argument that the law of peoples meets the demand of amour-propre, his
stability argument in the law of peoples, and his arguments against political realism and
distributive cosmopolitanism. I argue that these arguments parallel, and are grounded, in
Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre. And finally, I will consider two objections against Rawls’s
argument. The first objection says that Rawls’s law of peoples neglects women’s need for
recognition in decent peoples. The second objection says that Rawls’s law of peoples fails to
provide the social bases of self-respect for other societies such as benevolent absolutism,
burdened societies and outlaw states. I argue that there are Rousseauvian responses to these
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For example, Kuper (2000), Beitz (2000), Wenar (2001), Moellendorf (2002), Nussbaum (2002), Buchanan
(2004), Pogge (2004) argue that Rawls’s theory of international justice is inconsistent with his theory of domestic
justice. Reidy (2004; 2007), Maffetone (2011), Kim (2015) argue that it is consistent.
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objections. In response to the first objection, I argue that Rawls’s treatment of decent peoples
meets the demand of amour-propre for all peoples and it meets the demand of amour-propre at
least in a minimal sense for all natural persons. In response to the second objection, I argue that
Rawls’s treatment of outlaw states and other societies meets the demand of amour-propre for all
persons and that outlaw states and other societies are not moral persons that have a positive sense
of amour-propre. I conclude that there is a Rousseauvian interpretation of Rawls’s law of
peoples. In particular, Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre plays a significant role in Rawls’s
law of peoples.

1.   Amour-propre and Rawls’s Law of Peoples
There are three main themes in Rawls’s law of peoples. The first is to “consider how the
content of the Law of Peoples might be developed out of a liberal idea of justice similar to, but
more general than, the idea I called justice as fairness in A Theory of Justice (1971)” (LP 3). The
second is to “discuss how such a Law of Peoples fulfills certain conditions, which justify calling
the Society of Peoples a realistic utopia (see §1)” (LP 4). The third is to “explain why I have
used the term ‘peoples’ and not ‘states’” (LP 4). I argue that these themes can be traced back to
Rousseau, especially his concept of amour-propre.
First, in the two international original positions, the liberal conception of justice is extended
to the law of peoples.87 Rawls tries to defend the social contract tradition of Rousseau, Locke and
Kant in both his domestic and international theories of justice. In the domestic case, he argues
that all parties who represent free and equal, rational and reasonable beings, in the original
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Rawls says: “At the next level, the idea of the original position is used again, but this time to extend a liberal conception to the
Law of Peoples” (LP 32).
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position under the veil of ignorance would agree on the two principles of justice. Parallel to his
original position argument in the domestic case, Rawls first argues that in the international case,
parties that represent free and equal, rational and reasonable, liberal peoples in the first original
position under the veil of ignorance would choose the eight principles of the law of peoples.
Under the veil of ignorance, parties in the first international original position do not know the
size of their territory, the population, the extent of their natural resources, the level of their
economic growth and so on. They only know that they represent free and equal, rational and
reasonable liberal peoples and that the peoples they represent have two fundamental interests:
one is political independence, the security of its territory and the well-being of its people; another
is amour-propre. Thus stipulated, Rawls argues that the parties would agree on the following
principles:
(1) Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be
respected by other peoples.
(2) Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings.
(3) Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them.
(4) Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention.
(5) Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to instigate war for reasons other
than self-defense.
(6) Peoples are to honor human rights.
(7) Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war.
(8) Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that
prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime.
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Rawls then argues that it is unreasonable to suppose that all nonliberal nondemocratic
societies are not well-ordered. He argues that the law of peoples can be extended to decent
peoples because he conjectures that in the second international original position, decent peoples
who are rational and responsible would also agree on the eight principles of justice. Furthermore,
he thinks that it would hurt their self-respect if they were not included in the society of peoples.
Thus, the first theme of Rawls’s law of peoples is Rousseauvian for three reasons. First,
just like in the domestic case, his international original position argument follows the social
contract tradition of Rousseau, Locke and Kant. Second, one of the fundamental interests of the
peoples in the society of peoples is their proper amour-propre. As I will explain in detail later,
meeting the demand of amour-propre is one of the main reasons why parties in the international
original position would choose the law of peoples. Third, one of the main reasons why Rawls
includes decent peoples in the society of peoples is that denying them membership would hurt
their amour-propre.
Second, Rawls argues that his Society of Peoples, just like a liberal society, is a realistic
utopia. There are several conditions for a liberal society to be realistic. The first condition is that
“it must rely on the actual laws of nature and achieve the kind of stability those laws allow, that
is, stability for the right reasons” (LP 12). Rawls acknowledges that here he draws on Rousseau’s
thought in The Social Contract, that is, “taking men as they are and laws as they might be” (LP
13). The second condition is that “it is workable and may be applied to ongoing cooperative
political arrangements and relations between peoples” (LP 17). It is workable because citizens
share the desire for the social primary goods which include the social bases of self-respect. We
have seen that Rawls’s idea of self-respect as perhaps the most important primary good parallels
Rousseau’s story of the unhappy fugitive who lacks self-esteem. There are several conditions for
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a conception of justice to be utopian. First, it must specify a reasonable and just society in which
the social primary goods are equally or fairly distributed. As we have seen, one of the main
reasons why Rawls’s justice as fairness is just is that the equal or fair distribution of social
primary goods secures the social bases of self-respect. This also explains why Rawls’s justice as
fairness is Rousseauvian. The second reason for a conception of justice to be utopian is that it
satisfies the criterion of reciprocity. We have seen that the principle of reciprocity is originated
from the reciprocal feature of Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre. The third condition for a
realistic utopia is that it must have the essential elements of political liberalism. As we have seen,
for both Rousseau and Rawls, a conception of justice by a comprehensive doctrine is not the
correct path toward a society of mutual-respect and self-esteem. The fourth condition is that
liberal democracies must have political and social institutions that lead their citizens to a
sufficient sense of justice. This brings stability to these societies. We have seen that Rawls’s
moral psychology is an illustration of Rousseau’s thesis and that Rawls’s stability argument is
grounded in Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre. The fifth condition is that the stability of
liberal democracies is rooted in a political conception of justice affirmed by an overlapping
consensus of all reasonable comprehensive doctrines. We have seen that the overlapping
consensus argument is grounded in Rousseau’s conception of political freedom. The sixth
condition is that the political conception of justice must “show the reasonableness of toleration
by public reason” (LP 16). We have also seen that Rawls’s idea of public reason parallels
Rousseau’s idea of the general will. Since Rawls’s law of peoples is similar to a liberal society in
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the sense that they are both realistically utopian, the second theme of Rawls’s law of peoples is
also Rousseauvian.88
Third, Rawls argues that peoples are different from states. For Rawls, persons are
subjects of claims and so persons are not limited to individual human persons (LP 75). Nations,
Corporations, churches, teams are all persons that have claims on others. Peoples, in this sense,
are also persons. As moral persons, peoples see themselves as free and equal, and as having
fundamental interests of protecting their political autonomy, security, territory, and the wellbeing of its people. They also see themselves as having the fundamental interest of self-respect,
or amour-propre. Since peoples have a secure sense of self-respect, they are prepared to respect
other peoples and to recognize their equality while states do not. Rawls says: “What
distinguishes peoples from states — and this is crucial — is that just peoples are fully prepared
to grant the very same proper respect and recognition to other peoples as equals” (LP 35). And so
the crucial difference between states and peoples is that the former is merely rational while the
latter is also reasonable. The proper sense of amour-propre inclines peoples to act reasonably,
that is, “to grant the very same proper respect and recognition to other peoples as equals.” To
specify, outlaw states are not reasonable because they have an inflamed amour-propre that
inclines them to dominate other societies; burdened societies are not reasonable because they do
not have the resources to be well-ordered, or to be reasonable; benevolent absolutisms are not
reasonable because they are systems of coordination rather than systems of cooperation which
are ready to grant proper respect and recognition to other peoples. Thus, the reciprocal feature of

88

In the next section, I will present several arguments such as Rawls’s moral psychology, his stability argument, and
his overlapping consensus argument in the law of peoples. I argue that these arguments parallel, and are grounded
in, Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre, and so the second theme parallels, and is grounded in, Rousseau’s concept
of amour-propre is reaffirmed.
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Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre explains the crucial distinction between peoples and states.
And so the third theme of Rawls’s law of peoples is also Rousseauvian.
To sum up, the three themes of Rawls’s law of peoples are Rousseauvian. The first theme
of Rawls’s law of peoples parallels, and is grounded, in Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre
because as we will later see, meeting the demand of amour-propre is one of the main reasons
why Rawls’s law of peoples is chosen by the parties in the international original position. The
second theme of Rawls’s law of peoples parallels, and is grounded in, Rousseau’s concept of
amour-propre because Rawls’s idea of a realistic utopia parallels, and is grounded in, Rousseau’s
concept of amour-propre. The third theme of Rawls’s law of peoples parallels, and is grounded
in, Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre because the crucial distinction between peoples and
states is grounded in the reciprocal feature of amour-propre.

2.   Rawls’s Law of Peoples Meets the Demand of Amour-propre
To specify why the first theme of Rawls’s law of peoples parallels, and is grounded in,
Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre, I argue that one of the main reasons why the principles of
the law of peoples are chosen by the parties in the international original position is that Rawls’s
law of peoples meets the demand of amour-propre. I first explain why Rawls’s law of peoples
meets the demand of amour-propre. Then, I argue that Rawls’s stability argument in the law of
peoples parallels, and is grounded in, Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre. And finally, I
consider Rawls’s objections against political realism and the distributive cosmopolitanism. I
argue that political realism does not really have a moral psychology and that distributive
cosmopolitanism is not necessary for (and fails to meet) the demand of amour-propre.
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2.1 Why Does Rawls’s Law of Peoples Meet the Demand of Amour-propre?
We have seen that in the domestic case, one of the main reasons why parties who are free and
equal rational beings would choose Rawls’s justice as fairness over other principles of justice is
that Rawls’s justice as fairness meets the demand of amour-propre. And this also brings about
the stability of the well-ordered society of justice as fairness. Similar to the domestic case, one of
the main reasons why parties in the international original position would choose Rawls’s law of
peoples is that the law of peoples meets the demand of amour-propre. But different from the
domestic case, there are two kinds of persons that Rawls considers in the law of peoples. The
first kind of person is peoples. The second kind is natural persons. I argue that Rawls’s law of
peoples meets the demand of amour-propre in the international case in two ways. First, I argue
that Rawls’s law of peoples takes into account the amour-propre of reasonable peoples, whether
liberal and democratic or decent. Second, I argue that Rawls’s law of peoples takes into account
the amour-propre of natural human persons. For one thing, it requires a condition of admission
into the society of peoples that polities be organized so that basic human rights are secured and
thus that their members are at least recognized and respected as rational and responsible. While
this recognition and respect are insufficient for those who have developed into Stage 3 of moral
development, a polity that respect these human rights is no obstacle for its members to reform it
to maintain a proper sense of amour-propre. For another thing, the international community is to
respect and honor the equal human rights for all natural persons which include those who live in
outlaw states, burdened societies and benevolent absolutisms, and so this also provides the social
bases of self-respect for all natural persons in a minimal sense. Similar to the domestic case,
meeting the demand of amour-propre brings about the stability of the Society of Peoples.
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To specify, there are two main reasons why Rawls’s law of peoples meets the demand of
amour-propre. First, the freedom, independence and equality of the peoples, either liberal and
democratic or decent, are respected by other peoples in the law of peoples. We have seen that
amour-propre is the desire for equality and freedom. The social bases of amour-propre for
citizens are secured by the public affirmation of the two principles of justice. The social bases of
amour-propre for peoples are (partly) secured by the public recognition of the law of peoples.
There are several principles of the law of peoples that manifestly secure the freedom, equality
and independence of the members of the society of peoples: “1. Peoples are free and
independent, and their freedom and independence are to be respected by other peoples” (LP 37);
and “3. Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them” (LP 37); and “4.
Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention” (LP 37); and “5. Peoples have the right of
self-defense but no right to instigate war for reasons other than self-defense” (LP 37). These
rights and liberties are publicly affirmed through the law of peoples, and so Rawls’s law of
peoples provides the social bases of self-respect for both liberal democratic peoples and decent
peoples. Thus Rawls’s law of peoples meets the demand of amour-propre for both liberal
democratic and decent peoples.
Second, Rawls’s law of peoples also meets the demand of amour-propre for natural persons
in a minimal sense.89 For one thing, it takes into account the amour-propre of natural human
persons by requiring a condition of admission into the society of peoples that polities be
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I argue that Rawls’s list of human rights meets the demand of amour-propre for all natural persons at least in the
minimal sense. What does it mean that it meets the demand of amour-propre in the minimal sense? Recall
Rousseau’s story of the unhappy fugitive who lacks self-esteem (in Chapter 2). This young expatriate changed his
religion for bread, and was taught new dogma and evils. As he wanted to flee, he was locked up. The ecclesiastic
helped him escape and gave him a fortune but he soon lost everything. He was full of self-contempt by that time. To
have self-respect in a minimal sense, therefore, means that a person should have the right to life (which includes the
right to subsistence), the right to liberty (which include freedom of religion), the right to property, and the right to
formal equality (which includes the freedom from arbitrary treatment) and so on.
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organized so that basic human rights are secured and thus that their members are at least
recognized and respected as rational and responsible. For Rawls, a special class of urgent rights90
is to be respected by liberal and decent peoples in Rawls’s law of peoples.91 The sixth principle
of the law of peoples manifests this aspect of the law of peoples: “6. Peoples are to honor human
rights” (LP 37). These human rights include the rights to life, liberty, property and formal
equality (LP 65).92 Since a polity has to respect these human rights to be a member of the Society
of Peoples, Rawls’s law of peoples provides the social bases of self-respect for the members of
both liberal democratic and decent peoples. Even though not everyone is granted equal political
rights in decent peoples, they all have the right to liberty which includes “freedom from slavery,
serfdom, and forced occupation, and to a sufficient measure of liberty of conscience to ensure
freedom of religion and thought” and so on (LP 65). The public recognition of these human
rights provides the social bases of self-respect for the members of decent peoples because they
are thus respected and recognized as rational and responsible. While these human rights are
insufficient for them to have a secure sense of amour-propre, a polity that respects these human
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Rawls says that “Human rights in the Law of Peoples, by contrast, express a special class of urgent rights, such as
freedom from slavery and serfdom, liberty (but not equal liberty) of conscience, and security of ethnic groups from
mass murder and genocide” (LP 79). I think that the reason why these rights are “urgent rights” for Rawls is that the
violation of these rights is extremely corrosive of self-respect. And so Rawls’s list of human rights is essential for
the demand of amour-propre to be met.
91
This brings about the distinction between moral cosmopolitanism and distributive cosmopolitanism. The
cosmopolitanism that Rawls objects to is distributive cosmopolitanism. David Held and Pietro Maffettone (2016,
p.7) points out that Rawls and his opponents are all moral cosmopolitans because they agree that every person
should be treated with equal respect. But Rawls and his opponents disagree about what it means to treat every
person with equal respect. I argue that the law of peoples treats every person with equal respect in two ways: first,
the law of peoples treats all peoples (who are also moral persons) with equal respect; and second, it treats every
human being with equal respect by honoring human rights.
92
David Reidy (2006, p.170) points out that Rawls’s list of basic human rights “is less minimalist than many critics
have allowed.” He argues that the rights specified in Articles 3-18 of the UDHR (Universal Declaration of Human
Rights) are “the full and most fundamental sense of the term.” These rights include “the central elements of due
process and the rule of law (Articles 6-12 and 17), the right to refuse nonconsensual marriage (Article 16), a right
against cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and against torture (Article 5), the right to seek asylum (Article 14),
the right to a national identity (Article 15), and the right to freedom of movement (Article 13).” Other rights that are
entailed by these rights can also be included in the list of human rights.
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rights is no obstacle for its members to reform it to have a secure sense of amour-propre. For
another thing, and more importantly, Rawls thinks that the natural persons in outlaw states,
burdened societies and benevolent absolutisms are to be respected and recognized as having
equal human rights as others. Even though burdened societies and outlaw states do not respect
the human rights of their members, these human rights are still recognized and respected by
liberal and decent peoples (or the international community). And this also serves as incentives
for the members of these societies to reform them to maintain a secure sense of amour-propre.
The second, seventh and eighth principles of the law of peoples manifest this aspect of the law of
peoples: “2. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings” (LP 37); and “7. Peoples are to
observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war. 8. Peoples have a duty to assist other
peoples living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political
social regime” (LP 37). The second principle regulates international institutions, the standards of
fair trade and so on.93 The seventh principle restricts the violation of human rights to extremely
severe conditions under which the existence of liberal democracies is at stake. The eighth
principle specifies the duty of assistance that helps burdened societies to be well-ordered. These
principles show that Rawls takes the amour-propre of the natural persons in non-well-ordered
societies into account directly. Thus, Rawls’s law of peoples meets the demand of amour-propre
for all natural persons in a minimal sense.
Therefore, Rawls’s law of peoples meets the demand of amour-propre for two reasons. The
first reason is that the law of peoples ensures the social bases of self-respect for both liberal
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For a discussion of what it means to have fair trade, see Aaron James (2016). James (2016) argues for a worldhistorical approach to explain fair trade instead of an interpersonal approach. It seems to me, however, that Rawls’s
sixth principle of the law of peoples comes mainly from the consideration of treating every human being with equal
respect. And so Rawls’s explanation of fair trade is more likely to fall into an interpersonal approach range.
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democratic and decent peoples in the society of peoples. The second reason is that the law of
peoples honors the most urgent human rights that are essential for a minimal sense of amourpropre for all natural human persons. This also give incentives for the members of non-liberal
non-democratic societies to reform them to maintain a secure sense of amour-propre.

2.2 Amour-propre and Stability in the Law of Peoples
In the domestic case, Rawls argues that the stability of the well-ordered society of justice as
fairness is achieved for two reasons. First, citizens acquire the sense of justice in Stage 3 of
moral development. Second, there is an overlapping consensus from all reasonable
comprehensive views. Since the fundamental interests of citizens, amour de soi and amourpropre, are met by the principles of justice, citizens willingly comply with the principles of
justice. I have argued that Rawls’s moral psychology and the overlapping consensus argument in
the domestic case parallel, and are grounded in, Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre. Similarly,
in the international case, Rawls argues that the stability of the society of peoples is achieved for
two reasons. First, peoples acquire the sense of justice in Stage 3 of moral development. Second,
since the fundamental interests of peoples, amour de soi and amour-propre, are met by the law of
peoples, peoples willingly comply with the principles of the law of peoples. I argue that Rawls’s
moral psychology and the overlapping consensus argument in the international case parallel, and
are grounded, in Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre.

2.2.1 Amour-propre and Rawls’s Moral Psychology in the Law of Peoples
Rawls argues that the stability of the society of peoples is not the stability as a balance of
power, but the stability for the right reason. He argues that a liberal society is likely to be stable

129

for the right reason because citizens acquire the sense of justice that inclines them to accept the
principles of justice. Similar to the domestic case, he argues that the society of peoples is likely
to be stable for the right reason:
once the second original position argument is complete and includes the account
of moral learning, we conjecture, first, that the Law of Peoples the parties would
adopt is the law that we — you and I, here and now — would accept as fair in
specifying the basic terms of cooperation among peoples. (LP 45)94
We have seen that Rawls’s moral psychology is an illustration of Rousseau’s thesis that
“the sense of justice is no mere moral conception formed by the understanding alone, but a true
sentiment of the heart enlightened by reason, the natural outcome of our primitive affections”
(CP 96). In the domestic case, Rawls argues that citizens acquire the sense of justice in Stage 3
of moral development if they see that the just institution that they live in is beneficial to them and
those around them, given that they have acquired love and friendship in the first two stages. He
argues that the sense of justice inclines the citizens to accept and act on and from the principles
of justice. Similarly, here Rawls argues that peoples as moral persons acquire the sense of justice
in stage 3 of moral development, if they see that the law of peoples is beneficiary to them and
those around them, given that they have acquired love and friendship in the first two stages.95 He
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Italics added.
What does it mean to say that peoples have the sense of justice at Stage 3 of moral development, if they see that
the law of peoples is beneficiary to them and those around them, given that they have acquired love and friendship
in the first two stages? For Rawls, peoples, like persons, have achievements and accomplishments in history and
they base their self-respect on them. Thus, to say that peoples, like persons, experience three stages of moral
development, is to say that their domestic political and social institutions develop from benevolent absolutism (and
other societies) to decent and liberal peoples. As David Reidy (forthcoming, p.20) points out “Rawls’s account of
the benevolent absolutism, decent constitutional republic and liberal democracy tracks his account of moral
development from Theory.”
95
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argues that the sense of justice inclines peoples to accept and act on and from the principles of
the law of peoples.
We have seen that amour-propre plays a significant role in Rawls’s moral psychology in
the domestic case. Since peoples, like persons, also acquire the sense of justice in stage 3 of
moral development that inclines them to accept the law of peoples, amour-propre also plays a
significant role in Rawls’s moral psychology. Thus, there is a Rousseauvian interpretation of
Rawls’s moral psychology in the international case.

2.2.2 Amour-propre and Rawls’s Overlapping Consensus Argument in the Law of
Peoples
Another reason why peoples are willing to honor the principles of the law of peoples is
that their fundamental interests are respected and promoted by the law of peoples. As Rawls
writes:
When the Law of Peoples is honored by peoples over a certain period of time,
with the evident intention to comply, and these intentions are mutually
recognized, these peoples tend to develop mutual trust and confidence in one
another. Moreover, peoples see those norms as advantageous for themselves and
for those they care for, and therefore as time goes on they tend to accept that law
as an ideal of conduct. (LP 44)
Rawls says that peoples are rational and reasonable and that they have the two
fundamental interests. One of the fundamental interests is “to protect their political independence
and their free culture with its civil liberties, to guarantee their security, territory, and the wellbeing of their citizens” (LP 34). In Rousseau’s terms, peoples, like persons, are partly moved by
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amour de soi. Another fundamental interest is amour-propre, or the desire to receive “from other
peoples a proper respect and recognition of their equality” (LP 35). Thus, there is an overlapping
consensus among all liberal and decent peoples, that is, to honor the law of peoples that protect
and promote their fundamental interests, amour de soi and amour-propre. In other words, given
that peoples have acquired the sense of justice in the third stage of moral development, once they
see that the law of peoples respects and promotes their fundamental interests, they willingly
comply with the principles of the law of peoples.
Therefore, Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre also plays a significant role in Rawls’s
overlapping consensus argument in the international case. And so there is a Rousseauvian
interpretation of Rawls’s overlapping consensus argument in the law of peoples.

2.3 Amour-propre and Rawls’s Arguments against Political Realism and
Distributive Cosmopolitanism
We have seen that in the domestic case Rawls’s moral psychology is a realistic moral
psychology. This explains why his moral psychology is more understandable or more realistic
than the moral psychologies of intuitionism, perfectionism and utilitarianism. In the international
case, there are no rival conceptions of international justice for the parties in the original position
to choose from. Rawls’s arguments against political realism and distributive cosmopolitanism
explains why they cannot be presented to the parties in the international original position to
choose from. I argue that amour-propre plays a significant role in Rawls’s arguments against
political realism and distributive cosmopolitanism.
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2.3.1 Amour-propre and Rawls’s Argument against Political Realism
Political realism holds that the participators in international relations only aim to advance
their rational self-interest and that the stability can only be achieved by a balance of forces. In
response to political realism, Rawls writes: “Part of the answer to political realism is that this
reasonable sense of proper respect is not unrealistic, but is itself the outcome of democratic
domestic institutions” (LP 35). Peoples are moral persons. The moral nature of peoples includes
a proper sense of amour-propre that rests on their achievements and accomplishments in their
history, on the freedom and integrity of their citizens, and on the justice and decency of their
domestic institutions (LP 47). Since amour-propre has a reciprocal feature, peoples who have
amour-propre will have the reciprocity of disposition that inclines them to accept and act on and
from the principles of the law of peoples. And so political realism is mistaken to suppose that all
nations are only rational and that stability can only be achieved by a balance of forces.
Therefore, amour-propre plays a significant role in Rawls’s argument against political
realism. Political realism fails to recognize the reciprocal feature of amour-propre and so it does
not really provide a moral psychology.

2.3.2 Amour-propre and Rawls’s Arguments against Distributive Cosmopolitanism
The distributive cosmopolitan view starts from the premise that all natural persons are
rational and reasonable and that they have the capacity for a conception of the good and the
capacity for the sense of justice. According to distributive cosmopolitanism, in the international
original position argument, all parties would choose the first principle of justice that grants equal
basic liberties and rights for all natural persons. Rawls argues that the distributive cosmopolitan
view is unrealistic, as he says:
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On this account, the foreign policy of a liberal people — which it is our concern
to elaborate — will be to act gradually to shape all not yet liberal societies in a
liberal direction, until eventually (in the ideal case) all societies are liberal. But
this foreign policy simply assumes that only a liberal democratic society can be
acceptable. (LP 82)
Rawls argues that it is simply unrealistic to assume that liberal democracies are the only
acceptable societies. This is for the reason that Rawls conjectures that decent peoples are ready
and willing to interact with liberal democratic peoples on terms that liberal democratic peoples
recognize as reasonable. He thus argues that nonliberal or nondemocratic decent peoples are
owed due respect by liberal peoples. He proposes an argument from amour-propre in favor of
this conjecture, that is, if decent peoples are not respected by liberal peoples, “This lack of
respect may wound the self-respect of decent nonliberal peoples as peoples, as well as their
individual members, and may lead to great bitterness and resentment” (LP 61). Thus, liberal
peoples who have a secure sense of amour-propre are ready to grant due respect to decent
peoples, even though they believe that they, as liberal democracies, are superior to other forms of
societies (LP 62).96
The distributive cosmopolitanism view can take two forms. It can focus either on the
distribution across the body politics in the Society of Peoples or across natural persons. It argues
for the global distributive principles of justice such as the resource redistribution principle and
the global egalitarian principle. The resource redistribution principle says that the redistribution
of resources should make sure that resource-poor countries have the same opportunity to meet
the basic needs of its people as resource-rich countries. Rawls argues that this principle
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Rawls notes that this proper self-respect does not depend on their being superior or inferior to other societies (LP 48).
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undermines the political autonomy of the peoples in the society of peoples. The global
egalitarian principle proposes a General Resource Dividend (GRD) for each society to pay an
international fund to support the global poor. Rawls argues that the problem with this principle is
that it does not have a target or cutoff (LP 119).
What underlies Rawls’s argument against distributive cosmopolitanism is the demand of
amour-propre. First, it is not necessary to have the global distributive principles to meet the
demand of amour-propre in the international case. Like the domestic case, the demand of amourpropre is met if equal basic liberties and rights are publicly recognized and respected in the
international case. And so Rawls writes that the equality, freedom and independence of peoples
must be respected by other peoples and that basic human rights must be honored by all peoples.
In these ways, the demand of amour-propre is met for all peoples and all natural persons. But
unlike the domestic case in which the fair equality of opportunity principle and the difference
principle are proposed partly for everyone to have equal basic rights and liberties substantively,
in the international case, Rawls does not argue for such principles. This is partly for the reason
that once a society becomes well-ordered, it will respect and honor the equality, freedom and
independence of other well-ordered societies, and the basic human rights for every natural
person. Its amour-propre does not rest on its having more resources or wealth than other
countries, but on its domestic public culture, its accomplishment and achievement in its history,
and its freedom and integrity as a people. Thus, Rawls argues for the principle of assistance,
which has the target or cut off, rather than the global distributive principles, which does not have
the target or cut off, to assist burdened societies to be well-ordered so that they can have
sufficient self-respect that inclines them to respect other peoples in the international case.
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Second, the global distributive principles emphasize the importance of economic equality
across the body politics or natural persons. This may take two forms: the first one is to argue for
the global egalitarian principle without the priority of equal liberty; the second one is to argue for
the global egalitarian principle with the priority of equal liberty. I argue that either way, it leads
to an inflamed amour-propre across the body politics or natural persons. First, the global
egalitarian principle without the priority of equal liberty undermines the self-respect of peoples
and natural persons. in the domestic case, Rawls argues that the legitimate social bases of selfrespect are not socio-economic status but equal citizenship. He argues that grounding a person’s
self-respect on the socio-economic status necessarily undermines his self-esteem. This is for the
reason that if his socio-economic status is lower than others, grounding his self-respect on the
socio-economic status will make him feel that he is inferior to others. Now since the global
egalitarian principle (such as the global difference principle) still allows large economic
inequalities across body politics or natural persons, if peoples or natural persons ground their
self-respect merely on economic equality, they will necessarily have an inflamed amour-propre
that inclines them to dominate other peoples or natural persons. But if economic equality is
strictly required by the global distributive principles, some of the basic liberties or rights might
be undermined for the sake of economic equality. Sacrificing basic rights or liberties for the sake
of economic equality undermines the self-respect of the peoples. Second, the global egalitarian
principle with the priority of equal liberty also undermines the self-respect of peoples and natural
persons. If distributive cosmopolitanism argues that the global difference principle is required to
grant everyone equal basic rights and liberties substantively, Rawls would say that such a
principle is neither necessary nor desirable. We have seen the reason why such a principle is not
necessary — once a society is well-ordered, it will have a sufficient sense of amour-propre that
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rests on its moving to decency or liberal democracy. Such a principle is also not desirable. In the
domestic case, Rawls’s two principles of justice apply to the basic structure of the well-ordered
society of justice as fairness; but in the international case, there is no international basic structure
for the difference principle to apply. If a global legislature is made possible in the future, Rawls
predicts that such a global legislature is either impotent or despotism. If the global legislature is
impotent, the global difference principle is not applicable; but if it is despotism, the political
autonomy of the peoples and their members is undermined, and so is their self-respect. Thus, the
global distributive principles cannot meet the demand of amour-propre.
To sum up, Rawls’s law of peoples meets the demand of amour-propre because first, the
freedom, independence and equality of peoples are respected by both liberal democratic and
decent peoples; and second, the most urgent human rights of every human being are respected by
all peoples in the society of peoples, and this also gives incentives for the members of non-liberal
and non-democratic societies to reform them to maintain a secure sense of amour-propre.
Furthermore, since Rawls’s law of peoples meets the demand of amour-propre, peoples (and
individuals) are motivated to stabilize the society of peoples. Rawls’s stability argument in the
law of peoples also relies on Rousseau’s account of moral education, especially, the reciprocal
feature of amour-propre. Political realism and distributive cosmopolitanism are two rival
conceptions of international justice that Rawls considers in the law of peoples. In response to
political realism, Rawls argues that the law of peoples relies on a realistic moral psychology. In
response to the distributive cosmopolitanism, Rawls argues that it is unnecessary to have the
global distributive principles to meet the demand of amour-propre and that the global distributive
principles fail to meet the demand of amour-propre. Therefore, there is a Rousseauvian
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interpretation of Rawls’s law of peoples. In particular, Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre
plays a significant role in Rawls’s law of peoples.

3.   Objections and Responses
Two objections are raised against Rawls’s argument that the law of peoples meets the
demand of amour-propre. First, Rawls’s law of peoples presumably provides the social bases of
self-respect for the peoples in the society of peoples, but it does not provide the social bases of
self-respect for some members in the society of peoples. In particular, in a decent hierarchical
society such as Kazanistan, women are denied some of the important political rights. For
example, they may not have the right to vote. Since they are denied equal citizenship in the
decent society, they will not have a secure sense of self-respect.97 Second, Rawls’s law of
peoples presumably provides the social bases of self-respect for the peoples in the Society of
Peoples, but it does not provide the social bases of self-respect for benevolent absolutism,
burdened states and outlaw states which also have the need for equal membership in international
relations.98 Denying the equal membership of these states would wound their self-respect and
lead to bitterness and resentment. This may bring instability to the Society of Peoples.
I will argue that there are Rousseauvian responses to both questions. To the first question, I
argue that Rawls’s treatment of decent peoples meets the demand of amour-propre for all peoples
and that it meets the demands of amour-propre at least minimally for all persons. To the second
question, I argue that denying them membership in the law of peoples meets the demand of
amour-propre for all persons. I also argue that one of the main reasons Rawls excludes burdened
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This objection is raised by Nussbaum (2002).
This objection is raised by Beitz (2000).
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societies, benevolent absolutisms and outlaw states in the law of peoples is that they are not
moral persons who have a positive form of amour-propre.

3.1 The First Objection
In response to the first objection, there are several existing interpretations as to why Rawls
neglects women’s need for recognition in the decent peoples. First, the practice-dependent
interpretation endorsed by, among others, Aaron James (2005), Leif Wenar (2006), David Reidy
(2004) and Pietro Maffettone (2011), argues that our current social practices such as international
laws and institutions are only participated in by nations and that they represent nations instead of
individuals as free and equal. While this interpretation explains why Rawls’s law of peoples
must meet the demand of amour-propre for all peoples, it fails to explain why it must also meet
the demand of amour-propre for all persons. Gillian Brock (2010, p.95) argues that the
interdependence of the global political culture indicates that individuals should also be the focus
of global justice. She argues that “Every member state of the United Nations has signed one or
more of the six major human rights treaties, with more than 80 percent having ratified four or
more of these six core documents” (ibid.). What Brock says is not an objection against Rawls’s
law of peoples as she proposes to be, but an objection against practice-dependent interpretation
of Rawls’s law of peoples. As we have seen that Rawls’s law of peoples takes the amour-propre
of natural persons into account, and so it takes the interdependence of the global political culture
seriously. But Brock’s argument can be seen as an objection against the practice-dependent
interpretation which does not recognize the fact of the interdependence of the global political
culture.
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Second, the stability interpretation proposed by Hyunseop Kim (2015) argues that Rawls
does not simply endorse the status quo; he argues that Rawls assumes that domestic public
political culture is the main cause of international security and peace, and so liberal and decent
peoples do not go to war with each other. Kim seems to suggest that since Rawls’s main aim in
The Law of Peoples is to complete his stability argument in Political Liberalism, he needs not to
address the problem of low self-respect for individuals. But the stability interpretation does not
really explain why Rawls needs not to address this problem from the consideration of stability.
Allen Buchanan (2000) argues that if some individuals lack self-respect in decent peoples, it will
bring about the intra-state conflicts that undermine the stability of the Society of Peoples.
Buchanan’s objection can be seen as an objection against Kim’s stability interpretation of Rawls,
but it is not an objection against Rawls’s law of peoples as he proposes to be. As we have seen
that Rawls’s law of peoples takes into account of the amour-propre of the members in decent
peoples. They are respected and recognized as rational and responsible and their societies are no
obstacles for them to reform them to maintain a secure sense of amour-propre. And so since the
demand of amour-propre of the members of the decent peoples is met to some extent, even
though the decent societies are not as stable as liberal democracies (at least not in the sense of
constitutional stability), these societies are stable enough not to undermine the stability of the
Society of Peoples.
My interpretation, unlike the practice-dependent interpretation and the stability
interpretation, argues that Rawls’s law of peoples meets the demand of amour-propre for all
peoples, and that it meets the demand of amour-propre at least minimally for all persons. Rawls
realizes that the satisfaction of the demand of amour-propre for all peoples may be in conflict
with the satisfaction of the demand of amour-propre for all persons. And so even though his law

140

of peoples tries to meet both principles, when they conflict with each other, he tries to give
strong reasons to give priority to one of the principles. For example, in arguing that liberal
peoples must respect decent peoples, he argues that there are no strong reasons not to give
priority to the principle that the law of peoples must meet the demand of amour-propre for all
peoples.99 And in arguing that outlaw states must not be tolerated by liberal and decent peoples,
he gives strong reasons for giving priority to the principle that the law of peoples must meet the
demand of amour-propre for all persons.100
Rawls argues that liberal peoples must respect decent peoples partly because there are no
strong reasons not to respect them. Rawls argues that liberal peoples cannot simply assume that
there are no nonliberal and nondemocratic peoples that deserve moral recognition and respect.
Rawls says:
Just as citizen in a liberal society must respect other persons’ comprehensive
religious, philosophical and moral doctrines provided they are pursued in
accordance with a reasonable political conception of justice, so a liberal society
must respect other societies organized by comprehensive doctrines, provided their
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Rawls writes: “Denying respect to other peoples and their members requires strong reasons to be justified. Liberal
peoples cannot say that decent peoples deny human rights, since (as we shall see in §§8-9 where the notion of
decency is developed) such peoples recognize and protect these rights; nor can liberal peoples say that decent
peoples deny their members the right to be consulted or a substantial political role in making decisions, since the
basic structure of these societies will be seen to include a decent consultation hierarchy or its equivalent. Finally,
decent peoples allow a right of dissent, and government and judicial officials are required to give a respectful reply,
one that addresses the merits of the question according to the rule of law as interpreted by the judiciary. Dissenters
may not be dismissed as simply incompetent or lacking in understanding. In this and other ways, the common good
conception of justice held by decent peoples may gradually change overtime, prodded by the dissents of members of
these peoples” (LP 61).
100
Rawls writes: “It may be asked by what right well-ordered liberal and decent peoples are justified in interfering
with an outlaw state on the grounds that this state has violated human rights…. Liberal and decent peoples have
extremely good reasons for their attitude. Outlaw states are aggressive and dangerous; all peoples are safer and more
secure if such state change, or are forced to change their ways” (LP 81).
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political and social institutions meet certain conditions that lead the society to
adhere to a reasonable law of peoples. (LP 42-3)
It is important to note that decent peoples are to be tolerated only if “their political and social
institutions meet certain conditions that lead the society to adhere to a reasonable law of
peoples.” Liberal peoples should tolerate decent peoples because they are all members of the
Society of Peoples who accept the principles of the law of peoples. Rawls assumes that two
criteria need to be met by decent peoples. The first criterion is that “the society does not have
aggressive aims, and it recognizes that it must gain its legitimate ends through diplomacy and
trade and other ways of peace” (LP 64). The second criterion has three parts. The first part is that
“a decent hierarchical people’s system of law, in accordance with its common good idea of
justice (see §9), secures for all members of the people what have come to be called human
rights” (LP 65). The second part is that the system of law must impose duties and obligations to
all persons in the decent people. The third part is that judges and other officials must sincerely
believe that the law accords with the common good of the people.
Rawls’s criterion of decency is criticized as both demanding too much and demanding too
little.101 It demands too much because it excludes benevolent absolutism, burdened societies and
outlaw states in the Society of Peoples. It demands too little because Rawls’s list of human rights
is minimal.102 The first criticism is similar to the second objection that I will consider next. The
second criticism can be discussed here. Nussbaum (2002) argues that Rawls’s minimal list of
human rights allows decent hierarchical societies to be members of the Society of Peoples. These
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See, for example, Tarek Hayfa (2004).
For this objection, see for example, Nussbaum (2002), Alistair Macleod (2006) and Allen Buchanan (2006). For
a defense of Rawls’s view, see for example, Wilfried Hinsch and Markus Stepanians (2006) and David Reidy
(2006).
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societies do not have political democracy, the equal worth of liberty, universal suffrage, and
freedom of speech. She invites us to imagine an independent state, Kerala, where women are
denied the right to vote. She argues that even though these women are represented by a body in
the decent consultation hierarchy, the representatives may not dare to speak out. She argues that
these women are subordinated in the decent hierarchical society and that there is no reason to
think that they endorse this way of life that keeps them subordinated.
In response to Nussbaum, I think that if in the independent state of Kerala women are
subordinated and they feel that they are subordinated, there is no reason to include such a state in
the Society of Peoples. I think Rawls would also agree that if women in a state like Kerala are
subject to injustice as Nussbaum describes, there is no reason to call it “a decent hierarchical
society”. But there is no reason to think that women in decent peoples do not have at least a
minimal sense of self-respect in so far as their human rights are respected by all peoples in the
international community, and by its own societies. Furthermore, since women have some
political rights that allow them to participate (unequally) in the social cooperation of the decent
societies, I tend to think that they have more than a minimal sense of self-respect. In any case, if
those who have developed into Stage 3 of moral development in decent peoples are not content
with their unequal political rights, they may reform the political structure of the society to
maintain their secure sense of amour-propre.
What are the bases of self-respect for women in decent peoples, if not equal citizenship?
Rawls writes:
A decent hierarchical society’s conception of the person, as implied by the second
criterion, does not require acceptance of the liberal idea of persons are citizens
first and have equal basic rights as equal citizens. Rather it views persons as
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responsible and cooperating members of their respective groups. Hence, persons
can recognize, understand, and act in accordance with their moral duties and
obligations as members of these groups. (LP 66)
Here Rawls says that unlike persons in liberal peoples who are free and equal, reasonable and
rational, persons in decent peoples are “responsible and cooperating members of their respective
groups”. Thus, unlike persons in liberal peoples who base their self-respect on equal citizenship,
persons in decent peoples may base their self-respect on their having human rights that are
publically recognized by the Society of Peoples, or on their unequal political participation in the
social cooperation of the decent peoples for the common good. Even though women do not have
equal citizenship in the decent consultation hierarchy, their interests are represented by a body in
making final political decisions. As responsible members of the decent societies, women have
their moral duties and obligations in accordance with the common good idea of justice.
Assuming they are brought up to be responsible and rational, they will manifestly live up to the
duties and obligations set up by the decent hierarchy. If they are dissatisfied by the decisions of
the consultation hierarchy, they have the right to dissent. Their voice will be heard and they will
get a respectful reply. In any case, if those who have developed into Stage 3 of moral
development are not satisfied with the extent to which their demand of amour-propre is met, they
can reform the political structure of the decent peoples to maintain a more robust sense of amourpropre.

3.2 The Second Objection
Now turning to the second question, why does Rawls exclude benevolent absolutism,
burdened societies and outlaw states from the Society of Peoples? If these societies also have the
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need for moral recognition and respect, denying them equal membership in the Society of
Peoples would lead to bitterness and resentment. This would bring instability to the Society of
Peoples. I argue that there is also a Rousseauvian response to this question. First, burdened
societies and outlaw states do not respect the human rights of its members, and so denying them
membership in the society of peoples is related to one of Rawls’s aims of the law of peoples, that
is, to meet the demand of amour-propre at least minimally for all persons. Second, liberal and
decent peoples do not grant equal respect to benevolent absolutisms, burdened societies and
outlaw states partly because they are not moral persons that have a secure sense of amour-propre.
One of the important reasons why Rawls says that outlaw states do not deserve respect is that
these societies do not respect the human rights of their members, as Rawls writes: “An outlaw
state that violates these rights is to be condemned and in grave cases may be subjected to forceful
sanctions and even to intervention” (LP 81). But Charles Beitz (2000) argues that outlaw states
and other societies should be included in the international original position:
The exclusion of outlaw (and other) societies from the international original
position means that no argument for human rights, made from the point of view of
the original position, could establish that human rights have the kind of
universality that is usually presumed. We want to say that people are entitled to be
treated in certain ways (partly) in virtue of their characteristics as human beings
and independently of considerations that might be particular to their own
institutions and political cultures. (p.686)
Beitz argues that one of the reasons why outlaw states and other societies should be
included in the international original position is that the people in these societies deserve equal
respect regardless of their national identity. He argues that in the international original position,
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if all persons in the outlaw states and other societies are included, parties who are free and equal
rational persons would choose the global distributive principles of justice. Thus, Beitz argues
that if Rawls wants to sincerely endorse the universality of human rights, he should start with the
assumption that all persons deserve equal respect regardless of the origin of their nations.
In response to Beitz’s objection, I argue that on the one hand the most urgent human
rights are respected by all peoples in the society of peoples; on the other hand, burdened
societies, outlaw states and benevolent absolutism are not moral persons and that they do not
have a positive sense of amour-propre.
First, denying outlaw states and other societies membership in the law of peoples meets
the demand of amour-propre. If outlaw states and other societies are included in the international
original position, the most urgent human rights will not be respected by all peoples as they are
not respected by these societies.103 Denying them membership in the law of peoples, one the one
hand, serves as an incentive for these societies to respect human rights; on the other hand, it also
shows liberal and decent peoples’ respect of human rights. Thus, Beitz is mistaken to say that the
universality of human rights requires the inclusion of outlaw states and other societies in
international original position; on the contrary, the universality of human rights requires the
exclusion of outlaw states and other societies in the international original position.
Second, outlaw states and other societies are not moral persons and they do not have the
positive sense of amour-propre, and so they should not be represented by the parties in the
international original position. In other words, in the ideal theory of international justice, these
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This is, of course, true of outlaw states and burdened societies because they do not honor human rights. Rawls
says that benevolent absolutism honors human rights, but why aren’t they included in the society of peoples? David
Reidy (2006, p.176) points out that the members of benevolent absolutism enjoy the content of human rights only
through the good will of their ruler, not through their reciprocal commitment, and so they cannot “enjoy the content
of their basic human rights as a matter of right.”
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societies are excluded because they are neither just nor decent. The burdened societies are not
well-ordered because they suffer from unfavorable conditions. Rawls argues that burdened
societies lack the necessary resources to become well-ordered and so liberal and decent peoples
have the duty to assist burdened societies to become well-ordered. Once they become wellordered, they will have a positive form of amour-propre. Thus, burdened societies will become
members of the Society of peoples in due course. But outlaw states must not be tolerated by
liberal and decent peoples. Rawls says: “Liberal and decent peoples have extremely good reasons
for their attitude. Outlaw states are aggressive and dangerous; all peoples are safer and more
secure if such states change, or are forced to change, their ways” (LP 81). Thus, parallel to
Rawls’s treatment of unreasonable persons, he argues that unreasonable societies are not to be
respected by liberal and decent peoples. Indeed, outlaw states are like the slaveholder whose selfrespect is enhanced by subjecting others to a lesser liberty. Outlaw states also have amourpropre. But their amour-propre is inflamed. They have a desire for domination, rather than a
desire for equal standing with others in international relations. Thus, this desire of theirs must be
suppressed by all reasonable (or not unreasonable) peoples. Unlike burdened societies and
outlaw states, benevolent absolutism is not aggressive, and it respects the human rights of its
members (not as a matter of right). But unlike liberal and decent peoples, the benevolent
absolutism lacks the institutional structure needed to situate its members in various offices, etc.,
such that taken altogether they constitute one agent. As Rawls says, benevolent absolutism “does
not give its members a meaningful role in making political decisions” (LP 92). Since benevolent
absolutism doesn’t incorporate its members into a single structure — it subjects them to the
authority of its ruler, it is not one collective agent, but rather a ruler coordinating a
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population. Thus, like burdened societies and outlaw states, benevolent absolutism ought not to
be represented by the parties in the international original position.

4.   Conclusion
I have argued that three themes of Rawls’s law of peoples, that is, the two international
original position, the idea of a realistic utopia, and the distinction between peoples and states,
parallel, and are grounded in, Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre. I have also argued that
Rawls’s argument that the law of peoples meets the demand of amour-propre, his stability
argument and his arguments against political realism and distributive cosmopolitanism parallel,
and are grounded in, Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre. I have also considered two objections
against Rawls’s argument from the point of view of distributive cosmopolitanism. The first
objection is that Rawls’s law of peoples neglects women’s need for recognition in decent
hierarchical societies. The second objection is that Rawls’s law of peoples neglects other
societies’ need for recognition such as benevolent absolutism, burdened societies and outlaw
states. I have argued that there are Rousseauvian responses to both objections. To the first
objection, I have argued that Rawls’s treatment of decent peoples both satisfies the demand of
amour-propre for decent peoples and the demand of amour-propre at least minimally for all
persons. In response to the the second objection, I have argued that Rawls’s treatment of outlaw
states and other societies meets the demand of amour-propre for all persons. I have also argued
that these societies are denied membership in the society of peoples because they are not moral
persons that have a positive form of amour-propre. Therefore, there is a Rousseauvian
interpretation of Rawls’s law of peoples. In particular, Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre
plays a significant role in Rawls’s law of peoples.
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By recognizing the significance of amour-propre in Rawls’s law of peoples, we can see that
Rawls’s law of peoples is not inconsistent with his theory of justice in the domestic case. This
chapter thus also serves as a response to Rawls’s critics who argues that Rawls’s law of peoples
is inconsistent with his justice as fairness. Furthermore, we have seen that Rousseau’s concept of
amour-propre plays a significant role in Rawls’s stability argument in the law of peoples, and so
this chapter also serves as the completion of my interpretation of Rawls’s stability argument.
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CHAPTER 6 CONCLUDING REMARKS

“Burdened as a man may be with the weight of tradition, he can yet prop
open the gate of darkness with his shoulder to let the children through to the
bright, wide-open spaces, to lead happy lives hence forward as rational beings.”
(Lu Xun, “What Is Required of Us as Fathers Today”)104

In the preceding chapters, I have defended the following theses. First, Rawls correctly
interprets Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre as having both a negative form and a positive
form. The negative form of amour-propre is the desire for domination, whereas the positive form
of amour-propre is the desire for having equal status with others. Second, for both Rawls and
Rousseau, the desire for having equal status with others, that is, self-respect, rests on a person’s
equal citizenship and its fair value, not on his or her socio-economic status. Third, since Rawls’s
justice as fairness grants everyone equal citizenship and its fair value in the well-ordered society,
justice as fairness satisfies the demand of amour-propre. I have also argued that since Rawls’s
justice as fairness meets the demand of amour-propre, people are motivated to act on and from
the sense of justice in the well-ordered society of justice as fairness. I have argued that this
explains why Rawls’s justice as fairness is stable. Finally, I have argued that Rawls’s law of
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The English translation is from Lu Xun Selected Works, Vol. II, Translated by Yang Xianyi and Galadys Yang,
Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1980, p.57. Another English translation says: “Let the awakened man burden
himself with the weight of tradition and shoulder up the gate of darkness. Let him give unimpeded passage to the
children so that they may rush to the bright, wide-open spaces and lead happy lives henceforward as rational human
beings” (Tsi-An Hsia, 1968, pp. 146-7). The original text is “自己背着因袭的重担，肩住了黑暗的闸门，放他们
到宽阔光明的地方去；此后幸福的度日，合理的做人。” （鲁迅，“我们怎样做父亲”）
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peoples meets the demand of amour-propre for both peoples and persons, and that this explains
why Rawls’s law of peoples is stable.
In the above argument, I have assumed that Rawls’s argument that the legitimate bases of
self-respect are equal basic rights and liberties and their substantive fair value, not equal socioeconomic status is plausible. Given this assumption, I have argued that since Rawls’s justice as
fairness grants equal basic rights and liberties and their substantive fair value (secured by the
second principle of justice) to everyone in the well-ordered society, justice as fairness meets the
demand of amour-propre. Similarly, given this assumption, I have argued that since Rawls’s law
of peoples grants equal basic rights and liberties to all peoples and persons (in a minimal sense
for the latter), the law of peoples meets the demand of amour-propre. In this chapter, I shall
consider two objections against my assumption that the legitimate social bases of self-respect are
equal basic rights and liberties and their substantive fair value. The first objection comes from
some Chinese nationalists who argue that Chinese people’s self-respect comes from their
achievements and accomplishments in their history, especially the traditional culture of China.105
The second objection is from luck egalitarians who argue that a person’s self-respect comes from
economic equality. I argue that these two objections are groundless.

1.   Chinese Nationalists and Self-respect
Some Chinese Nationalists argue that Chinese people’s self-respect rests on their
achievements and accomplishments in their history, especially the traditional culture of China. I
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While I agree with Rawls that cultural achievements are often a proper bases of national pride, I think this is true
only if the achievements constitute instances of moral development, for example, moving to decency and from
decency to liberal democracy. This is the reason why I think that the traditional culture of China, which represents a
morality of authority, cannot serve as the proper bases of national pride.
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often hear people say that they are proud of being a Chinese because the tradition of old China
has lasted for five thousand years, or because China was a great nation, or because their
ancestors built the great wall, and so on. In recent years, I have also heard people say that they
are proud of being a Chinese because China has the world’s second largest economy. No doubt,
some of these features are peculiar to China, but none of them, as I see it, contributes to a proper
sense of self-respect. I will first study what these Chinese nationalists believe and why they hold
this view. Then I will argue that the tradition of old China cannot be the legitimate base of selfrespect.

1.1 Chinese Nationalists’ View on Self-respect
Robert Weatherley (2014, p.20) claims that Chinese nationalists identify themselves with
“the common myths, shared history and common public culture of their nation.” The common
myths refer to the greatness of China as a nation. The shared history refers to the achievements
and accomplishments in their history. The common public culture refers to the Confucianism
tradition of old China, the common language and writing system and the four great Chinese
inventions: porcelain, paper, printing and gunpowder. He argues that Chinese nationalism was a
powerful weapon against western colonialism in the early twenty-century, but it was also an
obstacle for China’s democratization. Robert Weatherley (2014) points out that Sun Yat-sen’s
Republic of China was a constitutional republic that had a constitution and a parliament. But he
argues that democracy did not lead China toward political independence from western
imperialism.106 So Sun and Chiang Kai-shek believed that the mass of Chinese people were not
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He Baogang (2004, p.176) argues that democracy did not lead to national unity in China in the early twentycentury due to the rise of regional militarists and that this forced both leaders in the Kuomintang Party and the
Chinese Communist Party to shift from democracy to authoritarianism.
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ready for a parliamentary democracy. China shifted towards authoritarianism. Individual rights
and liberties were sacrificed in order to expel foreign enemies from China. After the
establishment of People’s Republic of China (PRC), even though the Japanese Army was
expelled out of the land of China, protecting China’s independence from external threats remains
a primary task of the PRC. Some of the basic human rights are not honored by the PRC because
human rights talk is taken to be a form of western imperialism.107
Yingjie Guo (2004, p.17) distinguishes state nationalism and cultural nationalism in today’s
China. State nationalism, advocated by Chinese government officials, “portrays the state [or the
communist party] as the embodiment of the nation’s will, seeking for its goal the kind of loyalty
and support granted the nation itself and trying to create a sense of nationhood among all its
citizens” (p.17). Cultural nationalism, advocated by Chinese intellectuals, tries to recreate “a
widespread awareness of the myths, history, and linguistic traditions of the community” (p.18).
While state nationalism and cultural nationalism often go hand in hand, cultural nationalists do
not identify themselves with advocates of the party-state. They also think that the socialists’ and
Marxists’ elements in the party-state are illegitimate. But both state nationalism and cultural
nationalism think that human rights, liberty and democracy are parts of western culture that
contribute to Western imperialism. State nationalism argues that it brings harm to the party-state
to demand human rights, liberty and democracy (cf. p.29). Cultural nationalism thinks that
human rights, liberty and democracy are parts of colonial culture that are detrimental to national
self-esteem (cf. p.112).
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Also, an important ideological reason is that socialism is regarded as the only correct path toward equality and
freedom.
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We can see that Chinese nationalists think that equal basic liberties and rights are not the
legitimate bases of self-respect for Chinese people for two reasons. First, they think that human
rights, liberty and democracy are necessarily linked with western imperialism and colonialism.
Second, they think that they are foreign to us because they are not a part of the tradition of old
China. They think the legitimate bases of self-respect for Chinese people must, and should,
originate from their own culture. And so since human rights, liberty and democracy are not in the
tradition of old China, they cannot be the legitimate bases of self-respect for Chinese people.
Thus, they think that China should not advance human rights, liberty and democracy to secure
Chinese people’s self-respect; rather, they think that China must make the tradition of old China
universal, and make other peoples recognize the value of the traditional Chinese culture.

1.2 Why Can the Tradition of Old China not be the Proper Bases of Self-respect?
I think that it is understandable that Chinese nationalists psychologically connect western
imperialism with human rights, liberty and democracy. This psychological connection stems
partly from the pain and miseries that Chinese people experienced in their struggle for national
independence, and partly from their failure in achieving national independence by
democratization. But even though in the hearts of Chinese nationalists, there is a psychological
connection that links western imperialism with human rights, liberty and democracy, there is no
necessary conceptual connection between them. In fact, if Rawls is right, and I think he is, liberal
peoples have a positive sense of amour-propre that inclines them to respect other nations’ rights,
which include their right of non-intervention unless that nation severely violates basic human
rights. Thus, liberal democracies necessarily do not have a tendency to invade other countries.
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The western countries that invaded China in the last century were not liberal democracies by
then.
Chinese nationalists may argue that it does not matter whether liberal democracies are
aggressive or not. They may argue that what matters is that liberal democracy is a foreign thing
for Chinese people. And so equal basic rights and liberties and their substantive value cannot be
the rightful bases of self-respect for Chinese people. They argue that the legitimate bases of selfrespect for Chinese people are the tradition of old China. In what follows, I will give two case
studies and argue that the tradition of old China cannot be the proper bases of self-respect
because “filial piety” and “chastity,” which are two core values of the traditional culture of
China, are corrosive of self-respect. I will also argue that human rights, liberty and democracy
are a part of, and therefore are not foreign to, the domestic public culture of China because they
are embodied in the work of Lu Xun and other Chinese liberals.

1.2.1 Two Case Studies: “Filial Piety” and “Chastity” are Corrosive of Self-respect
“Filial piety” and “chastity” are two of the core values of the traditional culture of China
because they regulate family relations which mirror the relations between the rulers and the
subjects. “Filial piety” requires children to treat their parents with “piety” because their parents
give birth to them and raise them. According to the tradition of old China, children do not have
self-ownership; rather they are owned by (or belong to) their parents. “Chastity” requires women
to treat their husbands with “chastity,” that is, they do not have the right to remarry after the
deaths of their husbands and they cannot have relations with other men. In other words, women
do not have self-ownership too; rather they are owned by (or belong to) their husbands. These
two virtues were highly praised by intellectuals and moralists in the old China. They are two of
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the three Cardinal Guides (三纲) that regulate the relations between people. They are also
regarded as the primary motivating force for the stability of the old China. But as we will see,
these two virtues are corrosive of a person’s self-respect. And so they are not the proper
motivating force for stability.
In the Beginning of The Classic of Filial Piety (The Hsiao King), the Master (Confucius)
asked his student:
The ancient kings had a perfect virtue and all-embracing rule of conduct, through
which they were in accord with all under heaven. By the practice of it the people
were brought to live in peace and harmony, and there was no ill-will between
superiors and inferiors. Do you know what it was? (The Hsiao King, I)108
His student, Zeng, did not know the answer. So the Master answered:
(It was filial piety.) Now filial piety is the root of (all) virtue, and (the stem) out of
which grows (all moral) teaching. Sit down again, and I will explain the subject to
you. Our bodies- to every hair and bit of skin- are received by us from our
parents, and we must not presume to injure or wound them. This is the beginning
of filial piety. When we have established our character by the practice of the
(filial) course, so as to make our name famous in future ages and thereby glorify
our parents, this is the end of filial piety. It commences with the service of
parents; it proceeds to the service of the ruler; it is completed by the establishment
of character. (ibid.)
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the English translation is from The Sacred Books of the East: The Texts of Confucianism, vol. III, part I: The Shu
King, The Religious Portions of the Shih King, The Hsiao King, translated by James Legge, Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1879, pp.465-6.
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Here it says that filial piety is the origin of all virtues and the essence of moral teaching.
It says that with the practice of filial piety, the stability (peace and harmony) of the society is
achieved. The asymmetrical emphasis on filial piety from children to parents is characteristic of
the tradition of the old China. Filial piety advocates the self-sacrificing spirit of children to
please their parents. The Twenty-four Paragons of Filial Piety manifests this spirit in its extreme.
For example, among others, there is the story of Dong Yong who enters servitude to pay for his
father’s Funeral and the story of Wang Xiang who lies down on the ice to get carp for his
stepmother.109 In these stories, filial piety is praised as the virtue of highest priority that
outweighs other virtues and human goods. And so Dong Yong is praised as a “filial son” because
he sells himself as a slave to bury his father’s body despite the fact that servitude is corrosive of
his own self-respect. The story of Wang Xiang also shows how filial piety is corrosive of selfrespect. Wang Xiang’s stepmother had always treated him badly. But Wang Xiang was a “filial
son.” So he practiced his duty as a son, lying on the ice to get carp for her stepmother because
she had a craving for carp in her sickness. This story illustrates how the subjects in the old China
are taught to treat their rulers. Their rulers, like Wang Xiang’s stepmother, can treat their
subjects badly, but the subjects have the duty to do as the rulers command. “Filial piety” does not
affirm a person’s self-respect; rather, it nurtures the evils of servitude that “stabilize” the
hierarchical society.
“Chastity,” similar to “filial piety,” emphasizes the asymmetrical relation between the
rulers and their subjects. “Chastity” requires women to treat their husbands as their masters, and
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These stories are not the cruelest stories in The Twenty-four Paragons of Filial Piety. They are selected simply
because they illustrate how filial piety is corrosive of self-respect. The cruelest story among them is the story of Guo
Ju who tries to bury his son in order to save food for his mother. Lu Xun feels this story repugnant. This story is not
selected in today’s popular versions of The Twenty-four Paragons of Filial Piety.
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so men can have many concubines but women must keep their “chastity” even after the death of
their husband. “Chastity” also undermines a person’s self-respect. It enhances women’s servitude
that “stabilizes” the patriarchal society.

1.2.2 Lu Xun’s Criticisms of “Filial piety” and “Chastity”
After the May-fourth movement in 1919, Lu Xun wrote that the reform of China should
start with the reform of family, and that the reform of family should start with the abandonment
of the old tradition of “filial piety” and “chastity.” He argues that the tradition of old China is the
reverse of the natural order:
The young should take first place, but instead it is taken by the old. The emphasis
should be on the future, but instead it is on the past. The elder generation is
sacrificed to the generation before it; yet, with no means to outlive itself, it
expects the younger generation to sacrifice itself for the elder’s sake, destroying
all that could carry it forward. (Lu Xun, 1980, p.60)
Lu Xun argues that the tradition of old China assumes that “the young should be
sacrificed entirely to the old” (ibid.). He argues that this assumption is at variance with the
natural order. He argues that the traditions of old China of “filial piety” and “chastity” should
give way to European and American family tradition, that is, “the young and the weak usually
take first place” (ibid., p.61). He argues that parents should follow the natural way, that is, to
love their children first, rather than ask for their sacrifice first. He argues that this is the path
toward the emancipation of the young, and toward their happy lives.
Lu Xun’s thoughts are deeply influenced by Rousseau. In an essay entitled “Rousseau
and Personal Taste,” he tries to defend Rousseau’s ideas of freedom and equality, especially, the
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equal rights for men and women,110 against Rousseau’s critics (cf. p.377). His objection against
“chastity” is in the same vein.111 His thought that love should be the root of morality also
parallels Rousseau’s thought that moral sentiments are derived from natural sentiments. But
unfortunately, while Lu Xun is the most influential figure in modern Chinese literature and a
source of the domestic public culture of China, his thoughts on moral education and on political
liberties are underestimated.112
Since the emphasis on freedom and equality is not absent from the work of Lu Xun’s and
other Chinese liberals,113 which have been regarded as an important source of the domestic
public culture of China, they are not foreign to us. Furthermore, Chinese nationalists cannot say
that China does not have the soil to bring liberal democracy into fruition because, as Lu Xun,
Rousseau and Rawls all point out, the first step toward a society of mutual respect and selfesteem is natural love of which all human beings are capable.
To sum up, I have argued that some Chinese nationalists are mistaken to connect western
imperialism with human rights, liberty and democracy. I have also argued that Chinese
nationalists cannot ground their self-respect on the tradition of old China because “filial piety”
and “chastity,” two of the core values of the traditional culture of China, are corrosive of self-
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The inequality of women in the villages of China is exhibited in the organization of the village council, the
members of which are elected by villagers. In the village council, there is only one single woman called “women’s
representative,” whose primary task, over the past 30 years, has been birth control (cf. Manoranjan Mohanty and
Mark Selden, 2007, p.465).
111
Lu Xun refutes the spiritualists’ claim that women’s chastity is the remedy for the moral degeneration in China in
the early twenty-century. He has the deepest compassion for women’s miseries in the old China where they have no
right to remarry after the death of their husband. See Lu Xun Selected Works, Vol. II, 1980, pp.13-25.
112
Lu Xun was praised by Mao Tse-tung as “the most correct, the bravest, the firmest, the most loyal and most
zealous hero who stormed and broke up the enemy’s front” (Tsi-An Hsia, 1968, p.102). He was one of the leaders of
the Chinese League of Leftist Writers which aimed to support the activities of the Communist Party and was
supported by it from 1930-1935. But according to Tsi-An Hsia, from 1935 to the time of his death, Lu Xun “had lost
much of his interest in the League and had been sorely disappointed in it at times” (ibid., p.106).
113
For example, Hu Shih argues that Chinese people’s self-confidence cannot rest on the past glory of our ancestors;
rather he argues that it should rest on the reflection about what has gone wrong in the past (cf. Hu Shih, 1934).
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respect. I have also argued that the value of liberty and equality has been recognized by Chinese
intellectuals such as Lu Xun whose works are a part of the domestic public culture of China. And
so Chinese nationalists cannot say that human rights, liberty and democracy are foreign to us.
More importantly, they are not foreign to us because as Lu Xun, Rousseau and Rawls all point
out, we are all capable of natural love which is the first step toward a society of mutual respect
and self-esteem (or a liberal democracy).

2.   Luck Egalitarianism’s Objections against Rawls114
In Chapter 3, I argued that the public affirmation of the two principle of justice, especially
the public affirmation of equal citizenship, ensures the social bases of self-respect for everyone
in the well-ordered society of justice as fairness. I have argued that the legitimate social bases of
self-respect are equal citizenship, not equal socio-economic status. I have argued that Rawls’s
difference principle, that is, social and economic inequalities are to be the greatest benefit of the
least advantaged people, is partly used for securing equal basic rights and liberties for everyone
substantively. And so the difference principle also lends support for a person’s self-respect. But
one might wonder why the difference principle is required to affirm a person’s self-respect, not
other principles such as G.A Cohen’s strict reading of the difference principle. In what follows, I
will first introduce Joshua Cohen’s argument from self-respect for Rawls’s difference principle. I
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Here I mainly consider the form of luck egalitarianism that G. A Cohen proposes in Rescuing Justice and
Equality. Luck egalitarianism maintains that inequalities are unjust if they are the results of brute luck. Cohen says
that “The view that accidental inequality is unjust is suggested in certain passages in Ronald Dworkin’s ‘Equality of
Resources.’ Dworkin did not himself go so far as to endorse the view in its full generality, but Richard Arneson and
I proposed its generalization, and Elizabeth Anderson aptly dubbed the proposal ‘luck egalitarianism’” (Cohen 2008,
p.8). Rawls thinks that luck egalitarianism mistakenly ties a person’s self-respect with an ideal of cosmic order —
being immunized from brute luck.
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will then introduce G.A Cohen’s objection against Joshua Cohen’s argument. In the end, I will
argue against G. A Cohen’s objection.

2.1 Joshua Cohen’s Argument from Self-respect for Rawls’s Difference Principle
Joshua Cohen argues that Rawls’s difference principle lends greater support for selfrespect than alternative principles. His argument goes like this: (1) “the value of liberties to a
person depends on the level of resources available to the person” (Joshua Cohen, 1989, p.738);
and (2) Rawls’s difference principle provides greater minimum value of the liberties than
alternative principles; and (3) self-respect depends on the value of the liberties “since a greater
value enables a more confident pursuit of one’s aims” (ibid., p.739); and so justice as fairness
lends greater support for self-respect than alternative principles.
He also argues that the public affirmation of the fair value of liberty, or as he puts it, “the
maximal worth of the liberties” (ibid.), provides the recognitional bases for self-respect. Once
citizens know, and know that others know, that their worth does not rest on social advantages
such as social positions, natural endowment and good fortune, they will fully affirm others’
worth and express respect for others. Thus, he argues that Rawls’s difference principle provides
greater support for self-respect than alternative principles.

2.2 G. A Cohen’s Objection Against Rawls’s Difference Principle
G. A Cohen argues that Rawls’s difference principle, or what he calls “the lax reading of
the difference principle,” faces the same objection that Joshua Cohen raises (cf. G. A Cohen
2008, p.77). Thus, according to G. A Cohen, since his strict reading of the difference principle
provides greater minimum value of the liberties than Rawls’s difference principle, his strict
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reading of the difference principle lends greater support to self-respect than Rawls’s difference
principle.115 Furthermore, he argues that Rawls’s difference principle does not really commit to
treating every person as equals regardless of their social position, natural endowment and good
fortune. He argues that Rawls’s difference principle is not a basic principle of justice but a
compromise to the fact that the talented and the rich need unequal incentives to work hard. He
argues that this fact is only a fact when the talented and the rich make it true. He argues that if
the talented and the rich, as Rawls describes in the well-ordered society of justice as fairness,
have the sense of justice, they would not need unequal incentives to work hard to advance the
interests of the rest. And so he argues that his strict reading of the difference principle which
“counts inequalities as necessary only when they are, strictly, necessary, necessary, that is, apart
from people’s chosen intentions” is a basic principle of justice (ibid., p.69).
G. A Cohen illustrates his point with the example of two brothers, A, and B, who try to
decide to move from New York to Chicago or Boston. Suppose A and B are at the benefit levels
of 6 and 5 in New York. If they move to Chicago, their levels will rise to 10 and 5.1. If they
move to Boston, their levels will rise to 8 and 7. G. A Cohen argues that according to Rawls’s
difference principle, it is reasonable for A and B to move to Chicago even though the economic
inequalities are enlarged. He argues that for Rawls, these inequalities are justified because the
prospect of the less advantaged (B) in Chicago is better than in New York. If we take the factual
premise that A does not have unequal incentives to move to Boston into account, Rawls’s
difference principle, as Joshua Cohen suggests, provides the maximal minimum value of the
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Richard Penny (2013) develops G. A Cohen’s argument from self-respect against Rawls’s difference principle.
He argues that Rawls’s difference principle undermines a person’s self-confidence because it leaves “those who are
least advantaged with a smaller absolute bundle of resources with which to form and pursue their plan of life”
(p.346). He also argues that Rawls’s difference principle undermines the value of mutual beneficence, mutual
respect and fraternity. For an objection against Penny’s view, see Harrison P. Frye (2015).
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liberties. But since the factual premise would not be true if A values fraternity and decides to
move to Boston, G. A Cohen argues that Rawls’s difference principle does not provide greater
minimal value of the liberties than his strict reading of the difference principle. And so he argues
that his strict reading of the difference principle lends greater support to self-respect than
Rawls’s difference principle.
The proponents of Rawls might argue that Rawls’s two principles of justice only apply to
the basic structure of the well-ordered society of justice as fairness, not to personal choices. They
might argue that insofar as citizens in the well-ordered societies comply with the rules of the just
basic structure, personal choices do not affect distributive justice (cf. ibid., p.126). In particular,
they might argue that even though the rich and the talented are “market maximizers,” citizens in
the well-ordered society of justice as fairness are still granted the social bases of self-respect
secured by the just basic structure. But G. A Cohen argues that this basic structure objection
faces two difficulties. The first difficulty is that restricting justice to the basic structure
undermines the realization of fraternity, self-respect and the sense of justice. The second
difficulty is that Rawls’s idea of basic structure faces a dilemma: either the basic structure only
includes the coercive structure, then this restriction is arbitrary; or it also includes social
practices and personal choices, then this restriction collapses (cf. ibid., p.137). In particular, he
argues that the reason why restricting justice to the basic structure undermines self-respect of the
worse off is that their positions are made inferior to others by the basic structure by acquiescing
the rich and the talented people’s needs for unequal incentives. Thus, he concludes that the basic
structure objection fails.
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2.3 My Argument Against G. A Cohen’s Objection
A number of commentators have provided Rousseauvian responses to G. A Cohen’s
objection.116 For example, Robert Jubb (2011, p.257) argues that G. A Cohen’s strict reading of
the difference principle “fails to generate its own support because the policies needed to realize it
are ones which tend to demean and disfigure the lives of some of those who live under them.”
Jeffrey Bercuson (2014) argues that G. A Cohen’s strict reading fails to take men as they are and
political institutions as they might be (cf. pp.140-2). My argument against G. A Cohen’s
objection is in the same vein. I argue that G. A Cohen’s strict reading of the difference principle
is based on an unrealistic moral psychology.
G. A Cohen argues that Rawls’s incentive argument for the difference principle is based
on the assumption that human beings are unjustly selfish. He says:
No explanation was given in 1971 of why the incentives are necessary to the
stated ends, but it follows from my argument against Rawls’s position on
incentives that, if unequalizing incentives are truly necessary from the point of
view of the interest of the badly off, then they are necessary only because of an
infirmity in human nature, to wit, a certain unjust selfishness, that is more or less
acknowledge in the “Justice as Fairness” passage but that gains no mention, as
such, in the corresponding Theory passage. (G. A Cohen, 2008, p.178)
As I have said, for G. A Cohen, Rawls’s difference principle is a compromise to the fact
that the rich and the talented need unequal incentives to work hard. This fact, he argues, is made
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There are many other objections against G. A Cohen’s view. For example, David Miller (2008), Thomas Pogge
(2008), Robert Jubb (2009), Jan Narveson (2010) and Lea Ypi (2012) argue that Cohen’s claim that justice is factinsensitive is implausible or insignificant. Andrew Williams (1998) argues that Cohen’s strict reading of the
difference principle fails to satisfy the principle of publicity. Alan Thomas (2011) argues that Cohen’s critique of
Rawls’s special incentives is unsustainable.
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true intentionally by the rich and the talented. And so if the incentive argument is voiced from
the rich and the talented, the poor and the untalented cannot reasonably accept it. Here G. A
Cohen argues that Rawls’s incentive argument is based on the assumption that human beings are
unjustly selfish. For if this assumption is false, Rawls’s factual premise that the rich and the
talented need unequal incentives to work hard will not be true. G. A Cohen thus argues that
Rawls’s difference principle is not a basic principle of justice and that it undermines the selfrespect of the worse-off people. His response to the basic structure objection also relies on this
objection against Rawls’s moral psychology.
One of the cruxes of the debate between Rawls (and Joshua Cohen) and G. A Cohen is
whether Rawls’s incentive argument is based on the assumption that human beings are unjustly
selfish. Rawls, of course, has never said that human beings are unjustly selfish. He assumes that
moral persons are free and equal, rational and reasonable. He argues that human beings have the
capacity to form, revise and pursue their own conception of the good, and that they have the
capacity to act on and from the sense of justice. G. A Cohen argues that Rawls has an incoherent
account of human nature because Rawls argues that human beings have both the capacity for the
sense of justice and the capacity for the conception of the good. For Cohen, the citizens who act
from Rawls’s difference principle are not really just; rather, he thinks that they are unjustly
selfish.
But as we have seen in Chapter 4 Rawls has a realistic moral psychology. For Rawls and
Rousseau, the moral sentiments of the sense of justice are derived from the natural sentiments of
self-love. In the first stage of moral development, if children see that their parents manifestly
love them, they will love their parents back. This returning sentiment of natural love is the first
step toward the formation of the sense of justice. In the second stage of moral development,
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given that a person has acquired natural love in the first stage, if he or she sees that his or her
associates fulfill the duties and obligations set up by the association they belong to with evident
intention, he or she will have feelings of friendship toward them. In the third stage of moral
development, given that a person has experienced the first two stages, if he or she sees that the
just institution is beneficial to him and those around him, he or she will acquire the sense of
justice. In each stage of moral development, the reciprocity of disposition is exhibited. But in the
second stage, the reciprocity of disposition is more elevated than in the first stage. And in the
third stage, the reciprocity of disposition is the most elevated. Once a person has acquired the
sense of justice, he or she will act on and from the sense of justice regardless of natural or social
contingencies. And so, G.A Cohen is mistaken to say that Rawls’s moral persons are unjustly
selfish. Rather, they are simply “just.” For Rawls and Rousseau, the sense of justice is not
incompatible with self-love or self-interest. On the contrary, the sense of justice originates from
self-love or self-interest. As Rousseau says:
Our first duties are to ourselves; our primary sentiments are centered on
ourselves; all our natural movements relate in the first instance to our preservation
and our well-being. Thus, the first sentiment of justice does not come to us from
the justice we owe but from that which is owed us; and it is again one of the
mistakes of ordinary educations that, speaking at first to children of their duties,
never of their rights. (E 97)
For Rousseau, Cohen’s insistence on the strict reading of the difference principle is but
“again one of the mistakes of ordinary educations that, speaking at first to children of their
duties, never of their rights.” Cohen’s strict reading of the difference principle requires people to
sacrifice their basic interests to advance the interests of others. Of course, it is not always
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unreasonable to expect others to sacrifice their less important interests to advance my important
interests. But it is less clear whether I have a duty to give you ten dollars to make us equal if I
have w dollars and if you have w-20 dollars. If, as Cohen suggests, my giving you ten dollars
enhances your self-respect, then the self-respect that you have is a fragile self-respect that can
easily be broken if I refuse to give you the ten dollars. Self-respect should have a stronger
foundation, one that is not easily broken by people’s intentions. In any case, if the society wellordered by the strict reading of the difference principle does not give me the freedom to keep my
ten dollars, I will hesitate to live in that society. I hesitate to live in that society not because I
value ten dollars, but because I value my freedom to keep my ten dollars. If Cohen’s society
violates this freedom of mine, it violates “the first sentiment of justice.” Thus, Cohen’s society
may not be a just society in which equal basic liberties and rights are secured to affirm the selfrespect of everyone. Rather, some of these liberties may be violated in order to enhance
economic equality on the strict reading of the difference principle. Thus, Cohen’s strict reading
of the difference principle cannot provide the social bases of self-respect. And so it fails to meet
the demand of amour-propre.
Thus Joshua Cohen is correct that Rawls’s difference principle provides greater minimum
value of the liberties than alternative principles. It lends greater support to self-respect than
Cohen’s strict reading of the difference principle because Cohen’s principle fails to meet the
demand of amour-propre. The reason why Cohen’s principle fails to meet the demand of amourpropre is that it assumes an unrealistic moral psychology, according to which, people ought to
sacrifice their basic interests to advance the interests of others.
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3.   Conclusion
In this chapter, I have defended Rawls’s argument that the legitimate social bases of selfrespect are equal basic liberties and rights and their substantive fair value, not socio-economic
status. I have argued that some Chinese nationalists mistakenly ground Chinese people’s selfrespect on the tradition of old China. I have argued that the tradition of old China cannot be the
proper bases of self-respect because “filial piety” and “chastity,” the two core values of the
traditional culture of China, are corrosive of self-respect. I have also argued that equal basic
liberties and rights and their substantive fair value can be the proper bases of self-respect for
Chinese people because they are not foreign to us — they are evident in the writings of Lu Xun
and other Chinese liberals which fuse into the domestic public culture of today’s China.
I have also argued that luck egalitarians mistakenly ground self-respect in economic equality.
I have argued that economic equality based on Cohen’s strict reading of the difference principle
cannot be the proper bases of self-respect because Cohen’s principle fails to provide the social
bases of self-respect. I have argued that the reason why it fails to provide the social bases of selfrespect is that it assumes an unrealistic moral psychology, according to which, people must
sacrifice their freedom to advance the greater economic interests of others.
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